Teresa A. John

Universal banking and firm risk-taking☆

Abstract This paper analyzes the welfare implications of banks taking equity stakes in firms under conditions of imperfect information and moral hazard. Two cases of bank control over investment decisions are analyzed. In the first, the bank does not control the investment decisions of the firm. Here, the investment efficiency is higher and bank risk is lower for an optimal positive level of bank equity holdings. However, in the case when the bank has veto power over investment proposals by the firm, there is a trade off between increased investment efficiency and increased bank risk.

Risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions: A new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform

Abstract We characterize the risk-shifting incentives of a depository institution as arising fundamentally from the existence of limited liability and the associated convex payoff to equity-holders. This risk incentive feature is unchanged by deposits being insured, and hence excessive risk-taking by depository institutions is not solely attributable to the flat rate insurance premium. Consequently, the incentive problem cannot be resolved through a risk-based insurance premium, contrary to the prevailing view. We propose a solution that eliminates risk-shifting through an optimal tax structure and specify a corresponding insurance premium that is revenue neutral from the social planners (regulators) standpoint. The solution is derived in the context of a social objective function that trades off the benefits of liquidity services by banks and the unique informational role of bank loans with the costs of investment distortions engendered by risk-shifting.

Optimality of project financing: Theory and empirical implications in finance and accounting

During the 1980s a fairly active market developed in the private placement of limited recourse project financing. Although this form of financing is gaining in importance, we know very little about it. This article presents a theoretical analysis of project financing. In the model of the firm presented, outstanding risky debt gives rise to agency costs of underinvestment that are offset by the benefit of debt-related tax shields. The tradeoff specifies the optimal leverage for a firm. Within this framework, we consider the optimality of financing a new project with a nonrecourse project financing arrangement. We derive implications for 1) the characteristics of a new venture that will be project financed, 2) the wealth gains from project financing over that of financing with straight debt, and 3) the optimal allocation of debt across the different assets (the sponsor firm vs. the new venture). It is shown that a project financing arrangement, where the debt is optimally allocated to the sponsor firm and the new venture, increases value by reducing agency costs and increasing the value of tax shields (compared to the case of straight debt financing). The optimal allocation of debt in project financing involves assigning to the sponsor firm and the new venture debt levels equal to their individual optimal capital structures. Several testable empirical implications in finance and accounting are developed.

The Effects of Downsizing on Operating Performance

We examine the performance of 118 firms that downsized between 1989–1993. We find that downsizing firms experience declines in operating performance prior to the downsizing announcement. Operating performance improves significantly following the downsizing. These firms are able to reduce the cost of sales, labor cost, capital expenditures and R&D expenditures. We also find that firms that perform poorly in their industries prior to the downsizing and have increases in assets following the downsizing have larger improvements in performance. There is some evidence that the improvements are greater for firms that increase their focus.

Accounting Data and Asset Valuation: Theory

Firms and divisions which are not traded on organized exchanges are often valued without the benefit of market data. Accounting data is used instead. One suggested approach is to use accounting beta as a proxy for market return beta. In the context of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, we provide a theoretical justification for such a procedure. Our results provide a set of sufficient conditions so that return betas and accounting betas are equal. Our results also suggest a general methodology for evaluating projects and untraded firms using accounting data. The method underlying the derivation here is very general and can be applied in deriving testable restrictions between fundamentals, broader in context than that of accounting variables.

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND SHAREHOLDER VOTING ON BOARD STRUCTURE CHANGES

We examine voting outcomes on shareholder governance proposals that seek annual elections for all the directors on the corporate board. We relate these voting outcomes to different ownership structure characteristics and a series of variables that are publicly available. The pattern of support indicates that proposals are generally successful when they are supported by large activist groups and when institutions hold a significant fraction of shares outstanding. Our evidence casts some doubt on the efficacy of the Rule 14A-8 mechanism, which limits the amount of information that can be provided to shareholders as part of the proposal.

Corporate Taxes, Choice among Accounting Alternatives, and Information Content of Earnings

A model is developed to study managerial strategies vis-à-vis choice of accounting alternatives and earnings reports where the manager is better informed than the market about firm prospects. How corporate taxation affects these strategies is a focal aspect of this study. In the information equilibrium identified, managers of firms with higher future cash flows choose income-increasing accounting alternatives and report higher earnings in spite of the potential corporate tax consequences. The optimal earnings reports are shown to involve some intertemporal smoothing. The announcement effects and the comparative statics properties derived provide a rich menu of testable implications.