Thomas V. Morris

The Concept of God.

Functionalism and theological language, William P. Alston Divine necessity, Robert Merrihew Adams Does traditional theism entail pantheism?, Robert Oakes Gods body, William J. Wainwright Must God create the best?, Robert Merrihew Adams Duty and divine goodness, Thomas V. Morris The definition of omnipotence, Anthony Kenny Maximal power, Thomas P. Flint & Alfred J. Freddoso On Ockhams way out, Alvin Plantinga On the compossibility of the divine attributes, David Blumenfeld Eternity, Eleonore Stump & Norman Kretzmann Simplicity and immutability in God, William E. Mann.

On God and Mann: A View of Divine Simplicity

One of the most difficult and perplexing tenets of classical theism is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Broadly put, this is generally understood to be the thesis that God is altogether without any proper parts, composition, or metaphysical complexity whatsoever. For a good deal more than a millennium, veritable armies of philosophical theologians – Jewish, Christian and Islamic – proclaimed the truth and importance of divine simplicity. Yet in our own time, the doctrine has enjoyed no such support. Among many otherwise orthodox theists, those who do not just disregard it completely explicitly deny it. However, in a couple of recent articles, William E. Mann has attempted to expound the idea of divine simplicity anew and to defend it against a number of criticisms. He even has gone so far as to hint at reaffirming its importance, suggesting that the doctrine may have a significant amount of explanatory power and other theoretical virtue as part of an overall account of the nature of God, by either entailing or in other ways providing for much else that traditional theists have wanted to say about God. In this paper, I want to take a close look at Manns formulation of the doctrine and at a general supporting theory he adumbrates in his attempt to render more plausible, or at least more defensible, various of its elements and implications. As Mann has made what is arguably the best attempt to defend the doctrine in recent years, I think that such an examination is important and will repay our efforts.

The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes.

items whose existence and nature do not depend on minds. Grossmann develops his empiricism and realism by interacting with prominent figures from the history of philosophy. He devotes chapters, for example, to Descartes, Berkeley, Reid, Kant, and Brentano on perception, and to Kant, Bolzano, Mill, and Frege on mathematical knowledge. These historical chapters, typically concise, clear, and illuminating, are followed by systematic chapters on the relevant philosophical issues. The book falls into three main parts: (1) Knowledge of the External World: Perception, (2) Knowledge of Our Minds: Introspection, and (3) Mathematical Knowledge: Perception Again. Each part contributes to a wide-ranging defense of Grossmanns fourth way, a way that goes against the grain of much contemporary epistemology. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.33 on Sat, 26 Nov 2016 04:17:33 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Defining the Divine

There is no more central concept in the philosophy of religion than the concept of God. The theist proposes and the atheist denies that this focal concept is instantiated in the actual world. And of course, as in every major philosophical dispute, an understanding and assessment of the best arguments offered by both sides requires a good grasp of precisely what is the subject of argument. Yet it is a rather remarkable feature of the extensive contemporary literature in the philosophy of religion that little attention has been given to the question of a proper definition of the divine. What exactly is meant in traditional religious discourse by those terms standardly translated as ‘God’? What is the proper source or method for articulating a philosophically adequate conception of the divine? In this essay, I want to begin to explore such issues as these. As we shall see, the definition of such a metaphysically important term as ‘God’ is no trivial matter and can itself yield philosophical insight.