Terrence Lyons

Conflict-generated diasporas and transnational politics in Ethiopia

Diaspora groups link processes of globalisation and transnational migration to homeland politics and conflicts. In some cases, diaspora groups produced by a specific set of traumatic memories create ‘conflict-generated diasporas’ that sustain and often amplify their strong sense of symbolic attachment to the homeland. Conflict-generated diasporas tend to be less willing to compromise and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protractedness of homeland conflicts. Economists have focused on the links between remittances and civil war. Beyond resources, however, conflict-generated diasporas frequently have a prominent role in framing conflict issues and defining what is politically acceptable. Diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by traumatic memories tend to compromise less and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protracted nature of conflicts. The 2005 political opening and subsequent crackdown in Ethiopia illustrates how this diaspora shaped recent political developments and points to broader patterns of transnational linkages among diasporas and homeland political processes.

Post-conflict elections and the process of demilitarizing politics: the role of electoral administration

Post-conflict elections are called upon to advance the distinct processes of both war termination and democratization. This article examines the patterns in seven cases where elections served as the final step to implement a peace agreement following a period of civil war. Such elections are shaped in part by the legacy of fear and insecurity that persists in the immediate aftermath of a protracted internal conflict. Comparative analysis suggests that interim regimes in general, and electoral administration in particular, based on joint problem solving and consultation may ‘demilitarize politics’ and help transform the institutions of war into institutions capable of sustaining peace and democratization. In Mozambique, El Salvador and, to an extent, Cambodia, processes to demilitarize politics prior to elections created a context that allowed the elections to advance both peace and democratization. In the other cases, politics remained highly militarized at the time of the vote, leading either to renewed conflict (Angola) or the electoral ratification of the militarized institutions of the civil war (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Tajikistan). Interim electoral commissions provide an important opportunity to demilitarize politics by building consultative mechanisms and norms that increase confidence in the peace process and the legitimacy of the post-conflict elections.

Closing the Transition: the May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian transition, that began with the overthrow of military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in May 1991, formally ended with the swearing in of the newly elected Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia in August 1995. The intervening four years were a contentious time of clashes among rival political forces to determine the rules under which the transition would be conducted and hence which forces would be favoured. The first act of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) after deposing Mengistu was to convene a National Conference and establish a Council of Representatives that initially included a wide array of political groups. The EPRDF led throughout this transitional period and capitalised on its commanding position to consolidate its power. The party dominated the political landscape by virtue of its military power, effective organisation and leadership, and control of the agenda and rules of competition. It structured the transition around new ethnically defined regions, a constitution that emphasised self-determination, and a series of largely uncontested elections.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa

The Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute is embedded within a set of domestic political conflicts in each state, is linked further through proxy conflicts to instability in Somalia and the Ogaden, and is skewed additionally by the application of Washingtons global counter-terrorism policies to the region. Each of these arenas of contention has its own history, issues, actors and dynamic; however, each is also distorted by processes of conflict escalation and de-escalation in the other arenas. The intermeshing of domestic insecurities, interstate antagonisms, and global policies create regional ‘security complexes’ in which the security of each actor is intrinsically linked to the others and cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. Prospects for both the escalation and resolution of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict are linked to domestic political processes (such as increasing authoritarianism), regional dynamics (such as local rivalries played out in Somalia) and international policies (such as US counter-terrorism policies).

From victorious rebels to strong authoritarian parties: prospects for post-war democratization

ABSTRACT In a number of cases, rebel movements that won civil wars transformed into powerful authoritarian political parties that dominated post-war politics. Parties whose origins are as victorious insurgent groups have different legacies and hence different institutional structures and patterns of behaviour than those that originated in breakaway factions of ruling parties, labour unions, non-violent social movements, or identity groups. Unlike classic definitions of political parties, post-rebel parties are not created around the need to win elections but rather as military organizations focused on winning an armed struggle. Key attributes of victorious rebel movements, such as cohesive leadership, discipline, hierarchy, and patterns of military administration of liberated territory, shape post-insurgent political parties and help explain why post-insurgent parties are often strong and authoritarian. This article seeks to identify the mechanisms that link rebel victory in three East African countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda) to post-war authoritarian rule. These processes suggest that how a civil war ends changes the potential for post-war democratization.

The 100% Election

Abstract:Ethiopia’s 2015 elections confirm that the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)—having won 100 percent of parliamentary seats—has chosen to entrench an authoritarian system. We argue that this total election victory was meant as a signal to party cadres that defection is not tolerated. Our analysis of intra-regime dynamics shows how the EPRDF has responded to the death of Meles Zenawi through greater reliance on trusted party stalwarts for high-level posts. We conclude that growing demands from lower-level party cadres threaten to transform the ruling party from a disciplined national organization into a patronage-based alliance of ethnic factions.

Victorious rebels and postwar politics

Abstract Why do victorious rebels sometimes form powerful postwar political parties and other times collapse into weak, factionalized organizations? This paper examines cases of rebel victories in civil wars in Africa and traces the links between war duration, the extent of external intervention, and whether or not the war was fought in a compact area with the nature of the postwar political parties. It argues that protracted wars in confined territory with little external assistance have different organizational legacies than quick wars fought over expansive territory with significant international involvement. Four cases – Uganda, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Libya – are used to illustrate the argument.

Successful Peace Implementation: Plans and Processes

Abstract All peace agreements are flawed, to varying degrees, because mistrustful parties sign under pressure to end humanitarian suffering. They generally include what they can, leave out what cannot be settled, and gloss over differences in an effort to stop the killing. The peace implementation process, however, sometimes provides opportunities to strengthen weak agreements so that the peace process is strengthened from its initial, imperfect state. This article argues that peace implementation is more likely to lead to sustained peace if the process is flexible and prioritises the demilitarisation of politics. Implementation that follows a strict blueprint and prioritises making deadlines and milestones articulated in the agreement are likely to freeze in place the mal-distribution of power at the time the fighting stopped and consequently make sustainable peace more difficult.

African Foreign Policies: Power and Process@@@Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory

mation that does not lead much beyond the kind of statement already mentioned that concludes the book. Drawing from newspaper reports without cross-references poses the problem of conflicting information as well. Thus the author says in one place that unemployment is officially 15 percent but actually is as high as 40 percent (2), in another that it is 33 percent, and in still another that it ranges between 12.3 and 29.8 percent (72). Or, he says the World Economic Forum ranked South Africa in competitiveness as 52nd (51) and 42nd (164). In each case he cites a different newspaper as his source. There are many important topics addressed and there is much detail presented by the author for South Africa in the 1994—99 period. Most Africanists would agree with his hopes that South Africa succeed in its effort to build a nonracial, prosperous society. Nevertheless, Arnolds contribution to our understanding of where South Africa is headed is limited by his penchant for generalizing from selected newspaper sources, by poor organization both within and among chapters, by patronizing views, and by simplistic conclusions. Dean E. McHenry Jr. Claremont Graduate University Claremont, California