Thijs Vandemoortele

When Are Private Standards More Stringent than Public Standards

Retailers’ private standards are increasingly important in addressing consumer concerns about safety, quality and social and environmental issues. Empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts. This article develops a political economy model that may contribute to explaining this stylized fact. We show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to impose a lower public standard, retailers may apply their market power to install a private standard at a higher level than the public one, depending on several factors.

Quality standards, value chains, and international development : economic and political theory

1. Introduction 2. Modelling standards 3. Efficiency and equity effects of standards 4. The political economy of standards and development 5. International trade and standards 6. Risks, externalities and the nature of standards 7. Endogenous private and public standards in value chains 8. Butterflies and political economy dynamics in standard setting 9. The political economy of standards and inclusion in value chains 10. Standards, production structure and inclusion in value chains 11. Standards, market imperfections and vertical coordination in value chains 12. Market power and vertical coordination in value chains 13. Price transmission in value chains 14. Commodity characteristics and value chain governance 15. Economic liberalisation, value chains and development 16. Standards and value chains with contracting costs: towards a general model 17. General equilibrium effects of standards in value chains.

Impact of the WTO on Agricultural and Food Policies

Most studies on the impact of WTO agreements on policies are ex ante simulations or focus on trade effects. We estimate ex post the impact of the WTO on agricultural policies, including both the total transfers by the policies and the policy instruments used, in particular their market distortions. We use OECD data on total support and instrument choice in agricultural policy. Our empirical analysis provides evidence that the WTO did not cause a significant reduction in the total amount of support to agriculture but that it caused a significant shift from distortionary to less distortionary instruments.

Trade and the political economy of standards

This paper reviews the emerging literature on the political economy of public standards in an open economy to explain why standards are set at certain levels, and how this affects trade. We use a simple framework to illustrate how interest groups may influence the standard-setting process, and which factors may affect the political equilibria. We analyze the relation between trade and standards, and their potential protectionist nature. We argue that standards may act as barriers or catalysts to trade, that both under- or over-standardization may occur, and that standards may serve as protectionist instruments, or not.

The Political Economy of Policy Instrument Choice: Theory and Evidence from Agricultural Policies

We study the political economy of instrument choice in agricultural and food policies. After a review of the historical evolution of European agricultural price and trade policy instruments since 1880, we develop a political economy model of instrument choice. The key predictions of the model suggest a rational explanation of instrument choice patterns, based on the trade-off between the different cost components of the policies, and internal and external political constraints. An empirical analysis supports the main predictions of the theoretical model. We find that the GATT/WTO agreement had a significant impact.

You get what you want: A note on the economics of bad news

We develop a simple theoretical model that explains the slant towards negative coverage in news media. In a framework where news is informative and consumers are risk averse, diminishing marginal utility implies that information about a negative income shock is more valuable than information about a positive shock, which leads to disproportionate reporting of bad news.

On Butterflies and Frankenstein: A Dynamic Theory of Regulation

There are major differences in regulation among various countries. A particular case is the difference between the EU and US in regulating biotechnology.We develop a formal and dynamic model of government decision-making on regulation. We show that minor differences in consumer preferences can lead to important and persistent regulatory differences, and that temporary shocks to preferences can have long-lasting effects. This hysteresis in regulatory differences is shown to be caused by producer protectionist motives. We argue that this model may contribute to explain the difference between EU and US biotechnology regulation.

Trade, Development, and the Political Economy of Public Standards

This paper presents a political economy model of public standards in an open economy model. We use the model to derive the political optimum and to analyze different factors that have an influence on this political equilibrium. The paper discusses how the level of development influences the political equilibrium. We also analyze the relation between trade and the political equilibrium and compare this political outcome with the social optimum to identify under which cases `under-standardization?or `over-standardization?results, and which standards can be labeled as (producer)protectionist measures.

The Experience Economy as the Future for European Agriculture and Food

As recently as a century ago, one out of two people in Europe was employed in the agricultural sector. Today agriculture represents only a small fraction of total employment in most EU member states. What makes this decline in agricultural employment even more striking is that this evolution has occurred despite substantial EU subsidies to support farmers’ income. Given the apparent ineffectiveness of government support in keeping agricultural employment steady, it is worth considering which farming activities are likely to be successful in the economy of the 21st century. We argue in this paper that a potential growth path for European agriculture is the “experience economy” in which consumers are willing to pay premium prices for products and services that provide additional intangible “experiences”. We discuss the growth potential of the “experience economy” in the agricultural sector and conclude that it is worthwhile to consider the experience economy as a pathway for future farm growth.

The Market for Policy Communication

We develop a model of policy communication by aid agencies, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations and we show how the need for fundraising affects the policy communication strategy of these organizations. To attract more funds, organizations may bias their communication. The bias depends on the ex ante beliefs of donors and on mass media reporting.