Thomas J. Christensen

Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity

Contemporary balance-of-power theory has become too parsimonious to yield determinate predictions about state alliance strategies in multipolarity. Kenneth Waltzs theory predicts only that multipolarity predisposes states to either of two opposite errors, which this article characterizes as chain-ganging and buck-passing. To predict which of these two policies will prevail, it is necessary to complicate Waltzs theory by adding a variable from Robert Jerviss theory of the security dilemma: the variable of whether offense or defense is perceived to have the advantage. At least under the checkerboard geographical conditions in Europe before World Wars I and II, perceived offensive advantage bred unconditional alliances, whereas perceived defensive advantage bred free riding on the balancing efforts of others.

Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy

Since the early 1990s, American scholars and strategists have debated whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will pose a security threat to the United States and its regional interests in East Asia in the next few decades. Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the debate is the assessment of China’s overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers. So conferences have been held and papers written discussing whether China would become a “peer competitor” or “near peer competitor” of the United States in the military arena, or a “regional hegemon” towering over its cowed neighbors and threatening American interests in a region of increasing importance to the United States.1 Posing Problems without Catching Up Thomas J. Christensen

Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia

This article explores two starkly contrasting analytic approaches to assessing the performance of U.S. security strategy in East Asia since 1991: a positivesum approach, emphasizing the danger of security dilemmas and spirals of tension, and a zero-sum approach, emphasizing power competition and the long-term dangers posed by Chinas rise. In the policy world, the differences between these apparently irreconcilable perspectives are not so clear. Certain policiesfor example, maintaining a strong U.S.-Japan allianceflow from either logic. Moreover, each approach sometimes counsels counterintuitive policy prescriptions that are generally associated with the other. Relatively assertive U.S. security postures apparently have furthered positive-sum regional goals by catalyzing China to adopt reassuring policies toward its neighbors as a hedge against potential U.S. encirclement. From a zero-sum perspective, the United States often competes more effectively for regional influence by cooperating with China than it would by seeking to contain Chinas economic growth and diplomatic influence.

Perceptions and alliances in Europe, 1865–1940

While some structural realists and their liberal and institutionalist critics continue to fight a high-profile battle about the fundamental nature of international politics, a quieter discussion is progressing about how to integrate various aspects of realist thinking into a more coherent approach to security politics. The goal of this discussion is to marry the two major strands of contemporary realist thought: balance-of-power theory and security dilemma theory. Recent works advocate combining structural variables, such as the number of great actors in the system and the distribution of capabilities among them, with security dilemma variables, such as the comparative efficacy of offensive versus defensive doctrines given available weaponry and military training.

The contemporary security dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan conflict

Successful deterrence requires both threats and assurances about the conditionality of those threats. The real security dilemma is how to be tough enough without being overly provocative. Deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is possible, but not simple. Heres how.

The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations

Abstract Will Chinas development of a new generation of nuclear weapons impact US-China security relations in important ways? Ones answer depends on how one views the following: whether or not Chinese leaders believe that they are only now acquiring a secure second strike capability; the scope of coercive power that secure second strike capability provides to conventionally inferior actors; the meaning of Chinas ‘No First Use’ Doctrine; and the prospects for escalation control in future crises. Applying Cold War theories and tapping Chinese doctrinal writings this article concludes that Chinas nuclear modernization program might prove more consequential than is commonly believed.

Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams

I n Cold War history few topics have received more attention than the 1950 Sino-American crisis over K0rea.l China’s massive attack on UN troops in late November 1950 led to the longest retreat in American military history, an epic confrontation between the Truman administration and General Douglas MacArthur, and a polarizing domestic political debate about policy toward China. One major point of controversy was the question of how Ma0 might have been dissuaded from escalating China’s involvement in Korea. MacArthur supporters argued that Mao attacked out of adventurism because he was certain the

Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration

President Barack Obama ran a successful campaign on the theme of change. Yet, for addressing what is perhaps the greatest long-term strategic challenge facing the United States/ managing U.S. relations with a rising China/ change is not what is needed. President George W. Bush’s strategy toward China is an underappreciated success story and the Obama administration would be wise to build on that success rather than attempt to radically transform U.S. policy toward China. As a former U.S. Department of State (DOS) official working on China policy, I would sum up Bush’s strategy as a long/-term effort to shape the choices the leadership in Beijing makes about how to use China’s increasing regional and global influence. Rather than trying to rollback or contain the growth of Chinese power, the United States has used the combination of a strong U.S. regional presence and a series of creative diplomatic initiatives to encourage Beijing to seek increased influence through diplomatic and economic interactions rather than coercion, and to use that increased influence in a manner that improves the prospects for security and economic prosperity in Asia and around the world. This effort has been successful because Washington deftly handled many of the traditional issues in the bilateral relationship, such as economic frictions or

Low-Loss Plasmonic Dielectric Nanoresonators

Material losses in metals are a central bottleneck in plasmonics for many applications. Here we propose and theoretically demonstrate that metal losses can be successfully mitigated with dielectric particles on metallic films, giving rise to hybrid dielectric-metal resonances. In the far field, they yield strong and efficient scattering, beyond even the theoretical limits of all-metal and all-dielectric structures. In the near field, they offer high Purcell factor (>5000), high quantum efficiency (>90%), and highly directional emission at visible and infrared wavelengths. Their quality factors can be readily tailored from plasmonic-like (∼10) to dielectric-like (∼103), with wide control over the individual resonant coupling to photon, plasmon, and dissipative channels. Compared with conventional plasmonic nanostructures, such resonances show robustness against detrimental nonlocal effects and provide higher field enhancement at extreme nanoscopic sizes and spacings. These hybrid resonances equip plasmonics with high efficiency, which has been the predominant goal since the fields inception.

Spirals, Security and Stability in East Asia

In his article “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,”1 Thomas Christensen argues that East Asia is primed for conoict. He contends that security dilemma theory, and two other exacerbating factors, predict spirals of tension between China and Japan. First, Chinese historical memories of Japanese aggression make China especially fearful of increases in Japanese military activities. Second, because China regards Taiwan as a renegade province rather than an independent country, the acquisition of even defensive weapons by Taiwan or Japan (a potential Taiwanese ally) threatens China and may provoke spirals. Based on these arguments, Christensen concludes that the United States should limit the Japanese role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. For example, the United States should not codevelop theater missile defense (TMD) with Japan because this could trigger spirals between Japan and China (p. 75). In this letter I argue that Christensen greatly overstates the potential for conoict in the region. First, I argue that he misapplies security dilemma theory to East Asia. Security dilemma theory actually predicts stability in the region, not dangerous spirals. Second, I show that Christensen’s application of security dilemma theory is falsiaed by evidence from the past afty years. This evidence conarms my argument that spirals are unlikely in East Asia, despite historical grievances and the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty. The implication of my analysis is that U.S. alliance policies in East Asia need not be hamstrung by fears that the region is primed for conoict. Japan can and should be a full and active member of the alliance that guarantees its security.