Thomas W. Gallant

The social history of modern Greece: a roundtable

How is social history written and practiced in differing political and geographical contexts? As a journal, Social History has encouraged reflection on trajectories in different parts of the world though special issues on, most recently, Spain, the Caribbean, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics.1 This round-table discussion builds on this series of conversations by examining the social history and historiography of modern Greece – as written both within and outside of the country – and its contribution to wider European and global histories. Five social historians, at different career stages with contrasting biographies, participated in the roundtable through an exchange of views during the spring of 2017. The aims were to reflect on academic influences and trajectories; to identify future directions for the social history of modern Greece, including ways to better link it with the study of wider regions; and to analyse the very real effects of political change and financial crisis for the types of history that are produced and the choices that social historians of Greece make.

Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trial of Statesmanship (review)

third try would force Constantine to authorize elections that everyone agreed would bring George Papandreou back to power. Acting U.S. Ambassador Norbert Anschuetz, in a telegram Miller included in the FRUS collection (doc. 205, 5 September 1965), supported the King’s appeal to the U.S. National Security Council. According to the heavily-redacted telegram, the “Embassy has concluded George Papandreou’s return to power should be avoided if this can be done without a direct and open confrontation with him.” A week later, in a telegram Miller chose not to include in the FRUS, Anschuetz explained how the need for “utmost discretion” in preventing George Papandreou’s return to power supported the case for secret CIA payoffs. “In the early 1950s [the] overwhelming weight of U.S. influence deriving from American aid made it possible for us [to] take [a] strong political position without undue risk. Now . . . that American aid has virtually disappeared, American efforts to influence political solutions must be conducted with greatest possible deftness and discretion” (Anschuetz telegram, 10 September 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, Cyprus, Greece, box 126, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas). Notably, in advocating a deft and discreet covert CIA program (whether or not it was approved remains obscure based on available documentation), Anschuetz made clear that the real danger in Greece was not George Papandreou, but shifts in geo-political and domestic Greek realities that had “combined to create [a] movement of new dimensions in Greek political life” of which Andreas Papandreou had assumed the leadership. In this regard, Miller is surely correct in citing the inability of the United States to disengage itself from Greece’s domestic affairs, “except on terms it was unwilling to accept.” Unfortunately, among the terms U.S. policymakers were unable to accept were long-suppressed popular aspirations for domestic reform and greater respect for Greek national interests within its own neighborhood.