Theodore C. Bergstrom

On the private provision of public goods

Abstract We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the equilibrium provision of the public good. We are able to characterize the properties and the comparative statics of the equilibrium in a quite complete way and to analyze the extent to which government provision of a public good ‘crowds out’ private contributions.

Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection

Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models Theodore C. Bergstrom University of California Santa Barbara October 1, 2001

Courtship as a Waiting Game

In most times and places, women on average marry older men. We propose a partial explanation for this difference and for why it is diminishing. In a society in which the economic roles of males are more varied than the roles of females, the relative desirability of females as marriage partners may become evident at an earlier age than is the case for males. We study an equilibrium model in which the males who regard their prospects as unusually good choose to wait until their economic success is revealed before choosing a bride. In equilibrium, the most desirable young females choose successful older males. Young males who believe that time will not treat them kindly will offer to marry at a young age. Although they are aware that young males available for marriage are no bargain, the less desirable young females will be offered no better option than the lottery presented by marrying a young male. We show the existence of equilibrium for models of this type and explore the properties of equilibrium.

Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods

When is the Pareto optimal amount of public goods independent of income distribution? Subject to some regularity conditions, the answer is when preferences of every individual i can be represented by a utility function of the form U(X_i,Y)=A(Y)X_i+B_i(Y) where X_i is is consumption of private goods and Y is the amount of public goods.

Maximal elements of acyclic relations on compact sets

This paper proves that a continuous acyclic relation takes a maximal element on any compact set.

The Eigenfactor MetricsTM: A Network Approach to Assessing Scholarly Journals

Limited time and budgets have created a legitimate need for quantitative measures of scholarly work. The well-known journal impact factor is the leading measure of this sort; here we describe an alternative approach based on the full structure of the scholarly citation network. The Eigenfactor and Article Influence Score use an iterative ranking scheme similar to Googles PageRank algorithm. With this approach, citations from top journals are weighted more heavily than citations from lower-tier publications. We describe these metrics and the rankings that they provide.

WHEN DOES MAJORITY RULE SUPPLY PUBLIC GOODS EFFICIENTLY

H.R. Bowen showed that if voters have equal tax shares and if marginal rates of substitution are symmetrically distributed, then majority voting leads to efficient provision of public goods. These conditions are not likely to apply in a community with asymmetric income distribution. This paper defines a new idea for public goods allocation, a pseudo-Lindahl equilibrium which combines majority voting with tax rates that depend on income and other observable characteristices in such a way that the majority rule outcome is Pareto optimal for an interesting class of societies. The informational requirements for implementing pseudo-Lindahl are much less stringent than those required for an ordinary Lindahl equilibrium.

Chapter 2 A survey of theories of the family

Publisher Summary This chapter provides an overview of the theories of the family, and discusses the household technology and utility possibility frontiers, decision-making in the family, theories of the marriage and household membership, and interdependent preferences within families. An important conceptual building block for economic theories of marriage is the utility possibility frontier that any couple would face, if they were to marry each other. It is a consequence of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics that if preferences are convex and there are no consumption externalities, then any household that allocates marketable private goods among its members will act as if each household member is given a personal income and is allowed to spend it as he or she wishes. Although the problem of benefit–cost analysis of household public goods in benevolent families seems interesting and important, it does not seem to have received much attention in the literature.

Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods : An improved proof

Our 1986 paper ‘Private Provision of Public Goods’ presents a theorem on the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods. Richard Hirth of the University of Pennsylvania and Clive Fraser of Warwick have independently suggested that although our theorem is correct, our proof is incorrect. Each writer proposes an alternative method of proof for the theorem. With characteristic charity to our own deficiencies, we prefer to view our earlier proof as unduly opaque rather than wrong. Whichever view one takes, a more transparent proof is called for. The proof presented here follows the same outline as our 1986 proof, but explains a step of the argument that was far from obvious in the original proof. This proof uses the notation of the 1986 paper, and refers to ‘Facts’ that are proved there.

Income Prospects and Age-at-Marriage

This paper provides an empirical investigation of a theoretical model of the marriage market. In the model, women are valued more for their ability to bear children and men are valued more for their ability to make money. Men cannot reveal their labor market ability to potential spouses until they enter the labor force. At the same time, the relevant information for evaluating females as spouses is revealed at a younger age. The model predicts that the income of males will be positively associated with age-at-first-marriage. We find empirical support for the model. However, we also find the association between male earnings and age-at-first-marriage becomes negative for those who married after age 30, which was not predicted by the model. Consistent with the model, we do not find a strong relationship between earnings and age-at-first-marriage among females.