Thomas A. Boylan

Pragmatism in economic methodology: The Duhem-Quine thesis revisited

Contemporary developments in economicmethodology have produced a vibrant agenda ofcompeting positions. These include, amongothers, constructivism, critical realism andrhetoric, with each contributing to the Realistvs. Pragmatism debate in the philosophies of thesocial sciences. A major development in theneo-pragmatist contribution to economicmethodology has been Quines pragmatic assaulton the dogmas of empiricism, which are nowclearly acknowledged within contemporaryeconomic methodology. This assault isencapsulated in the celebrated Duhem-Quinethesis, which according to a number ofcontemporary leading philosophers of economics,poses a particularly serious methodologicalproblem for economics. This problem, asreflected in Hausmans analysis, consists ofthe inability of economics to learn fromexperience, thereby subverting the capacity totest economic theories. In this paper wedispute this position. Our argument is basedon a combination of Quines holism with VanFraassens constructive empiricism, especiallythe latters analysis of empirical adequacy andhis pragmatic approach to explanation. Theresulting reorientation of economic methodologyrestores the capacity of economics to learnfrom experience and reinstates the imperativeof developing alternatives to orthodoxtheorizing in economics.

The critique of equilibrium theory in economic methodology: A constructive empiricist perspective

Abstract Kaldor, one of the leading figures of the post‐war ‘Cambridge School’, has produced a large volume of methodological writings since the mid‐1960s, which we will argue represents one of the major critiques of orthodox equilibrium economic theory produced this century. While Kaldors position represents a fundamental and radical rejection of the methodological basis of equilibrium economics, he did not provide a systematically formulated alternative methodology for economics. Recent attempts at providing such a reconstruction has argued that scientific realism provides the most convincing philosophical interpretation of Kaldors methodological contributions. In this paper we will argue that van Fraassens constructive empiricism represent a more compelling alternative methodological framework to realism for systematizing Kaldors important contributions. In particular it will be argued that this constructive empiricist reading of Kaldor has the capacity to critically undermine the methodological ba...

Kaldor on Debreu: The Critique of General Equilibrium Reconsidered’

This paper revisits Kaldors methodological critique of orthodox economics. The main target of his critique was the theory of general equilibrium as expounded in the work of Debreu and others. Kaldor deemed this theory to be seriously flawed as an empirically adequate description of real-world economies. According to Kaldor, scientific progress was not possible in economics without a major act of demolition, by which he meant the destruction of the basic conceptual framework of the theory of general equilibrium. We extend Kaldors critique by recourse to major developments in 20th century philosophy of mathematics, and then go on to demonstrate that Debreus work, based as it is on Bourbakist formalism and in particular Cantorian set theory, is conceptually incompatible with Kaldors requirements for an empirical science. This aspect of Kaldors critique has not been explored, and as a consequence a major source of substantiating his critique has remained undeveloped.

Economic Theory and Rationality: A Wittgensteinian interpretation

In this paper we invoke Wittgensteins later philosophy to facilitate a number of methodological reflections on Paul Davidsons concept of transmutability. We argue that, while Davidson addresses the economic implications arising from his distinction between immutable and transmutable theories of external economic reality, he does not explore the more fundamental methodological implications of the concepts contained in his distinction, particularly that of transmutability. Transmutability is more fundamental and pervasive than Davidson had anticipated and presents a number of challenges to economic methodology and economic theorizing. Methodologically, the challenges require the consideration of new philosophical perspectives along with the fundamental reconsideration of widely accepted and influential modes of reasoning in economics. We respond to these challenges by invoking Wittgensteins later philosophy to challenge the dominance of J. S. Mills rationale for the immutability of economic laws; to motivate the empirical study of complex transformative processes; and to undermine the reductionist neoclassical theory of rationality.

Constructive Empiricism: a Reconstruction of Economic Methodology

The principal aim of this paper is to explore the possibility of applying van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism to the contemporary debate on the methodology of economics. The authors argue that constructive empiricism supplies a novel and challenging framework which takes this debate beyond relativism and rhetoric on the one hand and beyond instrumentalism and realism on the other. In particular, by developing the distinction between pure and applied economics and by locating economic explanation in the latter, constructive empiricism offers a challenging solution to the perennial question of the realism of assumptions debate, changes the methodological focal point of pure economics onto the issue of empirical adequacy.

National Economic and Social Council, The Economic and Social Implications of Emigration, Dublin, March 1991. 318pp

....we are satisfied that, while the causes of emigration have been many and have varied at different times, emigration has been due to two fundamental causes, the absence of opportunities for making an adequate livelihood, and a growing desire for higher standards of living on the part of the community, particularly the rural community. (Report of the Commission on Emigration and other Population Problems, 1954)