Terry D. Warfield

Equity Incentives and Earnings Management Evidence from the Banking Industry

We examine the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the banking industry. By focusing on this regulated industry and using industry-specific earnings management proxies, we provide evidence on the impact of regulation on earnings management arising from chief executive officers’ equity incentives. We find that bank managers with high equity incentives are more likely to manage earnings, but only when capital ratios are closer to the minimums required by regulators. This finding indicates that, in the banking industry, potential regulatory intervention induces, rather than mitigates, earnings management arising from equity incentives.

The Effects of Presentation Salience and Measurement Subjectivity on Nonprofessional Investors’ Fair Value Judgments

Fair value estimates reported in the financial statements differ in the subjectivity with which the estimates are measured. Mandated supplemental disclosures are intended to enable users to assess the nature of the inputs used to develop the fair value measurements, including their relative reliability, although prior research suggests some investors may have difficulty doing so. We draw on information processing research to predict and find that isolating fair value information in a separate column on the face of the income statement facilitates nonprofessional investors’ ability to incorporate into their perceived reliability and P/E judgments not only the fair value estimates, but also the disclosed measurement differences that underlie those estimates. Our results have implications for standard setters and researchers concerned with the effects of financial statement presentation on nonprofessional investors. Namely, we demonstrate how income statement presentation can improve reliance on mandated supplemental disclosures, thereby resulting in greater financial statement transparency.

The Market Perception of Corporate Claims

Abstract This paper examines the economic substance of a broad range of securities by investigating their association with systematic risk and prices. The analysis is motivated by continuing security innovation and its impact on hybrid security reporting. Based on a sample of 2,617 firms that reported minority interests or preferred stock during 1993–1997, the results indicate that redeemable preferred securities (including trust preferred stock) are not viewed by the market as either debt or equity, suggesting dichotomous security classification may lack representational faithfulness. Inconsistent with their treatment in the financial statements, non-redeemable preferred stock and minority interests are viewed as debt-like and equity-like respectively. Additional analyses document that the systematic risk and pricing results vary based on firm size, performance, and bond rating.