Thomas Rønde

Foreign Direct Investment and Spillovers Through Workers' Mobility

We analyze a model where a multinational firm can use its superior technology in a foreign subsidiary only after appropriate training of local managers. Technological spillovers from foreign direct investment arise when such managers are later hired by a local firm. Benefits for the host economy may also take the form of the rent that trained managers receive by the foreign affiliate to prevent them from moving to local competitors. We study conditions under which technological spillovers occur. We also show that under certain circumstances the multinational firm might find it optimal to resort to export instead of foreign direct investment, to avoid dissipation of its intangible assets.

High-tech clusters, technology spillovers, and trade secret laws

We analyze firms’ incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is shown that firms’ incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following three conditions are met: 1) technological progress is rapid; 2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; 3) the probability of a single firm to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. We show that some trade secret protection is always beneficial for firms’ profits and stimulates clustering. Excessive protection may impede technology spillovers and reduce firms’ incentives to cluster.

Regulation of pharmaceutical prices: Evidence from a reference price reform in Denmark

Reference price systems for prescription drugs constitute widely adopted cost containment tools. Under these regimes, patients co-pay a fraction of the difference between a drugs pharmacy retail price and a reference price that is set by the government. Reference prices are either externally (based on drug prices in other countries) or internally (based on domestic drug prices) determined. We study the effects of a change from external to internal reference pricing in Denmark in 2005. We find that the reform led to substantial reductions in retail prices, reference prices and patient co-payments as well as to sizable decreases in overall producer revenues and health care expenditures. The reform induced consumers to substitute away from branded drugs for which we estimate strong preferences. The increase in consumer welfare due to the reform therefore depends on whether or not we take perceived quality differences into account in its calculation.

Does the Mobility of R&D Labor Increase Innovation?

We investigate the effect of mobility of highly skilled workers in Denmark on the total patenting activity of the firms involved for the population of R&D active Danish firms observed between 1999 and 2004. Our study documents how workers joining increase firms’ patenting activity. The effect is strongest if workers join from patent-active firms. We also find evidence of a positive feedback effect on patenting from workers who have left for another patent-active firm. Summing up the effects of joining and leaving workers, we show that labor mobility increases the total innovative activity of the new and the old employer. Our study thus provides firm-level support for the notion that labor mobility stimulates overall innovation of a country or region.

Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure

This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent sellers investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.

Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion

This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.

Dynamic Incentives in Organizations: Success and Inertia

We present a dynamic model in which an employee of a firm searches for business projects in a changing environment. It is costly to induce the employee who found a successful project in the past period to search for a new project. Past success can therefore result in profitreducing corporate inertia. Still, when the firm chooses to counteract the reluctance to search by increasing the power of the incentives, it stimulates initial search efforts and results in higher profits. Corporate restructuring and increasing the employees authority over time are means to alleviate inertia but may undermine initial search incentives.