Thomas L. Carson

Book ReviewsBrian. Leiter,A Routledge Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality.New York: Routledge, 2002. Pp. xxii+323.

jectivism about the relevant subject matter, but developments in twentieth-century ethics suggest that more may need to be done to enable us to live with the idea of an alleged “correct perspective” which, however, does not admit of being demonstrated to “any rational person” qua rational. As noted above, some recent work in the Aristotelian idiom is helpful on this point. This is a book, then, of one (undoubtedly valuable) idea, which it would have been good to see located within a more inclusive “modern philosophy” rather than just in relation to a catalog of authors whom Johnston believes to be fundamentally misguided. After all, if he is right, these authors will not last, and there must be better ways to spend our time than in reading them. Johnston writes fluently and vigorously, though his rhetoric is a little monotonous. In particular, he is addicted to the words “confused” and “confusion,” which appear with relentless frequency in his critical discussions; the climax is reached on page 127, with five occurrences concerning Nagel.

15.95 (paper).

Intuitionism is enjoying renewed respect and interest in contemporary ethics. This volume and its many distinguished contributors reflect this development. “Ethical intuitionism” refers to some or all of the following views: (a) the epistemological theory that moral knowledge is based on moral intuitions and that the truth of certain moral judgments or moral principles is self-evident or independently credible; (b) pluralism, the view that there are a plurality of ultimate moral principles and no explicit priority rules for resolving conflicts between them (Ross’s theory, according to which the ultimate principles of right and wrong are prima facie duties, is a version of pluralism. Moore and Sidgwick are not pluralists about right and wrong, but Moore defends a pluralistic theory of value); and (c) “nonnaturalism,” the metaphysical view that there are moral facts and that they are constituted by nonnatural facts. The papers included in the book range over all three versions of intuitionism, with considerably more attention to a and b than c. The discussions of pluralism focus on pluralistic theories of right and wrong; there is little discussion of theories of value other than hedonism. The papers deal with a mix of topical and historical questions. The index reveals that Ross is the most discussed philosopher in the book, followed roughly by Moore, Sidgwick, Pritchard, and Ewing. I will focus primarily on intuitionism as an epistemological theory. Many philosophers are inclined to dismiss claims to self-evident moral knowledge as dogmatic and naive; they think that such claims are clearly discredited simply by appeal to the obvious phenomenon of moral disagreement. One of the most important and useful features of the book is that many of the contributors (most notably Stratton-Lake, Audi, Crisp, Gaut, Hooker, Sturgeon, and Gibbard) give arguments that show that epistemological intuitionism should not be so easily dismissed. Critics of epistemological intuitionism often assume that if something is self-evident, its truth must be obvious (and, therefore, not a matter of debate). However, this is not the case. Gaut cites Audi’s example “of a proposition that is not immediately obvious, but is self-evident—that if there have never been any siblings, there have never been any first cousins” (p. 143). Stratton-Lake notes the following self-evident principle: “Circles are figures that are bounded by a line that is equidistant from its centre” (p. 19). Some critics allege that in cases of disagreement all the intuitionist can do is dogmatically repeat what she claims is self-evident. This criticism is unfair for reasons that several of the contributors demonstrate. Sidgwick and others have proposed various tests for intuitions. As Stratton-Lake notes, the absence of conceptual confusion/unclarity is a requirement for reliable moral intuitions.