Thomas Søbirk Petersen

Just diagnosis? Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and injustices to disabled people

Most of us want to have children. We want them to be healthy and have a good start in life. One way to achieve this goal is to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). PGD enables people engaged in the process of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) to acquire information about the genetic constitution of an early embryo. On the basis of this information, a decision can be made to transfer embryos without genetic defects to the uterus and terminate those with genetic defects.1 However, is it morally acceptable to use PGD to reduce the probability of children with severe genetic diseases being born? Is the current routine use of PGD in public healthcare services to select against severe genetic diseases like anencephaly, spina bifida, cystic fibrosis and Down’s syndrome morally acceptable? These are complex questions involving a range of difficult ethical issues—for instance, critical discussions about the morality of embryo research and embryo termination.2 They also involve awkward conceptual issues concerning such matters as the meaning of words such as “disability”3 and “severe” in “severe genetic diseases”,4 which will not be discussed here. In this paper I examine an argument which aims to show that efforts to prevent the birth of severely disabled children using PGD are morally unacceptable. Essentially, this argument appeals to our concern for disabled people and the belief that PGD, through a slippery slope process, will have bad consequences for them. I conclude that the argument is problematic for a number of reasons. But before I examine the argument itself, it will be helpful to separate two types of slippery slope argument since these involve different kinds of reasoning. Many of the arguments against PGD point to the bad consequences it can be expected to have for disabled people. Central to all these …

Good Athlete – Bad Athlete? on the ‘Role-Model Argument’ for Banning Performance-Enhancing Drugs

The paper critically discusses a role-model argument (RMA) in favour of banning performance-enhancing drugs in sport. The argument concludes that athletes should be banned from using performance-enhancing drugs because if they are allowed to use such drugs they will encourage, or cause, youngsters who look up to them to use drugs in a way that would be harmful. In Section 2 the structure of the argument and some versions of it are presented. In Section 3 a critical discussion of RMA is presented. It is argued that we should be reluctant to accept the argument as it stands for at least three reasons: (i) it rests on an unsupported empirical claim; (ii) it also makes a false empirical claim; and (iii) the normative premise of the argument is too demanding morally. Further objections to the RMA are also discussed, but argued to be beside the point

Ethics, organ donation and tax: a proposal

Five arguments are presented in favour of the proposal that people who opt in as organ donors should receive a tax break. These arguments appeal to welfare, autonomy, fairness, distributive justice and self-ownership, respectively. Eight worries about the proposal are considered in this paper. These objections focus upon no-effect and counter-productiveness, the Titmuss concern about social meaning, exploitation of the poor, commodification, inequality and unequal status, the notion that there are better alternatives, unacceptable expense, and concerns about the veto of relatives. The paper argues that none of the objections to the proposal is very telling.

Should Athletes Be Allowed to Use All Kinds of Performance-Enhancing Drugs?—A Critical Note on Claudio M. Tamburrini

More generally he concludes that: “. . . all kinds of performance-enhancing methods [and substances] should be allowed in profes-sional sports (10: p. 216).” To our surprise, no one has conducted a systematic investigation of Tamburrini’s arguments in any book or international journal. Tamburrini’s view is sometimes mentioned in books and articles on the ethics of doping—and usually his view is stated as a controversial point of view not worth discussing.

A woman's choice? On women, assisted reproduction and social coercion.

This paper critically discusses an argument that is sometimes pressed into service in the ethical debate about the use of assisted reproduction. The argument runs roughly as follows: we should prevent women from using assisted reproduction techniques, because women who want to use the technology have been socially coerced into desiring children - and indeed have thereby been harmed by the patriarchal society in which they live. I call this the argument from coercion.Having clarified this argument, I conclude that although it addresses important issues, it is highly problematic for the following reasons. First, if women are being coerced to desire to use AR, we should eradicate the coercive elements in pro-natalist ideology, not access to AR. Second, the argument seems to have the absurd implication that we should prevent all woman, whether fertile or not, to try to have children. Third, it seems probable that womens welfare will be greater if we let well informed and decision-competent women decide for themselves whether they want to use AR.

Should violent offenders be forced to undergo neurotechnological treatment? A critical discussion of the ‘freedom of thought’ objection

In this paper we examine one reason for rejecting the view that violent offenders should be forced to undergo neurotechnological treatments (NTs) involving such therapies as psychoactive medication to curb violent behaviour. The reason is based on the concern that forced treatment violates the offenders right to freedom of thought. We argue that this objection can be challenged. First, we present some specifications of what a right to freedom of thought might mean. We focus on the recently published views of Jared Craig, and Jan Cristopher Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel. Second, we argue that forcing violent offenders to undergo certain kinds of NTs may not violate the offenders right to freedom of thought as that right is specified by Craig, and Bublitz and Merkel. Third, even if non-consensual NT is used in a way that does violate freedom of thought, such use can be difficult to abandon without inconsistency. For if one is not an abolitionist, and therefore accepts traditional state punishments for violent offenders like imprisonment—which, the evidence shows, often violate the offenders right to freedom of thought—then, it is argued, one will have reason to accept that violent offenders can legitimately be forced to undergo NT even if doing so denies them the right to freedom of thought.

Surgical castration, coercion and ethics

John McMillans detailed ethical analysis concerning the use of surgical castration of sex offenders in the Czech Republic and Germany is mainly devoted to considerations of coercion.1 This is not surprising. When castration is offered as an option to offenders and, at the same time, constitutes the only means by which these offenders are likely to be released from prison, it is reasonable—and close to the heart of modern medical ethics—to consider whether the offer involves some kind of coercion. However, despite McMillans seemingly careful consideration of this question, it appears to us that the matter is more complicated than his approach to it suggests. The first thing that adds to the complexity of the discussion concerns the alternative for sex offenders who do not accept the offer of castration. As mentioned, it is likely that these offenders will be kept in prison. McMillan even underlines that they may be detained ‘indefinitely’. And the response report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) to the Czech Government also emphasises—as part of the Czech Criminal Code—the possibility of ‘security detention’ that will last for as long as required for ‘the protection of society’.2 Suppose, …

On the partiality of procreative beneficence: a critical note

The aim of this paper is to criticise the well-discussed principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) lately refined by Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane. First, it is argued that advocates of PB leave us with an implausible justification for the moral partiality towards the child (or children) which reproducers decide to bring into existence as compared with all other individuals. This is implausible because the reasons given in favour of the partiality of PB, which are based on practical reason and common-sense morality, can just as well be used to guide reproducers to make choices that do not support partiality towards ones possible children. This seems to be true as least in some situations. Second, it is argued that Jakob Elsters recent critique of PB is problematic and specifically that a counterexample designed by Elster to criticise PB because of its partiality towards ones own children misses the target. Finally, a genuine counterexample to PB is developed in order to show that the partiality of PB leads to the wrong answer in a specific case.

Should neurotechnological treatments offered to offenders always be in their best interests

The paper critically discusses the moral view that neurotechnological behavioural treatment for criminal offenders should only be offered if it is in their best interests. First, I show that it is difficult to apply and assess the notion of the offenders best interests unless one has a clear idea of what ‘best interests’ means. Second, I argue that if one accepts that harmful punishment of offenders has a place in the criminal justice system, it seems inconsistent not to accept the practice of offering offenders treatment even when the state will harm them in applying the treatment. Finally, leading penal theories like consequentialists and retributivists would not accept that the offenders best interests, at least in certain situations, impose a necessary condition for the treatment of an offender.

Poverty relief: philanthropy versus changing the system: a critical discussion of some objections to the 'Singer Solution'

The aim of this paper is to present and evaluate a specific critical discussion of Peter Singers view on philanthropy. This critique of Singers position takes several forms, and here we focus on only two of these. First of all, it is claimed that philanthropy (based upon the giving up of luxury goods) should be avoided, because it harms the poor. As we shall see this is a view defended by Andrew Kuper. However, philanthropy is also accused of harming the poor by being sub-optimal and standing in the way of the more effective and lasting poverty relief brought about by changes in the political and economic system. This second complaint is defended by, among others, Paul Gomberg, Anthony Langlois and David Schweickart, as well as Kuper. To our knowledge, little systematic work has been done on the presentation and evaluation of theses objections to philanthropy. In what follows, the objections are dealt with in connection with private donations made by individuals, as this is the focus, and target, of the philosophers/scientists we wish to discuss.