Thomas Rabeyron

Feeling the Future: A Meta-Analysis of 90 Experiments on the Anomalous Anticipation of Random Future Events

In 2011, one of the authors (DJB) published a report of nine experiments in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology purporting to demonstrate that an individual’s cognitive and affective responses can be influenced by randomly selected stimulus events that do not occur until after his or her responses have already been made and recorded, a generalized variant of the phenomenon traditionally denoted by the term precognition. To encourage replications, all materials needed to conduct them were made available on request. We here report a meta-analysis of 90 experiments from 33 laboratories in 14 countries which yielded an overall effect greater than 6 sigma, z = 6.40, p = 1.2 × 10 -10 with an effect size (Hedges’ g) of 0.09. A Bayesian analysis yielded a Bayes Factor of 5.1 × 10 9, greatly exceeding the criterion value of 100 for “decisive evidence” in support of the experimental hypothesis. When DJB’s original experiments are excluded, the combined effect size for replications by independent investigators is 0.06, z = 4.16, p = 1.1 × 10 -5, and the BF value is 3,853, again exceeding the criterion for “decisive evidence.” The number of potentially unretrieved experiments required to reduce the overall effect size of the complete database to a trivial value of 0.01 is 544, and seven of eight additional statistical tests support the conclusion that the database is not significantly compromised by either selection bias or by intense “ p-hacking”—the selective suppression of findings or analyses that failed to yield statistical significance. P-curve analysis, a recently introduced statistical technique, estimates the true effect size of the experiments to be 0.20 for the complete database and 0.24 for the independent replications, virtually identical to the effect size of DJB’s original experiments (0.22) and the closely related “presentiment” experiments (0.21). We discuss the controversial status of precognition and other anomalous effects collectively known as psi.

Anomalous Experiences, Trauma, and Symbolization Processes at the Frontiers between Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neurosciences

Anomalous or exceptional experiences are uncommon experiences which are usually interpreted as being paranormal by those who report them. These experiences have long remained difficult to explain, but current progress in cognitive neuroscience and psychoanalysis sheds light on the contexts in which they emerge, as well as on their underlying processes. Following a brief description of the different types of anomalous experiences, we underline how they can be better understood at the frontiers between psychoanalysis and cognitive neurosciences. In this regard, three main lines of research are discussed and illustrated, alongside clinical cases which come from a clinical service specializing in anomalous experiences. First, we study the links between anomalous experiences and hallucinatory processes, by showing that anomalous experiences frequently occur as a specific reaction to negative life events, in which case they mainly take the form of non-pathological hallucinations. Next, we propose to analyze these experiences from the perspective of their traumatic aspects and the altered states of consciousness they often imply. Finally, these experiences are considered to be the consequence of a hypersensitivity that can be linked to an increase in psychic permeability. In conclusion, these different processes lead us to consider anomalous experiences as primary forms of symbolization and transformation of the subjective experience, especially during, or after traumatic situations.

Retro-priming, priming, and double testing: psi and replication in a test-retest design.

Numerous experiments have been conducted in recent years on anomalous retroactive influences on cognition and affect (Bem, 2010), yet more data are needed to understand these processes precisely. For this purpose, we carried out an initial retro-priming study in which the response times of 162 participants were measured (Rabeyron and Watt, 2010). In the current paper, we present the results of a second study in which we selected those participants who demonstrated the strongest retro-priming effect during the first study, in order to see if we could replicate this effect and therefore select high scoring participants. An additional objective was to try to find correlations between psychological characteristics (anomalous experiences, mental health, mental boundaries, trauma, negative life events) and retro-priming results for the high scoring participants. The retro-priming effect was also compared with performance on a classical priming task. Twenty-eight participants returned to the laboratory for this new study. The results, for the whole group, on the retro-priming task, were negative and non-significant (es = −0.25, ns) and the results were significant on the priming task (es = 0.63, p < 0.1). We obtained overall negative effects on retro-priming results for all the sub-groups (students, male, female). Ten participants were found to have positive results on the two retro-priming studies, but no specific psychological variables were found for these participants compared to the others. Several hypotheses are considered in explaining these results, and the author provide some final thoughts concerning psi and replicability.

Anomalous experiences, psi and functional neuroimaging

Over the past decade, there has been increasing scientific interest in anomalous experiences. These can be defined as “uncommon experience[s] […] that, although [they] may be experienced by a significant number of persons […], [are] believed to deviate from ordinary experience or from the usually accepted explanation of reality according to Western mainstream science” (Cardena et al., 2014). This scientific interest has led to important contributions toward the understanding of several aspects of these experiences (Brugger and Mohr, 2008). One of the most controversial hypotheses associated with anomalous experiences is the psi hypothesis, which states that anomalous experiences sometimes imply forms of interactions falling outside currently known biological and physical mechanisms (Bem and Honorton, 1994). Thus, far, small but persistent effects are frequently reported in experiments testing the psi hypothesis (Radin, 2006), while no consensus has been reached concerning their explanation (Alcock et al., 2003). Research testing the psi hypothesis has occasionally generated a great deal of interest and controversy. The most recent example is Bems series of precognition experiments (Bem, 2011), which triggered important methodological questionings on the validity of the frequentist approach (Miller, 2011; Rouder and Morey, 2011; Wagenmakers et al., 2011), widely used in experimental sciences. Bems paper was followed by an attempt of replication (Ritchie et al., 2012a), which resulted in reflections on the difficulty in publishing direct replications in psychology (Ritchie et al., 2012b). This debate, still ongoing, has shown how research about anomalous experiences can stimulate cutting-edge discussions on scientific methodology. This heuristic value of anomalous experiences has a history even in the infancy of cognitive neuroscience with the German neurologist Hans Berger, inventor of electroencephalography and the first person to describe different brain waves, having previously had a telepathic experience with his sister which made him obsessed by the idea of how his mind could have carried such a signal (Berger, 1940). More recently, attempts to test the psi hypothesis and find its neural correlates have been carried out using functional neuroimaging. The rationale behind these experiments is that if psi-related processes are indeed present in the brain, even unconsciously, they should be observable using functional neuroimaging. An example of such a study would be to test whether the brain activity of Participant A would be influenced when Participant B, situated in another isolated room, intends to send information to or simply concentrate on Participant A. Various types of hypothetical phenomena have already been examined, including forms of telepathy (Standish et al., 2003; Richards et al., 2005; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2008; Venkatasubramanian et al., 2008), distant intentionality (Achterberg et al., 2005), and precognition (Bierman and Scholte, 2002; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2008). All these six studies but one (Moulton and Kosslyn, 2008) reported results consistent with the psi hypothesis. Unfortunately, several of these studies suffer from methodological weaknesses that could account for the reported effects. Listing these flaws may contribute to the improvement of the research in this field. These methodological weaknesses can be grouped into four categories: Counter-balancing across participants is routinely used in experimental psychology and cognitive sciences to avoid systematic biases due to experimental conditions specific to one or several participants. In Venkatasubramanian et al. (2008), the receiver and the sender were presented green and red-colored stars to indicate the onset of telepathy and control trials, respectively. It is therefore not possible to know whether the difference in brain activity between the two conditions is due to the nature of the trial (telepathy vs. control) or to the difference in the color of the stimulus indicating trial onset. To disentangle this potential confound, the reverse cue association has to be given for half of the trials—or half of the participants, if their number is sufficient. Trial order randomization prevents biases that could be caused by the particular order of the trial conditions. Such biases can be caused by participants detecting a certain pattern (e.g., repetitions or alternations), leading to expectations and thus detectable neural signatures that could bias the results. Habituation, leading to different brain activity between the beginning and the end of the experiment may also bias the results. To counter-balance the potential biases produced by a particular sequence—even if it was generated randomly—each participant should be given a distinct series of randomly-ordered trials. Unfortunately, proper randomization was not met in four of the six studies: In Venkatasubramanian et al. (2008) no randomization was used at all, while in Standish et al. (2003) and Richards et al. (2005) the duration of the trials was randomized, but not their order. Moreover, in the Venkatasubramanian study, the target picture was freely chosen and drawn with a pen by one investigator used as the “sender.” A randomized target selection from a prepared set of images would have been preferable. Humans are indeed inherently biased in their attempts to generate random targets (Brugger and Taylor, 2003). Besides, a randomization would have prevented potential correlations between the target imagined by the “sender” and the guess of the “receiver” due to their potential interaction or common immediate past experience before the experiment. Information shielding: All normal mechanisms have to be excluded for correlations between the source (e.g., a “sender” or healer) and the participants brain activity to be considered as psi (see e.g., Alcock et al., 2003). However, some reports showed weaknesses on this crucial point. In Achterberg et al. (2005), the healers task is to influence from a distance the participant lying inside the scanner. In this study, the same healer was used for three different participants while the same sequence (i.e., the order of control and active sessions) was used. Consequently, this particular healer knew in advance this sequence, and it is not specified whether contact between the healer and the participants was prevented. In the Venkatasubramanian et al. (2008) study, the authors used the same target image for the only two participants whilst no information concerning a possible interaction between them was provided, potentially leading to the same problem. Small sample size, i.e., too small a number of participants and/or trials per participant, was also a weakness of several studies (Standish et al., 2003; Richards et al., 2005; Venkatasubramanian et al., 2008). As underpowered studies most often miss existing effects (leading to false negatives), reported positive results have a low probability to reflect a true effect (see e.g., Button et al., 2013). Furthermore, with too few participants, proper counter-balancing is difficult and the risk of confounds is greater. Two studies (Bierman and Scholte, 2002; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2008), however, appear methodologically sound. Both explored various potential sources of artifacts that could account for their respective significant results. Bierman and Scholte (2002) could not find any classical explanation for the significant effects observed. Moulton and Kosslyn (2008), on the other hand, concluded that their results constituted “the strongest evidence yet obtained against the existence of (psi)” despite the logical difficulties in proving a negative existential proposition (Whitehead and Russell, 1910–1913). Additionally, despite the many precautions taken by the experimenters, a subtle bias was still found in one participants data, indicating that the design could potentially be flawed. Finally, none of the studies addressed the issue of the confined and noisy environment inside the scanner tube that tends to make participants uncomfortable. As this problem is currently unavoidable, the participants could be prompted about their comfort or relaxation level and their answers used as a covariate in the analysis. Testing the psi hypothesis using neuroimaging is an important topic as it may help to shed some light on the nature of anomalous experiences (Watt and Irwin, 2010; Krippner and Friedman, 2010b), on altered states of consciousness (Krippner and Friedman, 2010a; Cardena and Winkelman, 2011) and more generally on potential methodological problems in the field of psychology and neurosciences (Watt, 2005). Nevertheless, in our opinion, no firm conclusions concerning the psi hypothesis can be made on the basis of this corpus of functional neuroimaging data, and more methodologically sound results need to be generated.

Une analyse du processus créateur chez Jean Renoir... : la quête de l’unité par le réel et le groupe

Nous proposons dans ce travail une etude des liens entre groupe et creativite a partir de l’œuvre du cineaste francais Jean Renoir. Nous nous sommes appuye en particulier sur sa filmographie et plusieurs de ses ecrits, dont son autobiographie, pour orienter nos reflexions. Celles-ci abordent en premier lieu le role de la transmission inter- et transgenerationnelle du pere au fils – son pere etant le celebre peintre Auguste Renoir – d’un processus createur qui s’etend sur deux generations. Le groupe apparait alors aussi bien comme la source du processus createur du cineaste que comme son objet d’etude, Renoir faisant un usage particulier du groupe par le biais de sa « methode ». Celle-ci vise a creer les conditions de possibilites d’un rapport authentique a l’autre que l’on retrouve dans les multiples rencontres ayant jalonne son existence et son parcours de creation. Renoir tente ainsi d’utiliser le groupe pour mieux saisir et mettre en evidence une forme de verite du reel qui necessite le passage par l’experience sensible. Cela le conduira a explorer tout au long de son œuvre les differentes facettes de son « realisme poetique », soulignant la profondeur et la complexite des liens qui unissent les etres et pouvant les mener au sentiment d’unite.