Theresa Schilhab

The symbolic species evolved

Introduction - searching the missing links Frederik Stjernfelt, Theresa Schilhab.- Part I: The Biosemiotic Connection.- 1. Towards a semiotic cognitive science: why neither the phenomenological nor computational approaches are adequate Terrence Deacon.- 2. The Symbolic Species hypothesis revisited Frederik Stjernfelt.- 3. Peirce and Deacon on meaning and the evolution of language Ahti-Veikko J. Pietarinen.- 4. Semiosis beyond signs. On a two or three missing links on the way to human beings Goran Sonesson.- Part II: The Prehistoric and Comparative Connection.- 5. The natural history of intentionality. A biosemiotic approach Jesper Hoffmeyer.- 6. The evolution of learning to communicate: Avian model for the missing link Irene M. Pepperberg.- 7. From parsing actions to understanding intentions Richard W. Byrne.- 8. New non-Linnaean, neo-cladistic nomenclature and classification conventions exemplified by recent and fossil hominids Niels Bonde.- 9. ----The tripod effect: Coevolution of cooperation, cognition and communication Peter Gardenfors et al.- Part III: The Cognitive and Anthropological Connection.- 10. Language as a repository of tacit knowledge Harry Collins.- 11. Levels of immersion and embodiment Theresa Schilhab.- 12. Emerging symbols Stefan Leijnen.- 13. Gender in innovative techno fantasies Cathrine Hasse.- Epilogue.- 14. New perspectives Terrence Deacon.- Index.

Developing the therapeutic potential of embodied cognition and metaphors in nature-based therapy: lessons from theory to practice

This paper theoretically examines the interplay between cognition and bodily involvement in relation to nature-based therapy and proposes implications for practice. With support from theory within embodied cognition and neuroscientific studies, it is argued that explicit learning is actively supported by bodily involvement with the environment. This argument is placed in the context of ‘nature-based therapy’, which can be perceived as a generic term for treatments with therapeutic use of activities and experiences in natural environments. The paper proposes that the use of metaphors to conceptualize desired therapeutic understanding in connection with the performance of activities in nature-based therapy can support the learning and change process by semantically relating cognition and bodily involvement.

Re-live and learn - Interlocutor-induced elicitation of phenomenal experiences in learning offline.

Contemporary neuroscience studies propose that sensory-motor experiences in the form of re-enactments or simulations are significant to the individuals development of concepts and language use. To a certain extent, such studies align with non-Cartesian perspectives on situated cognition. Since perceptual activity is reflected neurally, however, the neural perspective of experiences and re-enactments allows us to distinguish between online and offline conditions within situated cognition, thereby addressing the extent to which direct experiences contribute to a particular learning episode. Whereas online situated cognition reflects the traditional 4es (minds as embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended) and focus is on cognitive processes confined to the individual, offline situated cognition introduces Others as significant contributors to cognitive processes in the individual. In this paper, I analyse how offline situated cognition entails a hitherto underdescribed but radical receptivity to the social world that works through language. Based on the unfolding of how we acquire the concepts of mental states as part of theory of mind, I establish that in the hands of interlocutors, words cultivate minds by first eliciting phenomenal sensations and then facilitating an association of these to experiences that originate with a different phenomenal content. Thus, I conclude both that phenomenal experiences online are central to conceptual learning offline through re-enactions and that Others are profoundly essential in forming cognising Selves.

Adaptive Smart Technology Use: The Need for Meta-Self-Regulation

Today, smart technology in the form of tablets and smartphones is a cherished tool for most people. Instant online access that allows for extensive interacting on social media, texting, playing video games and music, checking for news and weather has turned smart technology into “an integral part of the lives of all ages worldwide” (Samaha and Hawi, 2016, p. 321). The multi-functional nature of smart technology makes it attractive as a tool for learning and education (Kucirkova, 2014; Schilhab, 2017a) leading, however, to noticeable changes in affordances and embodiment, and consequently learning (Mangen and Schilhab, 2012)1. For instance, reading scholars increasingly find that changing the physical reading platform (from a printed book to a digital screen) leads to marked alterations in comprehension of the text read. They point to factors related to the affordance of the reading device such as haptics e.g., perception through touch (Mangen and Kuiken, 2014) and lighting conditions (e.g., Benedetto et al., 2013) as aspects undergoing a significant change which result in a reduced learning outcome. This observation is corroborated by studies probing for accompanying metacognitive processing that show less accurate prediction of performance and more erratic study-time regulation when reading on screen versus on paper (Ackerman and Goldsmith, 2011). Such effects on literary reading are not agreed upon unanimously. Some researchers emphasize our “native biological plasticity” that among other things entails “bodily reconfiguration” Clark (2007 p. 263) and major “re-embodiment” (Ihde, 2010) when describing human cognition in relation to smart technology use. The argument asserts that the reduced comprehension when reading on screen is a novelty effect in the sense that subjects are proficient print-readers while still lacking in screen expertise (Hayler, 2015). Over time, people will adjust to the affordances of the new devices and the comprehension issues apparent today will evaporate as screen reading abilities are simultaneously refined and technology has co-evolved for this specific task. In so far as screen use is tool-use, the proposed plasticityand embodiment perspective prevalent in human-technology interaction studies seems pertinent. The question remains, however, if prolonged exposure and subsequent development of embodied skills is all it takes for humans to adapt to the affordances of smart technology. A relevant objection to the novelty claim could be that the comprehension issues associated with screen reading exemplifies a need to go beyond automatic embodiment processes and conceptualize the specifics of the mental processes that account for our adaptation to the environment. In the following article, I unfold why automatic skill learningmay not be an exhaustive answer to the affordances provided by smart technology. First, I discuss what characterizes smart technology

m-Reading: Fiction reading from mobile phones

Mobile phones are reportedly the most rapidly expanding e-reading device worldwide. However, the embodied, cognitive and affective implications of smartphone-supported fiction reading for leisure (m-reading) have yet to be investigated empirically. Revisiting the theoretical work of digitization scholar Anne Mangen, we argue that the digital reading experience is not only contingent on patterns of embodied reader–device interaction (Mangen, 2008 and later) but also embedded in the immediate environment and broader situational context. We call this the situation constraint. Its application to Mangen’s general framework enables us to identify four novel research areas, wherein m-reading should be investigated with regard to its unique affordances. The areas are reader–device affectivity, situated embodiment, attention training and long-term immersion.

Words as cultivators of others minds

The embodied–grounded view of cognition and language holds that sensorimotor experiences in the form of ‘re-enactments’ or ‘simulations’ are significant to the individual’s development of concepts and competent language use. However, a typical objection to the explanatory force of this view is that, in everyday life, we engage in linguistic exchanges about much more than might be directly accessible to our senses. For instance, when knowledge-sharing occurs as part of deep conversations between a teacher and student, language is the salient tool by which to obtain understanding, through the unfolding of explanations. Here, the acquisition of knowledge is realized through language, and the constitution of knowledge seems entirely linguistic. In this paper, based on a review of selected studies within contemporary embodied cognitive science, I propose that such linguistic exchanges, though occurring independently of direct experience, are in fact disguised forms of embodied cognition, leading to the reconciliation of the opposing views. I suggest that, in conversation, interlocutors use Words as Cultivators (WAC) of other minds as a direct result of their embodied–grounded origin, rendering WAC a radical interpretation of the Words as social Tools (WAT) proposal. The WAC hypothesis endorses the view of language as dynamic, continuously integrating with, and negotiating, cognitive processes in the individual. One such dynamic feature results from the ‘linguification process’, a term by which I refer to the socially produced mapping of a word to its referent which, mediated by the interlocutor, turns words into cultivators of others minds. In support of the linguification process hypothesis and WAC, I review relevant embodied–grounded research, and selected studies of instructed fear conditioning and guided imagery.

Levels of Immersion and Embodiment

Contemporary neuroscience seems to suggest that conceptual understanding as in reading and discourse at least in part is perceptually and sensory-somatically corroborated. In other words, conceptual knowledge seems to involve reenacting forms of perceptual experiences. However, in many aspects of life we do not have first hand experiences of the concepts we master to perfection. Who has ever had personal experiences with unicorns, the ice ages or Big Bang? In this chapter, I expand on the relation between symbol use as it applies to the linguistic exchange in professional communities and different levels of immersion in the associated practices to clarify the issue of levels of embodiment from a cognitive point of view.

Impact of iPads on break-time in primary schools—a Danish context

Abstract Today, technology in the form of tablet computers (e.g. iPads) is crucial as a tool for learning and education. Tablets support educational activities such as archiving, word processing, and generation of academic products. They also connect with the Internet, providing access to news, encyclopaedic entries, and e-books. In addition, tablets have the potential to provide immediate entertainment, such as games, social contacts, and videos. The impact of iPads in schools is widespread, and may among many other things change both formal and informal learning during break-time periods such as breaks and lunch in pre-school, primary, and lower secondary education. The inclination to converse or interact with people nearby may diminish considerably if desired information or entertainment is only a click (or swipe) away. The present qualitative research involved interviews of 10 pupils from three schools in the Copenhagen area to explore their subjective experiences of the impact of the municipally endorsed distribution of iPads for student use during break-time. The findings of this exploratory study suggest that there are significant differences in experiences by age group. The study suggests that schools help pupils adopt the kind of technological literacy that will still allow them to engage in socio-emotional learning during break-time.

Issues to Consider

In this chapter I turn to the implications of and obvious objections to the idea of derived embodiment. Throughout the account, I have presented a number of examples to grant the idea probability. I have implicitly endorsed the idea of the full-blown and somewhat ideal form of the derived embodiment mechanism to which interactional expertise-like knowledge applies to facilitate analysis. I have also maintained that as process in practice given the engaged involvement of an interlocutor, derived embodiment is somewhat demanding. Understanding interactions that only partly activate derived embodiment processes is still of relevance to explore kinds of knowledge exchange. Hence, I begin this chapter by proposing instances that to some extent entail derived embodiment processes without completely matching the ideal description. In particular, I focus on the role of the interlocutor to stress how the lack of perceptual qualities in, for instance, acquiring a theory of mind depends on the verbal ostensive pointing via designation. The example substantiates the argument that language widely mixes embodied and social processes. It also shows that the social level is highly decisive with respect to interpretations of phenomena that are difficult to grasp by first order linguification processes. The example concerned with acquisition of concepts for mental states is followed by a final discussion on the generality of derived embodiment. Is the mechanism applicable to the acquisition of the concept of ‘weather’? If not, what are the limiting conditions pertaining to the mechanism? In the last section, I focus on the sub-aggregates and back doors in the linguification product. I end by concluding that despite the usability of derived embodiment, the mechanism is chosen only when we have turned down other options. The proposition remains however that derived embodiment mechanisms are significant to the concrete transgression of individual experiences distinctive of human cognition.

Attention Restoration Theory II: a systematic review to clarify attention processes affected by exposure to natural environments

ABSTRACT Attention Restoration Theory (ART) predicts exposure to natural environments may lead to improved cognitive performance through restoration of a limited cognitive resource, directed attention. A recent review by Ohly and colleagues (2016) uncovered substantial ambiguity surrounding details of directed attention and how cognitive restoration was tested. Therefore, an updated systematic review was conducted to identify relevant cognitive domains from which to describe elements of directed attention sensitive to the restoration effect. Forty-two articles that tested natural environments or stimuli against a suitable control, and included an objective measure of cognitive performance, had been published since July 2013. Articles were subjected to screening procedures and quality appraisal. Random effects meta-analyses were performed to calculate pooled effect sizes across 8 cognitive domains using data from 49 individual outcome measures. Results showed that working memory, cognitive flexibility, and to a less-reliable degree, attentional control, are improved after exposure to natural environments, with low to moderate effect sizes. Moderator analyses revealed that actual exposures to real environments may enhance the restoration effect within these three domains, relative to virtual exposures; however, this may also be due to differences in the typical lengths of exposure. The effect of a participants’ restoration potential, based upon diagnosis or fatigue-induction, was less clear. A new framework is presented to qualify the involvement of directed attention-related processes, using examples of tasks from the three cognitive domains found to be sensitive to the restoration effect. The review clarifies the description of cognitive processes sensitive to natural environments, using current evidence, while exploring aspects of protocol that appear influential to the strength of the restoration effect.