Thomas P. Lyon

Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure Under Threat of Audit

We develop an economic model of “greenwash,” in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and a non-governmental organization (NGO) may audit and penalize the firm for failing to fully disclose its environmental impacts. We identify conditions under which NGO punishment of greenwash backfires, inducing the firm to become less rather than more forthcoming about its environmental performance. We show that complementarities with NGO auditing may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt environmental management systems. Mandatory disclosure rules offer the potential for better performance than NGO auditing, but the necessary penalties may be so large as to be politically unpalatable. If so, a mix of mandatory disclosure rules, NGO auditing and environmental management systems may be needed to induce full environmental disclosure.

Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective

We survey the growing theoretical literature on the motives for and welfare effects of corporate greening. We show how both market and political forces are making environmental CSR profitable, and we also discuss morally-motivated or altruistic CSR. Welfare effects of CSR are subtle and situation-contingent, and there is no guarantee that CSR enhances social welfare. We identify numerous areas in which additional theoretical work is needed.

Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio Standards? An Empirical Investigation

Renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) for electricity generation are politically popular in many U.S. states although economic analysis suggests they are not first-best policies. We present an empirical analysis of the political and economic factors that drive state governments to adopt an RPS, and the factors that lead to the inclusion of in-state requirements given the adoption of an RPS. Although advocates claim an RPS will stimulate job growth, we find that states with high unemployment rates are slower to adopt an RPS. Local environmental conditions and preferences have no significant effect on the timing of adoption. Overall, RPS adoption seems to be driven more by political ideology and private interests than by local environmental and employment benefits, raising questions as to when environmental federalism serves the public interest.

Quality leadership when regulatory standards are forthcoming

In many markets, governments set minimum quality standards while some sellers compete on the basis of quality by exceeding them. Such quality leadership strategies often win public acclaim, especially when they involve environmental attributes. Using a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation, we show that if the high-quality firm can commit to a quality level before regulations are promulgated, it induces the regulator to weaken standards, and welfare falls. Our results raise doubts about the social benefits of corporate self-regulation, and highlight the dangers of lengthy delays between legislative mandates for new regulations and their implementation. Copyright 2000 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

A Model of Sliding-Scale Regulation

Price caps, while widely touted, are less commonly implemented. Most incentive schemes involve profit sharing and are, thus, variants of sliding-scale regulation. I show that, relative to price caps, some degree of profit sharing always increases expected welfare. Numerical simulations show that welfare may be enhanced by large amounts of profit sharing and by granting the firm a greater share of gains than of losses. Simulations also suggest profit sharing is most beneficial when the firms initial cost is high and cost-reducing innovations are difficult to achieve but offer the potential for substantial savings.

The Means and End of Greenwash

Corporate claims about environmental performance have increased rapidly in recent years, as has the incidence of greenwash, that is, communication that misleads people into forming overly positive beliefs about an organization’s environmental practices or products. References to greenwash in the literature have grown rapidly since the term was introduced more than 2 decades ago, with a sharp increase in articles since 2011. We review and synthesize this fragmented and multidisciplinary literature, showing that greenwash is a broad umbrella term that encompasses a variety of specific forms of misleading environmental communication. More research is needed that identifies and catalogues the varieties of greenwash, theorizes and models their mechanisms drawing on existing social science research, and measures their impacts on corporate performance and social welfare.

Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Protection

This talk summarizes the results of a series of papers that John Maxwell and I (along with colleagues at other universities) have been working on for some time. Our goals are to understand why companies voluntarily engage in environmental protection, and to understand the implications of these actions for social welfare and for government policy.1

What do Facilitating Practices Facilitate? An Empirical Investigation of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts

Long-term contracts often include most-favored-nation clauses (MFNs), which are nondiscrimination guarantees that obligate a buyer or seller to treat all trading partners symmetrically in pricing decisions. Recent theoretical work has shown that such clauses can facilitate tacit collusion by increasing the cost of selective price changes aimed at attracting new business. An alternative view is that MFNs serve to facilitate efficient price adjustment in extended exchange relationships. We test these competing hypotheses using data from long-term natural gas contracts, many of which employ MFNs. Our conclusion is that the pattern of MFN adoption, in conjunction with the structure of the nondiscrimination regions and the parallels with other nonstrategic price escalation provisions, lends strong support to the efficiency rationale.

Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration and Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure

Corporate greenwashing has accelerated in recent years, bringing in its wake growing skepticism about corporate green claims. Although a theory of the drivers and deterrents of greenwashing has begun to emerge, it is static in nature and does not incorporate the full range of ways in which firms can misrepresent their environmental performance. Our contribution is threefold. First, we extend the theory of organizational information disclosure to incorporate the possibility of undue modesty about a firms environmental, social, and governance practices. Second, we hypothesize about the drivers of exaggeration and undue modesty based on which of a firms stakeholders are salient at a given point in time; to do so, we place the firm within a dynamic context that has largely been missing in the prior literature. Third, we test our hypotheses using a data set that allows us to directly compare corporate green claims against actual performance. Results reveal that corporate output growth, deregulation, and low profits under deregulation significantly affect the choice between greenwashing and brownwashing. The effects of growth and profits are mitigated by external scrutiny.

Does Disclosure Reduce Pollution? Evidence from India's Green Rating Project

Public disclosure programs that collect and disseminate information about firms’ environmental performance are increasingly popular in both developed and developing countries. Yet little is known about whether they actually improve environmental performance, particularly in the latter setting. We use detailed plant-level survey data to evaluate the impact of India’s Green Rating Project (GRP) on the environmental performance of the country’s largest pulp and paper plants. We find that the GRP drove significant reductions in pollution loadings among dirty plants but not among cleaner ones. This result comports with statistical and anecdotal evaluations of similar disclosure programs. We also find that plants located in wealthier communities were more responsive to GRP ratings, as were single-plant firms.