Thomas C. Mann

The asymmetric connection between money and material vs. experiential purchases

We examined the relationship between having a monetary mindset and the pursuit of material goods over experiences and found that people tend to think of their material purchases more in monetary terms than their experiential purchases. Purchase price correlated more highly with participants’ satisfaction with their material goods than their experiences (Study 1) and participants reported that the amount spent on significant components of a purchase (Study 2) would have more impact on their satisfaction with material goods than with experiences, as would a change in purchase price (Study 3). When the same purchase (a 3D TV) was framed in material terms (vs. experiential terms), participants reported that a price change would have a greater impact on their satisfaction. These findings suggest experiences suffer less than material possessions from the extrinsic psychology that comes with thinking about purchases in monetary terms.

Reversing Implicit First Impressions through Reinterpretation after a Two-Day Delay

People are adept at forming impressions of others, but how easily can impressions be updated? Although implicit first impressions have been characterized as difficult to overturn, recent work shows that they can be reversed through reinterpretation of earlier learning. However, such reversal has been demonstrated only in the same experimental session in which the impression formed, suggesting that implicit updating might be possible only within a brief temporal window, before impressions are consolidated and when memory about the initial information is strongest. Implicit impressions may be unable to be revised when reinterpreting details are learned later, due to memory consolidation or forgetting of the details to be reinterpreted. This study tested whether implicit first impressions can be reversed through reinterpretation after a two-day delay following the initial formation. Results showed that implicit revision emerged after the delay, even among those with poor explicit recall or who were not cued to recall. We discuss implications for theory on impression formation and updating.

Social-psychological evidence for the effective updating of implicit attitudes

Recent findings in social psychology show how implicit affective responses can be changed, leading to strong, fast, and durable updating. This work demonstrates that new information viewed as diagnostic or which prompts reinterpretations of previous learning produces fast revision, suggesting two factors that might be leveraged in clinical settings. Reconsolidation provides a plausible route for making such reasoning possible.

On the neural implausibility of the modular mind: Evidence for distributed construction dissolves boundaries between perception, cognition, and emotion

Firestone & Scholl (F&S) rely on three problematic assumptions about the mind (modularity, reflexiveness, and context-insensitivity) to argue cognition does not fundamentally influence perception. We highlight evidence indicating that perception, cognition, and emotion are constructed through overlapping, distributed brain networks characterized by top-down activity and context-sensitivity. This evidence undermines F&Ss ability to generalize from case studies to the nature of perception.