Thorolfur Matthiasson

Benefits of traceability in fish supply chains – case studies

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the seafood industry perceives benefits of traceability implementation. Furthermore, ex ante cost‐benefit analyses (CBAs) of adopting new traceability systems are conducted for two firms, operating at different steps of the seafood supply chains, to obtain preliminary knowledge on the net benefits of the project and on how costs and benefits are distributed among the actors.Design/methodology/approach – This is a case‐based study.Findings – The surveyed companies perceive improving supply chain management as the most important benefit of traceability. Other benefits are increase of the ability to retain existing customers; product quality improvement; product differentiation; and reduction of customer complaints. However, the quantifiable benefits are perceived differently by the actors at different steps in the supply chains, e.g. implementing radio frequency identification (RFID) tags on pallets in the seafood trading company case study shows tan...

Early discharge and home intervention reduces unit costs after total hip replacement: results of a cost analysis in a randomized study

Total hip replacement (THR) is a common and costly procedure. The number of THR is expected to increase over the coming years. Two pathways of postoperative treatment were compared in a randomized study. Fifty patients from two hospitals were randomized into a study group (SG) of 27 patients receiving preoperative and postoperative education programs, as well as home visits from an outpatient team. A control group (CG) of 23 patients received “conventional” rehabilitation augmented by a stay at a rehabilitation center if needed. All costs for the two groups both in hospitals and after discharge were collected and analyzed. On average total costs for the SG were

The Icelandic Debate on the Case For a Fishing Fee: A Non-Technical Introduction

8,550 and

Cost Sharing and Catch Sharing

11,952 for the CG, a 28% cost reduction. Total inpatient costs were

Fixed wage or share: Contingent contract renewal and skipper motivation

5,225 for the SG and

The Icelandic Response to the Collapse of the Financial Sector in October 2008

6,515 for the CG. In a regression analysis the group difference is statistically significant. Adjusting for changes in the Oxford Hip Score gives effective costs (C/E). The ratio of the SGs C/E to the CGs is 0.60. That is a cost-effectiveness gain of 40%. A shorter hospital stay augmented with better preoperative education and home treatment appears to be more effective and costs less than the traditional in hospital pathway of treatment.

Positioning Fisheries in a Changing World

TResearch by J.D. Sachs and A.M. Warner, indicates that resource-rich countries are less successful in terms of economic growth than are resource-poor countries. The question of what measures Icelanders need to take to prevent their fishery wealth from limiting economic growth is posed. The main body of the essay discusses arguments for a fishing fee. The principal arguments for a fishing fee are listed. One type of argument concerns flexibility, with a view to possibly introducing other forms of management or altering the distribution of profit in the future. Another type of argument concerns equity and fairness, contending that having a fishing fee makes it easier to ensure that the entire nation enjoys the benefit of the resource. A third type of argument is connected to risk-management, maintaining that, if properly arranged, a fishing fee would make it possible to offer vessel operators an indirect insurance policy which otherwise would not be available to them. The fourth type of argument concerns counter-cyclical policy and the problem of co-habitation of the fishery industry and other export industries. and refers to the possibility of wage earners and/or taxpayers being forced (or tempted) to apply general policy instruments to secure a portion of the fishery rent. The general measures available to obtain a piece of the fishery rent share a common failing: their use unavoidably increases costs for other sectors of industry and thus limits possibilities for growth in those sectors and links their performance to fisheries performance. Then there are arguments for neutrality, based on the idea that so-called resource rent taxes should not affect the use of the factors of production. And finally there are economic growth arguments, which can be linked to theories of rent- seeking and Dutch disease

Closing the open sea: Development of fishery management in four Icelandic fisheries

The model developed in this paper attempts to provide an explanation of the fact that Icelandic vessel owners and Icelandic skippers do not share costs of operation of a vessel. In the model a skipper is contracted to take a fishing vessel to the fishing ground. The skipper is remunerated with a share of the catch, subject to an agreed minimum. Skippers and vessel owners are modelled as if risk neutral. Skippers develop a fishing strategy which is more costly, the higher the value of the potential catch associated with that strategy. Costs that accrue are partly pecuniary (and shareable) and partly skipper-specific (and non- shareable). The conclusions of the paper demonstrate that given the assumptions of our model, a vessel owner should prefer a remuneration contract with a positive revenue share and zero cost share.

Principles for distribution of rent from a 'commons'

Fishermen around the world are usually remunerated by shares. Iceland is no exception in that respect. The fixed wage systems that have been tried out have been short-lived and their utilization limited. The fundamental question asked in this paper is: Why do almost all vessel owners use the same remuneration principles? The answer offered is that the circumstances under which fishing is conducted play a vital role here. Surveillance of the conduct of employees is almost impossible. Hence, vessel owners must develop some system for motivating workers and to discourage shirking. It is shown that sharing is better than alternative forms of remuneration in that respect. The production unit is a small platform that is not easily abandoned during a trip. The product of a given trip is well defined. All of these factors help to explain the prevalence of sharing in fisheries.

Consolidation and distribution of quota holdings in the Icelandic fisheries

The debt-relief measures taken by the Icelandic government have proven to create a win-win situation for the financial sector, the business sector, families and the Icelandic economy in general. By taking a concerted effort to clean out the bad firms and correct the balance sheet of liveable firms a signal was sent to all suppliers to Icelandic firms: Bankruptcy risk has been minimalized. Thus, write downs of debt helped to rebuild trust that had been lost as a consequence of the collapse of the Icelandic banks. Other measures taken by the Icelandic government with the help and approval of the IMF has also alleviated the adjustment to the post-collapse realities. Emphasis on social services, health and education has been helpful in enhancing investment in human capital. The fact that the Icelandic unemployment rate has fallen below 5% can serve as an illustration that those endeavours have not been in vain. The Icelandic economy still faces problems. Capital controls are in place and will be hard to lift. Icelanders disagree on how to organize their currency policy in the future. Lastly, productivity is still very low in many sectors.