Terry Terriff

The governance of European security

This article seeks to develop a concept of ‘security governance’ in the context of post-Cold War Europe. The validity of a governance approach lies in its ability to locate some of the distinctive ways in which European security has been coordinated, managed and regulated. Based on an examination of the way governance is utilised in other political fields of political analysis, the article identifies the concept of security governance as involving the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes. Three issues are examined to demonstrate the utility of the concept of security governance for understanding security in post-Cold War Europe: the transformation of NATO, the Europeanisation of security accomplished through EU-led initiatives and, finally, the resultant dynamic relationship between forms of exclusion and inclusion in governance.

NATO's Triple Challenge

NATOs future is again the subject of speculation and debate despite its having fought a recent and apparently successful war in Kosovo. This article proposes that there are three aspects to this challenge. First, NATO is facing a series of dilemmas in its relations with non-members: how should it manage relations with Russia, and with the applicants for membership? The authors argue that NATO should seek to develop a consolidationist posture. The second challenge is that of developing an EU–NATO partnership in the light of the Helsinki Headline Goals. This, it is proposed, can be developed through a division of labour. The third task, that of military restructuring, is overshadowed by the complexities of processing a working European military structure. In conclusion, the authors suggest that a strategy for the alliance, a key component of the Cold War, but subsequently lost, can be refashioned from the above elements.

Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational Culture in the US Marine Corps

Taylor and Francis Ltd FDEF_A_205517.sgm 10.1080/14702430601056139 Defence Studies 470-2436 (pr nt)/1743-9698 (online) Original Article 2 06 & F ancis 60 00June 2006 erryT rriff .R.Terriff@bham.ac.uk Over the past decade and half European and North American military organizations have been confronted with an ongoing the need to adjust to the post-Cold War security environment. A problem military organizations confront is that the ending of the Cold War did not result in a new strategic and military environment that was constant, rather it has produced a very dynamic environment in which the character of threats and dangers, and indeed the character of warfare, is subject to change. This state of relentless change is not progressive in nature, instead the change is nonlinear, and interactive, creating a security and military environment that is characterized by increasing complexity. 1

The common European security and defence policy and the ‘third‐country’ issue

The Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) of the European Union (EU) was launched in 1999 and has been perceived as a landmark step toward European security cooperation, particularly in the field of crisis management. Still in its early stages, some difficult issues have become apparent. Of these, the so‐called ‘third‐country’ issue may prove to be among the most significant. This problem refers to the necessity of associating states outside the EU with CESDP. In this regard, three states stand out — the United States, Turkey and Russia — and this article considers their concerns and the European response in detail. This is prefaced by a general overview of how the third‐country problem emerged and what the EU has done to address it. It concludes by suggesting that third‐country considerations could well determine where and how EU‐led missions operating under the auspices of CESDP are deployed.

NATO military transformation: challenges and opportunities for France

Abstract In the first decade of the 21st Century the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has begun the process of ‘Transformation’. NATO determined to pursue military transformation because of the evident changes in the strategic environment and recognition of the growing military capabilities and concepts gap between the US and the rest of NATO. NATO Transformation has at its core three main strands: expeditionary capabilities; NATOs Network Enabled Capability (NNEC); and Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). NATOs member states have since late 2002 started the process of transforming their military forces, but the progress of their individual efforts has been uneven, resulting in military capabilities and conceptual gaps beginning to emerge within Europe. This article examines these issues before turning to explore the challenges and opportunities NATO Transformation poses for France as it rejoins the Alliances integrated military structure.

Fear and loathing in NATO: The Atlantic alliance after the crisis over Iraq

Abstract Transatlantic relations have been badly strained by the dispute over the US policy on Iraq. The divisions within NATO in February 2003 and subsequent relations between members, however; are a reflection of the alliance not having been able to define an agreed role for itself. Underlying this problem are three deep‐seated issues that hark back into the cold war era that have yet to be resolved: the role of the US in Europe; Europes role in the common defence; and NATOs role ‘out of area’. The success or failure of NATOs current efforts to transform itself will impact directly on these three issues and on the future role of the alliance, particularly in the eyes of the US.

The CJTF Concept and the Limits of European Autonomy

Since the early 1990s, NATO’s focus has shifted from being solely prepared for Article V missions to being able to engage as well in crisis response operations in the event of out-of-area crises. At the same time, the Alliance has proceeded with internal military change and adaptation, the most important of which are the three interrelated elements of ESDI, the CJTF concept and the new military command structure.1 The CJTF initiative is frequently seen as the key internal military innovation undertaken by NATO. The CJTF initiative was initially conceived as a means for NATO to generate an out-of-area military crisis response in circumstances of great uncertainty, but it was quickly recognized that it was also an instrumentality through which the Alliance could effectuate an ESDI. The centrality of the CJTF concept means that it has served as a symbol that NATO knows where it is going and why, that it really does know what it is doing, that it does have a purpose. As a symbol of NATO’s purpose and direction, the CJTF concept provided an answer to those who had questioned whether the Alliance did have a role in the post-Cold War era, or whether it was simply an anachronism whose day was done.2

The United Nations, conflict management and spheres of interest

The initial promise of the UN being able to manage conflicts with the ending of the Cold War has faded. Historically, the ability of the UN to act has been strongly influenced by the interests of its member states, especially the major powers, and a number of factors, such as threat, type of response, limitations on UN action, and degeneration of a situation, have affected the ability of the UN to respond and respond successfully. These and other factors can be organized to define a ‘window of opportunity’ for successful UN action. The ‘window’ concept suggests that in the current era, where most conflicts have little impact on the wider international system, the major powers are likely to be motivated only to manage those conflicts which affect their interests. This will have significant implications for the UN as a conflict manager. Terry Terriff is Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK. James Keeley is Associate Professor in the De...

Nuclear arms control: Finishing the cold war agenda

The START-II Treaty signed by US President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 3 January 1993 caps a quartercentury of strategic nuclear arms control. Since November 1969, when formal talks first began, the course of negotiations between the two nuclear powers acted as a bellwether of the state of their political and military relations. It took three years to negotiate the SALT-I agreements, which marked the heyday of detente. Growing doubts about detente stalled negotiations on a follow-on agreement for six years. The 1980s failed to produce any strategic arms agreement, reflecting in part the deteriorating US-Soviet relations in the early years of the decade. The START-I Treaty was finally signed on 31 July 1991, after nine years of negotiations. At the time, it was widely regarded as the last arms control accord of its kind. However, within 18 months a follow-on agreement had been negotiated cutting US and Russian forces by twothirds, to 3,000-3,500 on each side.

Of Romans and Dragons: Preparing the US Marine Corps for Future Warfare

Reforming a large organization is always difficult. This article considers the attempts made by the United States Marine Corps to introduce change over the last few years. It centres on the influence of the Commandant of the Corps in the late 1990s, General Charles C. Krulak, and his attempts to engineer a force that would be both relevant and capable in the years beyond his tenure. He sought to meet the challenge posed by the rise of unconventional forms of warfare, such as counter-insurgency, with a series of radical reforms; however, Krulaks vision and his ability to push change were hampered by internal and external impediments. He was unable to shape the Marine Corps that he wanted to see operating in the 21st century. Examined here are the reasons why Krulak was not successful, and why the corps is still struggling to shape itself as an organization properly geared to dealing with todays asymmetric threats. The corps is not yet all that it should be.