Thomas Scanlon

Giving desert its due

I will argue that a desert-based justification for treating a person in a certain way is a justification that holds this treatment to be justified simply by what the person is like and what he or she has done, independent of (1) the fact that treating the person in this way will have good effects (or that treating people like him or her in this way will have such effects); (2) the fact that this treatment is called for by some (justified) institution or practice; or (3) the fact that the person could have avoided being subject to this treatment by choosing appropriately, and therefore cannot complain of it. I will explore the implications of this understanding of desert for the role of desert-based justifications of blame, punishment, and economic reward.

Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 3 Sen and Consequentialism

It is a particular pleasure to be able to participate in this symposium in honor of Amartya Sen. We agree on a wide range of topics, but I will focus here on an area of relative disagreement. Sen is much more attracted to consequentialism than I am, and the main topic of my paper will be the particular version of consequentialism that he has articulated and the reasons why he is drawn to this view.

Individual Morality and the Morality of Institutions

This paper discusses the relationship between moral philosophy and political philosophy. It holds that political philosophy in one way is part of moral philosophy since it deals with the content of moral standards governing the relations between individuals and institutions. This is the “morality of institutions”. But this also leads to conclusions about individual morality, which deals with standards applicable to individuals. On the basis of a contractualist conception of individual morality and a conception of the morality of institutions that closely follows John Rawls’ theory of justice, the paper addresses the question of the foundations of the obligation to comply with institution-defined standards that are directed towards individuals. At the end, it focuses in particular on the difficulty of rationalizing that obligation in the case of unjust institutions.

Reply to Leif Wenar

Explains how a contractualist moral theory can explain the moral phenomena commonly called rights, although it does not appeal to the notion of a right as a basic element of moral thinking, or explain the difference between rights violations and wrongs of other kinds. Argues that the latter failure is not an important fault.

Reply to Zofia Stemplowska

Describes the author’s value of choice account of responsibility and examines a response by Stemplowska to an objection to this account, raised by Alex Voorhoeve. Argues that the problem raised by Voorhoeve’s example concerns the way in which risk is taken into account in contractualism rather than the value of choice account of responsibility. Departs from the author’s earlier work in arguing that the risk of harm should sometimes be taken into account on an ex ante rather than an ex post basis.

Reply to Serena Olsaretti

The paper examines how the value of choice account is supposed to explain the significance of choice in the justification of moral principles and social institutions and policies, responding to some questions and objections raised by Serena Olsaretti.

Reply to Martin O’Neill

Discusses the variety of objections to inequality, relations between these objections, and the implications of this pluralist view of equality for the question of cosmopolitanism about justice.

Reply to Jonathan Wolff

Considers the variety of egalitarian ideas and, the compatibility of equality with the recognition of forms of valuable accomplishment.

A dificuldade da tolerância

The article shows why tolerance is a complex attitude that implicates to find a just measure between an absolute acceptance and an immoderate opposition, pointing to the different internal tensions inherent to the attitude of tolerance and to the costs and risks involved in the practice of the tolerance, even in a constitutional democracy in which certain basic rights are already secured.

The case for legalised euthanasia

We cannot be sure, until the Supreme Court decides the assisted suicide cases and its decision is published, how far the justices might have accepted or rejected the arguments of the brief published below. In this introduction I shall describe the oral argument before them last January, and offer some suggestions about how, if they decide against the briefs position, as many commentators now think they will, they might do the least damage to constitutional law.