Terra Lawson-Remer

Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment Index: Country Scores and Rankings

Building on a previously proposed methodology for an index of economic and social rights fulfillment, this article presents country scores and rankings based on the Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment Index (ESRF Index). Unlike socioeconomic indicators, which are often used as proxies for the extent to which rights-holders enjoy economic and social rights, the ESRF Index incorporates the perspective of the duty-bearer as well as the rights-holder and takes into account the principle of progressive realization. The resulting scores and rankings provide important new information that complements other measures of economic and social rights fulfillment. The ESRF Index is an important conceptual and methodological breakthrough; although it still does not capture all key human rights principles, such as the rights to participation, nondiscrimination, and equality. The article also analyzes the results of the global ranking and outlines some priorities for further research.

Security of Property Rights for Whom

Recent research regarding property rights and economic development often treats property rights security in a country as homogeneous, although protecting the private entitlements of some can entail preventing others from claiming and controlling those same resources. This one-dimensional conception of property rights ignores the significant variation in the risk of expropriation faced by different groups in the same country. Using a new set of indicators that measures the property insecurity of ethnocultural minorities, this study finds that in many countries members of marginalized groups face significantly higher property insecurity than foreign investors and domestic elites, and that although secure property rights for elites and foreign investors may be positively related to long-run development, property rights for marginalized groups are not.

Property Rights, Growth, and Conflict

Whose property rights are secure and insecure matters fundamentally for the political and economic implications of expropriation risk. Using a new set of indicators that measure the property insecurity of ethno-cultural minority groups, this article demonstrates that property insecurity of ethno-cultural minorities does not reduce long-run growth; that the severity of property insecurity for the worst-off group in a country is strongly related to the onset of armed conflict; and, controlling for civil war, property insecurity for ethno-cultural minorities is actually associated with higher growth rates. Economic growth can occur when the property rights of elites are secure but marginalized minorities face high a risk of expropriation, as land may be reallocated into the hands of investors with skills and access to capital. However, the potentially growth enhancing effect of forced displacement and resettlement is reduced because the property insecurity of minorities also increases the likelihood of armed conflict.

Do Stronger Collective Property Rights Increase Household Income? Evidence from a Field Study in Fiji

A diverse body of recent research identifies collective ownership as a potentially better institution for common pool resource governance under some conditions than either private or state ownership. Extensive previous work analyzes the structure and functioning of successful collective ownership institutions, but limited research examines the impact of stronger collective ownership rights on household income. Exploiting a natural experiment – in which some villages were exogenously included in a provincial level initiative to strengthen collective ownership rights over fisheries, while villages in a neighboring province were excluded – this article uses a unique dataset to examine the impact of collective fisheries ownership on household income and food consumption. Strengthening collective ownership rights improves household consumption of marine resources, but does not increase monetary income. Income improvements that at first appear due to stronger collective ownership institutions are instead a byproduct NGO engagement.