Tero Piiroinen

Toward Pragmatist Methodological Relationalism From Philosophizing Sociology to Sociologizing Philosophy

In this article, relationalist approaches to social sciences are analyzed in terms of a conceptual distinction between “philosophizing sociology” and “sociologizing philosophy.” These mark two different attitudes toward philosophical metaphysics and ontological commitments. The authors’ own pragmatist methodological relationalism of Deweyan origin is compared with ontologically committed realist approaches, as well as with Bourdieuan methodological relationalism. It is argued that pragmatist philosophy of social sciences is an appropriate tool for assisting social scientists in their methodological work, especially as regards problem-driven case studies.

For “Central Conflation” A Critique of Archerian Dualism

Taking a side in the debate over ontological emergentism in social theory, this article defends an outlook that Margaret S. Archer has dubbed “central conflation”: an antidualistic position appreciating the interdependency of agency and structure, individuals and society. This has been a popular outlook in recent years, advocated broadly by such theorists as Pierre Bourdieu, Randall Collins, and Anthony Giddens. However, antidualism has been challenged by those who believe the key to success in social science lies in level-ontological emergentism. Archer’s own morphogenetic theory is an explicitly dualist version of that approach. I answer Archer’s arguments for emergentism, in so doing clearing a path for the even fuller acceptance of antidualism by theorists.

Human Transaction Mechanisms in Evolutionary Niches—a Methodological Relationalist Standpoint

There is a great variety of relationalisms on offer for social scientists these days (see, e.g., Archer, 1995; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Depelteau, 2008; Emirbayer, 1997; Fuchs, 2001; Kivinen and Piiroinen, 2006; Powell, 2007; Tilly, 2001). Some of the most interesting ones of them share an anti-dualistic vein of thought that can be traced back to John Dewey (e.g., [1920] 1988a, pp. 187–198; [1925–1927] 1988c, pp. 355–356) and Norbert Elias (e.g., 1978, pp. 14–16, pp. 113 ff., 2000, pp. 468 ff.), where society and individuals are not juxtaposed as fixed, separate sui generis entities, but are rather conceived as parts or aspects of one and the same relational process of social life.1 Ontological or metaphysical relationalisms claim that reality is ultimately relational no matter how we might find it best to describe it, whereas non-metaphysical versions of relationalism stick to methodological or instrumentalist tools.

Two viewpoints on the challenges of ICT in education: knowledge-building theory vs. a pragmatist conception of learning in social action

Abstract The paper contrasts two different approaches to the educational challenges of the ubiquitous, rapidly developing information and communication technologies (ICT). The first is the constructivist ‘knowledge building’ theory spearheaded by Carl Bereiter and Marlene Scardamalia and recently further developed by Kai Hakkarainen and Sami Paavola; the second is a pragmatist standpoint drawing in particular from John Dewey’s ideas about learning as a natural part of human social actions and transactions. The knowledge builders have set their approach out as a suitable answer to the challenges of the present-day, ICT-characterised ‘Knowledge Age’. But here it is argued that a pragmatist approach can be advanced that avoids the over-intellectualisation of education characteristic of knowledge builders and thereby offers a viable alternative for improving present-day educational practices in ways that promote appropriate utilisation of ICT in schools in particular.

Pragmatist Methodological Relationalism in Sociological Understanding of Evolving Human Culture

Among the most significant intellectual contributions made by the classic of pragmatism John Dewey are his presentation of human culture as evolving organism–environment transactions and the related philosophies of community and education. Dewey’s philosophy and methodology are relational all the way down, and without a doubt he can be seen as an eminent pioneer of relational social science. However, although relationalist social theorists today are to some extent drawing on Dewey’s ideas, all too few contemporary social scientists seem aware of Dewey’s role in paving the way for the Darwinian theory of evolution in social sciences. This may partly be explained by the long-standing mistrust of evolutionary theory among social scientists—due to the notoriety of ‘Social Darwinism’, ‘sociobiology’, and any simplistic version of ‘evolutionary psychology’. But unlike crude applications of evolutionary theory, Dewey’s anti-nativist, anti-individualist naturalism of Darwinian origin opens up interesting viewpoints on social life, especially on cultural learning as a cornerstone of modern humanity. In this chapter, methodological relationalism—as opposed to ontological relationalism—brings forth evolution-historically enlightened conceptual tools for social scientific work. The proposed solution revolves in particular around the evolution-theoretically topical notion of ‘niche construction’—a notion which Dewey’s thinking already anticipated.

A meaning holistic (dis)solution of subject–object dualism – its implications for the human sciences

This article presents and analyses a social-practice contextualist version of meaning holism, whose main root lies in American pragmatism. Proposing that beliefs depend on systems of language-use in social practices, which involve communities of people and worldly objects, such meaning holism effectively breaks down the Enlightenment tradition’s philosophical subject–object dualism (and scepticism). It also opens the human mind up for empirical research – in a ‘sociologizing’, ‘anthropologizing’ and ‘historicizing’ vein. The article discusses the implications of this approach for the human sciences, for instance certain parallel developments in anthropology and archaeology.