Tibor Solymosi

A Reconstruction of Freedom in the Age of Neuroscience: A View from Neuropragmatism

Pragmatism has resurged explicitly in neopragmatism and implicitly in neurophilosophy. Neopragmatists have focused primarily on ideals, like human freedom, but at the expense of science. Neurophilosophers have focused primarily on scientific facts, but with an eye toward dismissing aspects of our self-conception like free will as illusory. In both cases, these resurgences are impoverished as each neglects what Dewey referred to as the method of intelligence. Neurophilosophical pragmatism – neuropragmatism – aims to overcome the deficiencies of neopragmatism and neurophilosophy by carrying forth the project of reconstruction by taking both the methods and results of experimental inquiry as the means for attaining ends-in-view such as human freedom.

Pragmatism, Inquiry, and Design: A Dynamic Approach

There is an underappreciated affinity between the Daniel C. Dennett’s account of the evolution of intelligence and design and the theory of inquiry developed by American pragmatists, such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey. This pragmatic theory of inquiry has its basis in homeostasis and allostasis. This biological basis serves as a dynamic platform for sophisticated technoscientific inquiry through which humans produce designs of their own as well as retroactively learn of design in nature.

Against representation: A brief introduction to cultural affordances

Cognitive science and its philosophy have been far too long consumed with representation. This concern is indicative of a creeping Cartesianism that many scientists and philosophers wish to evade. However, their naturalism is often insufficiently evolutionary to fully appreciate the lessons of pragmatism. If cognitive neuroscience and pragmatism are to be mutually beneficial, the representational-friendly scientists and the anti-representational pragmatists need an alternative to representation that still accounts for what many find so attractive about representation, namely intentionality. I propose that instead of representations we philosophers and scientists begin thinking in terms of cultural affordances. Like Gibsonian affordances, cultural affordances are opportunities for action. However, unlike Gibsonian affordances, which are merely biological and available for immediate action in the immediately present environment, cultural affordances also present opportunities for thinking about the past and acting into the future—tasks typically attributed to representations.

Neuropragmatism on the Origins of Conscious Minding

The philosophy of pragmatism has much to offer mind and life scientists in their thinking about the origins and nature of experience. In this chapter, I provide an introduction to neurophilosophical pragmatism by reviewing how classical pragmatists, such as John Dewey, reconceived concepts like experience, mind, and consciousness in light of the advances ushered forth by Darwinism. I then elaborate on a recent debate in cognitive science and neurophilosophy over how to think about conscious mental activity. In doing so, I draw on and modify the pragmatist framework sketched in the first part of the chapter.

Dewey on the Brain: Dopamine, Digital Devices, and Democracy

Central to Dewey’s treatment of the nervous system throughout his work is its import for ameliorative action. Dewey’s theory of mentation has its origins in his early thought in which he draws on contemporary physics and biology to incorporate the nascent understanding of the nervous system. This interdisciplinary approach continues through his career. After selectively reviewing Dewey’s remarks about brains and nervous systems, I apply his ameliorative theory of mind and brain to our contemporary situation in which our digital devices work against the energetic focusing that Dewey saw as integral to healthy nervous system function. I consider the threat of what Tschaepe calls dopamine democracy and reflect on whether neuropragmatism is able to meet that challenge.

Moral First Aid for a Neuroscientific Age

The rise of neuroscience brings hope to many people because its proponents and practitioners promise to resolve — somehow, at some time — many, if not most, of the ailments with which human experience is constantly consumed. From dealing with the horrors of cognitive debilitation to reveling in the wonder of understanding the most complex entity in the known universe (the human brain), neuroscientists, neurophilosophers, and neuro-enthusiasts believe a robust theory of the brain and nervous systems will bring not only practical utility but peace of mind and peace among people. Such hopes are inextricably moral. Yet our moral development has rarely if ever kept pace with our scientific and technical development. As we venture into the still largely unknown landscape of the human nervous systems, the need for a philosophical reconstruction of key human concepts becomes ever more urgent. Given the growing neuro-hype that surrounds the deluge of neuroscientific data, especially when it comes to the neuroscientific investigation of morality, a reconstruction of ethics — one that embraces both the historical development of ethical theories and the recent scientific investigations into whether and how various ethical theories operate in the brain — provides a platform from which to reach new moral vistas.

Neuropragmatism and the Reconstruction of Scientific and Humanistic Worldviews

Neurophilosophical pragmatism, or neuropragmatism, is a scientifically informed treatment of cognition, knowledge, the body-mind relation, agency, socialization, and further issues predicated on sound judgments about these basic matters. Neuropragmatism is capable of grappling with philosophical questions arising at many levels, from synapse to society. There is much at stake, as the epigraph by Dewey states. With its firm grounding in science, neuropragmatism may be the philosophy best equipped to deal productively with the challenges facing our culture, as developments in neuroscience and neurotechnology bring about both better means for dealing with old problems, and new ways of creating and dealing with the problems of today and tomorrow.

Refounding Environmental Ethics: Pragmatism, Principle, and Practice

that Munthe adequately surveyed the relevant literature. For example, Munthe fails to address Indur Goklany’s thorough treatment of the precautionary principle as the framework for evaluating threats of harm against each other (Goklany, 2001), which seems to me clearly bears relevance to Munthe’s view. Goklany argues that the only way the precautionary principle can be intelligently understood is as involving six hierarchical criteria for taking a precautionary approach to risk assessment (Goklany, 2001). Second, despite his extensive discussion of maximin and Rawls (in Chapter 3), Munthe never mentions Stephen Gardiner’s paper, ‘A Core Precautionary Principle’, in which Gardiner discusses maximin and outlines what he identifies as a core precautionary principle that draws on Rawlsian criteria (but which is not itself a maximin principle) (Gardiner, 2006). One last example is the lack of reference to Kerry Whiteside’s recent historical treatment of the precautionary principle in his Precautionary Politics (Whiteside, 2006). The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk is a valuable addition to the literature on precaution because of its reframing of the discussion away from ‘the precautionary principle’ to a focus on the normative basis of precaution more generally. Hopefully Munthe will provide further details of his account in future work.