Teenie Matlock

Fictive motion as cognitive simulation.

Sentences such as The road runs through the valley and The mountain range goes from Canada to Mexico include a motion verb but express no explicit motion or state change. It is argued that these sentences involve fictive motion, an implicit type of motion. But do people trying to understand these sentences mentally simulate motion? This question was addressed in four experiments. In each, participants read a story about travel—for instance, fast versus slow, short versus long distance, and easy versus difficult terrain—and then made a timed decision about a fictive motion sentence. Overall, latencies were shorter after they had read about fast travel, short distances, and easy terrains. Critically, the effect did not arise with nonfictive motion target sentences (e.g., The road is in the valley), as was demonstrated in three control studies. The results suggest that the processing of fictive motion includes mental simulation.

Spatial and Linguistic Aspects of Visual Imagery in Sentence Comprehension.

There is mounting evidence that language comprehension involves the activation of mental imagery of the content of utterances (Barsalou, 1999; Bergen, Chang, & Narayan, 2004; Bergen, Narayan, & Feldman, 2003; Narayan, Bergen, & Weinberg, 2004; Richardson, Spivey, McRae, & Barsalou, 2003; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002). This imagery can have motor or perceptual content. Three main questions about the process remain under-explored, however. First, are lexical associations with perception or motion sufficient to yield mental simulation, or is the integration of lexical semantics into larger structures, like sentences, necessary? Second, what linguistic elements (e.g., verbs, nouns, etc.) trigger mental simulations? Third, how detailed are the visual simulations that are performed? A series of behavioral experiments address these questions, using a visual object categorization task to investigate whether up- or down-related language selectively interferes with visual processing in the same part of the visual field (following Richardson et al., 2003). The results demonstrate that either subject nouns or main verbs can trigger visual imagery, but only when used in literal sentences about real space-metaphorical language does not yield significant effects-which implies that it is the comprehension of the sentence as a whole and not simply lexical associations that yields imagery effects. These studies also show that the evoked imagery contains detail as to the part of the visual field where the described scene would take place.

On the Experiential Link Between Spatial and Temporal Language

How do we understand time and other entities we can neither touch nor see? One possibility is that we tap into our concrete, experiential knowledge, including our understanding of physical space and motion, to make sense of abstract domains such as time. To examine how pervasive an aspect of cognition this is, we investigated whether thought about a nonliteral type of motion called fictive motion (FM; as in The road runs along the coast) can influence thought about time. Our results suggest that FM uses the same structures evoked in understanding literal motion, and that these literal aspects of FM influence temporal reasoning.

Abstract motion is no longer abstract

Abstract Dynamic conceptualization is a fundamental notion in cognitive linguistics. Abstract motion is one type of dynamic conceptualization. It is said to structure descriptions of static scenes such as ‘The mountain range goes from Mexico to Canada’, and in doing so, invokes a subjective sense of motion or state change. In recent years, a growing body of experimental research supports this claim. However, additional work is needed to understand the dynamics of abstract motion and the extent to which it generalizes. This paper provides some background on abstract motion and reports two new experiments that investigate two unexplored types of abstract motion, including visual paths and pattern paths. Together, the results indicate that abstract motion plays a central role in language use and understanding.

Metaphor and the Space Structuring Model

We propose an account of metaphor comprehension based on conceptual blending theory. We review data from on-line processing measures that support predictions of conceptual blending theory and report results of an off-line feature listing study that assessed how different sorts of contexts alter the information activated by a given word. Participants generated features for words used in the null context, sentences that promoted a literal reading of the target word, sentences that promoted a metaphorical reading, and sentences that required literal mapping. In literal mapping, the literal sense of the word was used in a way that prompts the reader to blend it with structure from a different domain. Results revealed some overlap in the features generated in each of the 4 contexts, but that some proportion of the features listed for words in literal, literal-mapping, and metaphoric-sentence contexts were unique and context specific.

The conceptual structure of information space

In this chapter we examine how people think about the information space of the World Wide Web. We provide empirical evidence collected in interviews with beginning and experienced web users to show that much of peoples conceptual experience of the web is metaphorical and understood through the process of conceptual integration. We argue that designers of tools for navigation and collaboration in information space should consider how people experience web space, including the natural tendency to metaphorically construe information space in terms of physical space.

Of magnitudes and metaphors: explaining cognitive interactions between space, time, and number.

Space, time, and number are fundamental to how we act within and reason about the world. These three experiential domains are systematically intertwined in behavior, language, and the brain. Two main theories have attempted to account for cross-domain interactions. A Theory of Magnitude (ATOM) posits a domain-general magnitude system. Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) maintains that cross-domain interactions are manifestations of asymmetric mappings that use representations of space to structure the domains of number and time. These theories are often viewed as competing accounts. We propose instead that ATOM and CMT are complementary, each illuminating different aspects of cross-domain interactions. We argue that simple representations of magnitude cannot, on their own, account for the rich, complex interactions between space, time and number described by CMT. On the other hand, ATOM is better at accounting for low-level and language-independent associations that arise early in ontogeny. We conclude by discussing how magnitudes and metaphors are both needed to understand our neural and cognitive web of space, time and number.

Categorization in the wild

In studying categorization, cognitive science has focused primarily on cultural categorization, ignoring individual and institutional categorization. Because recent technological developments have made individual and institutional classification systems much more available and powerful, our understanding of the cognitive and social mechanisms that produce these systems is increasingly important. Furthermore, key aspects of categorization that have received little previous attention emerge from considering diverse types of categorization together, such as the social factors that create stability in classification systems, and the interoperability that shared conceptual systems establish between agents. Finally, the profound impact of recent technological developments on classification systems indicates that basic categorization mechanisms are highly adaptive, producing new classification systems as the situations in which they operate change.

Mental number space in three dimensions.

A large number of experimental findings from neuroscience and experimental psychology demonstrated interactions between spatial cognition and numerical cognition. In particular, many researchers posited a horizontal mental number line, where small numbers are thought of as being to the left of larger numbers. This review synthesizes work on the mental association between space and number, indicating the existence of multiple spatial mappings: recent research has found associations between number and vertical space, as well as associations between number and near/far space. We discuss number space in three dimensions with an eye on potential origins of the different number mappings, and how these number mappings fit in with our current knowledge of brain organization and brain-culture interactions. We derive novel predictions and show how this research fits into a general view of cognition as embodied, grounded and situated.

Even Abstract Motion Influences the Understanding of Time

Many metaphor theorists argue that our mental experience of time is grounded in our understanding of space, including motion through space. Results from recent experiments – in which people think about motion, which in turn influences their thinking about time – support this position. Still, many questions remain about the nature of the metaphorical connection between time and space. Can the mere suggestion of motion influence how people reason about time, and if so, when and how? Three experiments investigated how thinking about “abstract” motion through sequences of numbers or letters would influence reasoning about time. Our results extend earlier psychological work on the link between time and space by showing that even motion in non-physical domains can influence temporal reasoning. The results provide further evidence that metaphorical understanding is grounded in our everyday physical and conceptual experience.