Thomas R. Cusack

Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China

Military expenditures of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Peoples Republic of China are examined from two perspectives: (1) a modification of the traditional Richardson arms race formulation and (2) the notion that the military budget is used by decision makers, in part, to respond to the domestic political and economic environment. These competing formulations are juxtaposed in an empirical analysis of their relevance for understanding contemporary arms allocation decisions. The empirical evaluation of these processes is informed by a critical appraisal of alternative assessments of military allocations, as reflected in data provided by the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research International, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and William T. Lee, a noted defense analyst. The findings suggest that the arms race formulation is empirically deficient in accounting for the spending patterns of the United States, Soviet Union, and Peoples Republic of China in the period from 1949 to 1978. For both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the use of the military allocation process to influence domestic political and economic conditions receives considerable support. It is also clear from the analysis conducted that the choice of data, especially with regard to Soviet spending, plays a significant role in these findings.

The Political Economy of US Military Spending

The causes of the dramatic rise in military spending in the post-war era have been the subject of much political and academic controversy. No extant formulation seems to provide a compelling explanation of the dynamics involved in the levels of, and rates of change in, such spending. In light of this, the authors develop a new model, based mainly on a political-business cycle argument, to account for these dynamics. The basic proposition in this model is that variations in national defense spending arise from political considerations which are related to real and desired conditions within the national economy. Applying this model to the experience of the United States 1948-1976, the authors show that it has a large measure of empirical validity. If one removes the effects of war-time mobilization, it is clear that for the United States the principal driving forces in military spending dynamics were (1) the perceived utility of such spending in stabilizing aggregate demand, (2) the political or electoral value of the perceived economic effects arising out of such spending, and (3) the pressures of institutional-constituency demands.

Prelude to war: Incidence, escalation and intervention in international disputes, 1900–1976

The study provides an overview of a set of data describing the incidence and character of serious international disputes in the twentieth century. The principal findings reported include: Average annual incidence of serious international disputes has risen more than fourfold between 1900 and 1976. The underlying cause of this increase seems to be simply the increased size of the international system. The relative likelihood with which a serious dispute culminates in war is 1 in 9. However, there are definite differences in this relative frequency. Disputes involving major powers escalate to war approximately 1 in 5 times. Disputes involving only minor powers culminate in war with a likelihood of 1 in 20. Intervention in ongoing disputes increases the chance of war. The character of intervention has changed throughout the century with initiators less able to attract support and the targets of threat and force more able to do so.

Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System

For hundreds of years realists have debated idealists about the nature of the interstate system and the most effective means to promote the endurance of the system and the survival of individual states. This paper uses a computer simulation called EARTH ( E xploring A lternative R ealpolitik T heses) to explore the viability of collective security in a realist world. The results of our experiments indicate that the practice of collective security promotes the endurance of the entire system. Our results also show that states that practice collective security principles are more likely to survive in a realist world than states that operate according to realist principles.

The evolution of power, threat, and security: Past and potential developments

This paper describes the development of the international military situation over the past three decades and explores the potential for its transformation under different assumptions regarding economic conditions and the character of international relations. Using newly derived indices in the conventional military area, an assessment is made of the shifting tides in the power, threat and security situation that has confronted twenty‐five important states in the international system during the recent past. The past is then contrasted with some possible alternative developments. These developments are assayed using a global simulation model, GLOBUS, developed at the Science Center Berlin.

On the theoretical deficit in the study of war

The volume of research on the causes and consequences of war has grown significantly over the last two decades. Since its origins, it has been criticized for the lack of theoretical guidance and its failure to produce integrative cumulativeness. The assessment provided here is contrary to the very bleak picture generally drawn and argues that there has been some progress. Furthermore, it is suggested that the kind of closure some critics hold up as an ideal is misleading and inappropriate. Enhancement of the quality of this sort of research in the future is argued to depend upon (1) the continued development of contending theoretical formulations wherein war is seen as part of the broader range of international relations, (2) close attention to the various aspects of the war process, and (3) efforts to solidify organizational elements of the field.

Balancing behavior in the interstate system, 1816–1976

The concept of balancing—joining the weaker party in a conflict—is an important part of the realist literature. The concept has a modern counterpart in the literature on extended deterrence that grew up in the nuclear era. But despite the importance of this concept, it has not been subjected to extensive empirical study. In this paper, we show how the realist and extended deterrence literature are linked, and go on to test for the existence of balancing behavior in serious disputes for the 1816–1976 time period. The results indicate that, while there are many disputes in which no joining occurs, when it does happen, the capability balance is likely to shift to favor the initially smaller side, as the balancing literature would predict.

Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions Where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information

What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a standalone player and reduces the demands of the outside player: being in a group lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may harm also the intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and preference independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis we also distinguishing between coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always perfectly aligned.What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces the demands of the outside player. Group membership lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may harm also the intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and preference independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis, we also distinguish between coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always perfectly aligned.

The Endless Election: 1990 in the German Democratic Republic

The breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe has been characterized as the ‘black Friday of the social sciences’ by Klaus von Beyme (1990a, p.472). Few had theorized about and even fewer had predicted the end of the former Stalinist regimes and with them the collapse of the post-1945 bipolar structure and Soviet hegemony in the region. All the East European states are now enmeshed in a transition that many hope will lead to stable democratic order. Whether this will occur or not is, as with the breakdown, something social science cannot predict today. But, in the case of the GDR, this may be less problematic in both theoretical and practical terms. The German problem, at least in the eyes of some Germans, was solved with the unification. Of all the nations that are now in the process of transition to democracy, what was once the GDR is in a privileged position: The former GDR is about to slip into a new paternalistic relationship, in order to allow all its problems to be solved by a big brother’ (von Beyme 1990b, p.180).