Thomas-Durell Young

The Revolution in Military Affairs and Coalition Operations: Problem Areas and Solutions

Paper prepared for the conference: The RMA and the Asia Pacific: Challenge and Response Organized by the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy for: The Office of the RMA, Department of Defence Russell, ACT Australia

Questioning the “Sanctity” of long-term defense planning as practiced in Central and Eastern Europe

ABSTRACT It is an article of faith amongst many defense officials that long-term defense planning constitutes the gold standard in the development and management of modern armed forces. That such a method has become central to the U.S. and other countries’ defense planning systems it is surprising that there is so little questioning of its contemporary relevance, let alone an understanding of its provenance, original intent, and its highly nuanced nature. Rather, what one finds on closer examination of long-term defense planning methods is that they have contributed to producing sub-optimal defense plans. In order to provide greater clarity and understanding of the utility of long-term defense plans, this essay argues that as a key element of PPBS, this planning method has been a failure when measured against the ability of defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe to produce viable defense plans. To produce cost-informed and implementable defense plans, these defense institutions need to return to the original intend of this planning tool: to inform officials of long-term financial obligations and to enable informed decision-making to fund the current force.

Is the US’s PPBS Applicable to European Post-Communist Defence Institutions?

The US has exported versions of the Department of Defense’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to almost all the legacy defence organisations of former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe to enable them to plan and create modern financial management systems. Thomas-Durell Young traces how these efforts have largely failed to produce viable defence plans, and argues that only by strengthening the influence of policy over programming will this be possible.

The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

ABSTRACT By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.

Programming challenges and impediments to reform: identifying pragmatic solutions

ABSTRACT Using two recently published essays by the current writer that assesses the dismal record of performance of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in enabling communist legacy defence institutions in Central and Eastern Europe to develop viable defence plans, this essay argues the need for deep reforms in the region’s defence institutions. To guide this reform effort, pragmatic solutions are suggested to improve the ability of these organisations to produce viable defence plans. Recommended reforms are: (1) conduct conceptual and cultural “audits,” (2) make operational and financial data central to decision-making, (3) change current organisational sociology, (4) examine planning methods and practices, and (5) stress the need to adopt policy frameworks to drive the operation of defence institutions.

Impediments to Reform in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: Addressing the Conceptual Divide

This article argues two key points. First, that Western democratic and communist defense and military concepts are antithetical and includes an explanation of why this is the case. Second, evidence is provided to demonstrate that legacy concepts are very much both actively and passively evident in European post-communist defense institutions. Consequently, it is argued that absent systematic efforts to expose and challenges the legitimacy of existing legacy concepts (and their accompanying assumptions and institutional logic), these institutions will continue to exist at best in a state of conceptual incoherence, and at worse as zombie organizations; not dead, but certainly lacking any manifestations of life.

When Programming Trumps Policy and Plans: The Case of the US Department of the Navy11

ABSTRACT Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8 (Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, decisions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authorization and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article argues that reform of the Department of the Navy’s planning process is urgently needed. OPNAV’s weak planning and overly dominant programming practices are compared with those of the Departments of the Army and Air Force and are shown to be out of conformance with them. The article concludes with specific and detailed recommendations for reform of both the current planning and programming processes.

The Challenge of Reforming European Communist Legacy ‘Logistics’

ABSTRACT This article posits four key challenges to address the question as to why logistics reform in Communist-legacy defense institutions has been so slow. First, what is the conceptual foundation for logistics in these countries? Second, what is the general state of national logistics capabilities in these countries? Third, why has the reform of logistics in these post-Communist legacy defense institutions been so slow and superficial? Fourth, in an attempt to understand the problem better, what do legacy defense institutions need to do themselves in order to be able to adopt modern Western logistics concepts? Conversely, what do donor nations need to understand about these legacy logistics organizations the better to enable them to understand the immense gap that divides Communist from Western logistics concepts? In addressing these questions, the author will argue two points. First, logistics reform has been impeded to date by a lack of appreciation on the part of particularly Western officials that legacy logistics concepts could not be more antithetical to their Western counterparts. Second, reform of legacy logistics organizations will not follow from attention and resources directed at tactical-level formations and importing the expeditionary logistics concept. Rather, the causation of the continued inability to adopt Western logistics concepts can be found in national-level policy, financing, laws, and regulations that continue to enable the operation of legacy concepts.