Ted Ruffman

A meta-analytic review of emotion recognition and aging: Implications for neuropsychological models of aging

This meta-analysis of 28 data sets (N=705 older adults, N=962 younger adults) examined age differences in emotion recognition across four modalities: faces, voices, bodies/contexts, and matching of faces to voices. The results indicate that older adults have increased difficulty recognising at least some of the basic emotions (anger, sadness, fear, disgust, surprise, happiness) in each modality, with some emotions (anger and sadness) and some modalities (face-voice matching) creating particular difficulties. The predominant pattern across all emotions and modalities was of age-related decline with the exception that there was a trend for older adults to be better than young adults at recognising disgusted facial expressions. These age-related changes are examined in the context of three theoretical perspectives-positivity effects, general cognitive decline, and more specific neuropsychological change in the social brain. We argue that the pattern of age-related change observed is most consistent with a neuropsychological model of adult aging stemming from changes in frontal and temporal volume, and/or changes in neurotransmitters.

EMOTION RECOGNITION DEFICITS IN THE ELDERLY

In two studies, healthy elderly adults were poor at recognizing certain emotions. In study one, an emotion face morphed to express a new emotion. The elderly were impaired when recognizing anger and sadness, whereas no differences were found between the two age groups in recognizing fear or happiness, or in a task requiring reasoning about non=emotion stimuli. In study two, the elderly were impaired when judging which of two faces was more angry, sad, or fearful, but they were not impaired when judging other emotions or when judging which of two beakers was more full. The elderly were also impaired when matching emotion sounds to angry, sad, and disgusted faces, but not to other emotions and not when matching non-emotion (e.g., machine) sounds to machines. Elderly deficits were independent of performance on a task requiring basic face processing (gender recognition). Overall, the results provide support for an age-related decline in the recognition of some emotions that is independent of changes in perceptual abilities, processing speed, fluid IQ, basic face processing abilities, and reasoning- about non-face stimuli. Recognition of emotion stimuli might be mediated by regions of the brain that are independent from those associated with a more general cognitive decline

How Parenting Style Affects False Belief Understanding

This study investigated whether mothers facilitate false belief understanding, and if so, what strategies are particularly relevant. The mothers of 64 3- and 4-year-olds were given questionnaires eliciting information about mothers education, mothers occupation, number of younger and older siblings, the time the child spends with mother, and about how mothers deal with five disciplinary situations with their child. Three variables were positively correlated with belief understanding: age, number of older siblings, and number of times mothers said they would respond to the disciplinary situations by asking the child to reflect on the victims feelings (How Feel responses). These three variables had an independent effect on belief understanding because each was significant after accounting for the influence due to the other two variables. In contrast, there was no significant positive relation between belief understanding and mothers who engaged their child in general discussion and exploration of the disciplinary issues, or who simply reprimanded the child without discussing the situation. The effects for number of older siblings and How Feel responses remained even after the influence due to the childs age, verbal mental age, time spent with the mother, and number of younger siblings was accounted for. The results are consistent with recent research showing that parent-child relations may be important for theory of mind understanding. More importantly, they provide insight into a specific strategy by which parents may help children learn about mental states.

How language relates to belief, desire, and emotion understanding

Abstract Two experiments examined syntax and semantics as correlates of theory-of-mind (ToM). In Experiment 1 children’s language was examined at 3 years of age in relation to ToM at 3, 3.5, 4, and 5.5 years. Semantics predicted unique variance in later belief understanding but not desire understanding. Syntax did not explain unique variance in belief or desire. In Experiment 2 two measures of syntax and a measure of semantics were used with 65 3–5-year-olds. The syntax measures tested children’s understanding of word order and embedded clauses. They were related to false belief, but contrary to some predictions, were also related to emotion recognition. Performance on language control tasks with low syntactic demands correlated equally well with false belief. In both experiments performance on the syntax and semantics tasks was highly inter-correlated. We argue that ToM is related to general language ability rather than syntax or semantics per se.

How language does (and does not) relate to theory of mind: A longitudinal study of syntax, semantics, working memory and false belief

Forty-four children (mean 3.8 years) were given three false belief, a working memory, and four language tasks (each designed to tap a different aspect of syntax or semantics), and were tested again 6 months later. Once the range of scores in the language and false belief tasks were equated, there was a bidirectional relation between language and theory of mind. There was no evidence for syntax playing a unique role in the contribution of language to theory of mind. No one measure of syntax or semantics was more likely than any other to predict later false belief. Nor was false belief related more to one aspect of later language (syntax vs. semantics) than another. Our data, taken with other findings, are consistent with the idea that both syntax and semantics contribute to false belief understanding. Working memory did not mediate the relation between language and theory of mind, nor did it facilitate later false belief.

Iodine supplementation improves cognition in mildly iodine-deficient children

BACKGROUND The effects of severe iodine deficiency during critical periods of brain development are well documented. There is little known about the consequences of milder forms of iodine deficiency on neurodevelopment. OBJECTIVE The objective was to determine whether supplementing mildly iodine-deficient children with iodine improves cognition. DESIGN A randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind trial was conducted in 184 children aged 10-13 y in Dunedin, New Zealand. Children were randomly assigned to receive a daily tablet containing either 150 microg I or placebo for 28 wk. Biochemical, anthropometric, and dietary data were collected from each child at baseline and after 28 wk. Cognitive performance was assessed through 4 subtests from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children. RESULTS At baseline, children were mildly iodine deficient [median urinary iodine concentration (UIC): 63 microg/L; thyroglobulin concentration: 16.4 microg/L]. After 28 wk, iodine status improved in the supplemented group (UIC: 145 microg/L; thyroglobulin: 8.5 microg/L), whereas the placebo group remained iodine deficient (UIC: 81 microg/L; thyroglobulin: 11.6 microg/L). Iodine supplementation significantly improved scores for 2 of the 4 cognitive subtests [picture concepts (P = 0.023) and matrix reasoning (P = 0.040)] but not for letter-number sequencing (P = 0.480) or symbol search (P = 0.608). The overall cognitive score of the iodine-supplemented group was 0.19 SDs higher than that of the placebo group (P = 0.011). CONCLUSIONS Iodine supplementation improved perceptual reasoning in mildly iodine-deficient children and suggests that mild iodine deficiency could prevent children from attaining their full intellectual potential. The trial was registered with the Australia New Zealand Clinical Trials Register as ACTRN12608000222347.

Social understanding: how does it fare with advancing years?

Until recently, theory of mind abilities have received little attention beyond the childhood years. However, pioneering work carried out by Happé, Winner, and Brownell (1998) has opened the doors on a new and exciting area of research that examines theory of mind abilities in later years. Happé et al. reported that theory of mind performance was superior in the elderly. Yet, in direct contrast to these findings, Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, and Taylor (2002) report a decline in theory of mind abilities with advancing years. We used Happé et al.s task and, like Maylor et al., found a decline in theory of mind abilities in the elderly. Yet this deficit was related to a decline in fluid abilities. We then examined whether deficits in social understanding in the elderly could also be independent of fluid abilities. We used two new tasks; identifying emotions from still photos and identifying emotions and cognitions from video clips. Again we found a decline in social understanding in the elderly, and in this case, the decline was independent of changes in fluid abilities.

Do infants really understand false belief

In his Research Focus ([1] this issue) Leslie argues that the idea of an innate theory of mind module (ToMM) has for too long been considered absurd. We do not consider it absurd but simply think current data can be explained equally well by means of an interaction between genetic endowment and the environment, and that exploration of this interaction should not be curtailed by a priori restrictions due to genetic over-specification.

Is there a gender difference in false belief development

The contribution of childrens social environment to their acquisition of theory of mind skills, combined with the well documented advantage for girls in mental state talk with siblings, peers and mothers, might lead to a female advantage on false belief tasks. We present a post-hoc analysis of large datasets from two independent laboratories. A slight advantage for girls on false belief task performance was found in both datasets and was only apparent in younger but not older children. Language ability could be controlled for only in a smaller subsample of one dataset and cannot be ruled out as a potential mediator of this effect. However, if there is an age-specific advantage for girls in false belief acquisition it is a weak effect only.

What mothers say and what they do: The relation between parenting, theory of mind, language and conflict/cooperation

We used a longitudinal study with 55 middle- and upper middle-class children to investigate the relation between early mother characteristics (e.g. mental state talk, general parenting style) and later child characteristics (e.g. theory of mind, conflict/cooperation). Children were tested once when they were around 3 years and then again around 4 years. At each time point, children were given a task in which mothers helped the child and a friend draw items with a drawing toy. We examined 2 measures of child theory of mind (task performance and mental state talk), and 4 measures of conflict/cooperation. Early mother mental state talk was uniquely related to both later theory of mind measures and 2 of 4 later conflict/cooperation measures. Mother parenting style (warmth) was uniquely related only to 1 later child conflict/cooperation measure. Child theory of mind was not related to any child conflict/cooperation measures. Thus, it seems to be only what mothers say (their mental state talk) that relates to child theory of mind, and both what they say and what they do (their warmth) that relates to child conflict/cooperation.