Tiemei Li

Beyond Tax Avoidance: Offshore Firms’ Institutional Environment and Financial Reporting Quality*: BEYOND TAX AVOIDANCE

We explore how firms’ operations in Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs) through subsidiaries or affiliates affect the quality of financial reporting. Using a unique and large sample of firms that have headquarters in the 15 countries with the strictest legal regimes and have subsidiaries or affiliates in OFCs, we find that such firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than comparable firms without OFC operations. We also find that as OFC characteristics become more prevalent, firms are more likely to engage in both accrual�?based and real earnings management. More importantly, after disentangling OFC characteristics into the opportunity for tax avoidance, regulation arbitrage and secrecy policies, we find that beyond tax avoidance, regulation arbitrage and the secrecy policies of OFCs significantly affect financial reporting quality. The causal effect of OFC operations is supported by the analysis of financial reporting quality when firms set up OFC operations. Our findings are robust to various additional tests addressing potential endogeneity issues. We conclude that the assessment of a firm’s institutional environment must encompass the registration status of its subsidiaries or affiliates as well as its own.

Are offshore firms less conservative in financial reporting? International evidence

Using a large sample of multinational firms operating in offshore financial centers (offshore firms) from 1998 to 2014, this study investigates the financial reporting implications of economic activities involving offshore financial centers (OFCs). We find that offshore firms have a greater tendency to report less conservatively than non-offshore firms. Moreover, we find that financial reporting is less conservative for firms operating in OFCs with more pronounced OFC attributes than for those with less pronounced OFC attributes. Finally, we also find that firms with their headquarters registered in OFCs (type I offshore firms) tend to adopt less conservative accounting practices than those with subsidiaries operating in OFCs (type II offshore firms). Our findings provide useful insights into how a multinational firms operation in OFCs is associated with financial reporting practices.

The Corrosive Effect of Offshore Financial Centers on Multinational Firms’ Disclosure Strategy

Abstract This study investigates whether U.S. multinational firms with subsidiaries located in offshore financial centers (OFCs) (i.e. offshore firms) are more likely to be opaque in their voluntary disclosure relative to U.S. multinationals without such subsidiaries (non-offshore firms). We use management earnings forecasts to capture corporate voluntary disclosure. Consistent with the opportunism view, but inconsistent with the efficiency argument, our results (including robustness checks) show that offshore firms are less likely to issue earnings forecasts, disclose forecasts less frequently, exhibit a stronger tendency to withhold bad news forecasts, and release less precise forecasts than non-offshore firms. Moreover, of the three distinct dimensions of OFCs’ institutional environment, namely, low taxation, lax regulation, and secrecy policy, each plays a role in negatively shaping firms’ disclosure strategy. Thus, OFCs’ institutional features exacerbate the opacity that plagues firms seeking to avoid taxes via their OFC subsidiaries. Our results are consistent with the notion that, beyond the scope of taxes, multinational firms’ use of OFCs has a corrosive effect on market information dynamics. Hence, OFCs have a much wider impact on the U.S. economy as well as other major economies than just tax avoidance or evasion.