Taras Kuzio

Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?

When the study of transitions moved from Latin America and southern Europe scholars initially assumed that transition in these two regions would be regime-based ‘double transitions’ of democratisation and marketisation. Gradually, it was accepted by scholars that many post-communist states inherited weak states and institutions, thereby adding a third factor to the transition process of stateness. This ‘triple transition’ has been largely accepted as sufficient to understand post-communist transitions and, in some cases, includes nationality questions. This article builds on the ‘triple transition’ by separating the national and stateness questions within its third aspect and argues that although both processes are interlinked they should be nevertheless separated into separate components (democratisation and marketisation are treated separately but are also closely related phenomena). This article argues two points. First, stateness and the nationality question were until recently ignored by scholars because these were not factors in earlier transitions. Secondly, they were ignored because the relationship of nationhood to the civic state is still under-theorised.

Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence

Theories of nationalism and the Soviet Ukrainian context strengths and weaknesses of the national movement Ukraine on the eve of the Gorbachev era Gorbachev, dissent and the new opposition (1987-88) consolidation (1988-89) the birth of mass politics (1989-90) 1990 - Ukrainian elections and the rise of a multi-party system stalemate and the rise of national communism (1990-91) from Soviet to independent Ukraine - the coup and aftermath.

The Opposition's Road to Success

Abstract:The Orange Revolution was the culmination of a political crisis that began exactly four years earlier in November 2000. The Kuchmagate crisis emerged after President Leonid Kuchma was implicated in the murder of a journalist and other abuses of office. The crisis split the national-democratic reformist and centrist-oligarch alliance that had ruled Ukraine throughout the 1990s when state and nation building was prioritized. From 2000 onwards both sides in the alliance sought to unilaterally dominate Ukrainian politics, thereby making the 2004 elections a choice between consolidating democracy or consolidating autocracy. Civil society and the democratic opposition grouped around candidate Viktor Yushchenko unleashed the Orange Revolution in protest at blatant election fraud, defeating a Russian-backed attempt at installing Viktor Yanukovych as Kuchmas successor.

Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine: Defining the ‘Other’

National identity is forged and defined through a dual process of stressing the similarities of the in-group (the ‘Self’) and its differences with those outside the political community (the ‘Others’). The need to define the in-group as different becomes more compelling when the ‘significant Other’ denies the authenticity of the in-group and seeks to subvert its separate existence, as in the Ukrainian–Russian case. This article places the Ukrainian–Russian relationship within discussions of national identity, culture and ‘Otherness’ by examining how Ukraines ruling elites hold no consensus over how to relate to the ‘significant Other’ (Russia). The ruling elites hail from the centrist and centre-right camps and are attempting to create a new national identity outside Eurasia. But, they remain divided over whether Russia is part of Europe and how to return to Europe. The left, meanwhile, see Europe as the ‘Other’ and Russia as the successor state to the former USSR. Therefore, no dominant view of Russia as the ‘Other’ exists in Ukraine and the article discusses the attitudes of the four main political groups (nationalists, the centre-right, centrists and the left) towards Russia and Russians as ‘Others’ within domestic and foreign policy discourse. How Ukraine relates to the Russian ‘Other’ will both affect the domestic nation-building project in Ukraine by helping or hindering the integration of its Russian minority, as well as having repercussions upon how Russia redefines its identity in the post-Soviet era.

National identity and history writing in Ukraine

Think Ukrainian. You are a successor to Princess Olha, Volodymyr the Great and Yaroslav the Wise, who are Equal to the Apostles. History requires from you confidence and trust in Ukraine. Think Ukrainian. Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine. Presidential political advertisement, Channel 5 Television, 28 January 2006 The writing of history has a direct influence upon national identities. This is especially the case when historical writing and interpretation are contested, as they are among the three Eastern Slavic peoples (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians). Where contestation is high, as in the Ukrainian‐Russian relationship since the disintegration of the USSR, the writing and interpretation of history also impact upon their domestic and foreign policies and, most notably, their inter-state relations. Russian elites and the majority of Russians do not look upon Ukraine and Belarus as “foreign” countries. 1 This article focuses on one aspect of the contestation in history writing between Ukraine and Russia; that of the medieval state of Kyiv Rus. The article surveys four different “schools” within Ukraine for the study of the medieval state of Kyiv Rus: Russophile (traditionally known as Russian imperial), Sovietophile (Soviet), Eastern Slavic, and Ukrainophile (Ukrainian National). 2 The use of the term “school” to define different interpretations does not signify a coherent group of historians, but rather a broad set of ideas and interpretations. Two of the four schools are the traditional Russophile and Sovietophile. The former emerged in the Tsarist empire and re-emerged in post-Soviet Russia. It also established a dominant position amongst Western historians of Russia. Sovietophile historiography existed primarily in the Soviet era, although allegiance to it has continued among radical left political parties in post-Soviet states. Within the former USSR, the Sovietophile school of history has only been re-introduced in Belarus by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s since his election in 1994. 3 The Sovietophile school has many aspects that make it similar to the Russophile. It prioritises Russia as the leading Eastern Slavic nation and also accepts that there was a transfer of power after the collapse of Kyiv Rus to Vladimir-Suzdal, Muscovy, and the Russian empire. This translatio of the Kyiv Rus legacy is a core concept of Russophile and Sovietophile historiography. Where the Sovietophile school differed from the Russophile was that it permitted some limited recognition of Ukrainians and Belarusians (who are largely absent from Russophile historiography). In the Sovietophile school, Ukrainians only

Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges: ‘Kuchmagate’ to the Orange Revolution

Leonid Kuchmas second term in office as president of Ukraine (1999–2004) was characterized by the collapse of the national democrat–centrist alliance, the ‘Kuchmagate’ crisis, the rise of a non-communist opposition in the 2002 elections and the election of Viktor Yushchenko in the 2004 elections following the protests that sparked the Orange Revolution. This revolution cannot be understood without reference to these earlier developments that turned out to have been the preparatory work. Furthermore, the deep divisions that have become evident under Yushchenko had their origins in Ukraines regionalism, the ‘Kuchmagate’ crisis, anti-regime protests and different attitudes to dealing with the past.

Geopolitical pluralism in the CIS: The emergence of GUUAM

This article argues that the 12 states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are evenly divided into two groups that are grouped around Russia and Ukraine. The emergence of these two groups, one of which is decidely pro‐Western and pro NATO ‐GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) ‐is a sign of what Brzezinski defined as early as 1994 as geopolitical pluralism has finally emerged in the former USSR. US policy, he argued, should be the consolidation of this geopolitical pluralism within the former Soviet Union as the means by which a non‐imperial, ‘normal’ Russian nation‐state would emerge with whom a ‘genuine American‐Russian partnership’ could be secured. Brzezinski signalled that Ukraine was the key state that prevented the revival of a new Russian empire and therefore aided the consolidation of Russian democracy. One could add that GUUAM, as an organization led by Ukraine, should also therefore play a central role in US and Western policy towards the former USSR.

Radical nationalist parties and movements in contemporary Ukraine before and after independence: The right and its politics, 1989–1994

(1997). Radical nationalist parties and movements in contemporary Ukraine before and after independence: The right and its politics, 1989–1994. Nationalities Papers: Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 211-242.

National identity in independent Ukraine: An identity in transition

The article discusses the legacies of external domination and totalitarianism upon nation building in post‐Soviet Ukraine. Nation building in Ukraine is placed within a historical context showing how many of the features which are found in contemporary Ukraine existed during earlier periods in other countries. The article argues against the view that language should be perceived as the key ‐ if the only ‐ marker of national identity in Ukraine. Instead, it explores other elements of national identity in Ukraine to show how nation building is developing. Russian‐speaking Ukrainians, therefore, should not be regarded as ‘disloyal’ to Ukrainian independence and are not supporters of pro‐Russian separatism, a view often held within the academic community.

Does public opinion matter in Ukraine? The case of foreign policy

Abstract The article critically surveys the impact of domestic public opinion on foreign policy in Ukraine by integrating it within theories of public opinion. Studies of public opinion in Ukraine have not given due weight to the unique characteristics of the Ukrainian ‘public’, which differs greatly from the Western public. Ukrainian society is passive, atomized and its power is ‘submerged’ relative to that of the state. The article argues that public opinion is of minimal importance in the area of foreign policy.