Theresa Thompson Chaudhry

Contracting and Efficiency in the Surgical Goods Cluster of Sialkot, Pakistan

This article provides empirical evidence of the inefficiency of contracting institutions (measured by high switching costs) among surgical instrument producers in Sialkot, Pakistan, even though it is an industrial cluster where manufacturers have access to a multiplicity of suppliers. Following the methodology of Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002), we found that nearly 50 per cent of firms in the sample would reject an untried supplier offering a lower price. The decision to reject a prospective new supplier offering a 10 per cent discount was positively related to the complexity of the input and measures of relational contracting, and negatively related to a belief in informal contract enforcement mechanisms. Firms were more likely to switch to the prospective discount supplier when they were introduced through a business network. Belief in formal contract enforcement was not significant in any of the regressions.

Relational Contracting in Pakistan’s Surgical Instrument Cluster: An Empirical Study

This paper tests an idea from relational contracting theory [Macauley (1963); North (1990); Greif (1994); Kranton (1996)] that informal relationships can substitute for formal contract enforcement through the judicial system, from the analysis of a new survey of the surgical instrument cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan. Inter-firm trust is thought to lead to reduced transaction costs (a passive benefit of a cluster). Considered here are exchanges of goods between clustered suppliers and their customers, who are either members of the cluster or firms that interact frequently with it. Inter-firm trust is measured as the amount of trade credit offered to customers. The results show that suppliers are more likely to offer trade credit when they believe in the effectiveness of formal contract enforcement and when they participate in business networks (proxied by inter-firm communication). There is also some evidence that customer lock-in helps to develop inter-firm trust since firms give more credit when relationships are of longer duration, and as locked-in customers are less able to find alternate suppliers.

Prospects for Cooperative Marketing Among Surgical Instrument Producers in Pakistan

Given that clustered firms in developing countries generally sell their goods through multinational firms, we seek to determine under what conditions might clustered surgical instrument firms band together and form a cooperative to “break out” of their relationship with multinational buyers to market their own goods. Our results, based on a survey of surgical instrument producers in Sialkot, Pakistan, demonstrate that firms are more likely to be interested in such initiatives once they have already had some direct experience in marketing, such as selling products under their own brand name and having already sold some goods directly to hospitals. Firms that have had relationships of longer duration with customers tend to be less likely to be interested in joint action initiatives. This indicates that a higher opportunity cost of engaging in joint action (as proxied by relationships of longer duration) reduces the likelihood of cooperative marketing initiatives in clusters.