Tim Gray

The ‘Social Gap’ in Wind Farm Siting Decisions: Explanations and Policy Responses

If approximately 80% of the public in the UK support wind energy, why is only a quarter of contracted wind power capacity actually commissioned? One common answer is that this is an example of the ‘not in my backyard’ (Nimby) syndrome: yes, wind power is a good idea as long as it is not in my backyard. However, the Nimby claim that there is an attitude–behaviour gap has been rightly criticised. This article distinguishes between two kinds of gap that might be confused, namely the ‘social gap’ – between the high public support for wind energy expressed in opinion surveys and the low success rate achieved in planning applications for wind power developments – and the ‘individual gap’, which exists when an individual person has a positive attitude to wind power in general but actively opposes a particular wind power development. Three different explanations of the social gap are distinguished, only one of which depends upon the individual gap. In the second section of the article the relevance of our three explanations for policy is considered. It is argued that the different explanations suggest different policy responses and that the success of efforts to increase wind energy capacity may depend on developing a better understanding of the relative significance of the three explanations.

Participation in Fisheries Governance

1. Theorising about participatory fisheries governance - Tim S Gray 2. What role for public participation in fisheries governance - Clare Coffey 3. Engaging stakeholder preferences through deliberative democracy in North Sea fisheries governance - Jenny Hatchard 4. The role of partnerships in the governance of fisheries within the European Union - Tony Hawkins 5. Regionalisation of fisheries governance: An empty vessel or a cornucopia of opportunity - David Symes 6. Fisheries governance, socal justice and participatory decision-making - Hans-Kristian Hernes, Svein Jentoft and Knut H Mikalsen 7. Between top-down and bottom-up governance: Dutch beam trawl fishermens engagement with fisheries management - Rob van Ginkel 8. Co-management at the eleventh hour? Participation in the governance of the New England groundfish fishery - Madeleine Hall-Arber 9. Participatory governance in inshore fisheries co-management in England and Wales - Paul Knapman 10. A comparative analysis of two forms of stakeholder participation in European aquaculture governance: Self-regulation and Integrated Coastal Zone Management - Selina Stead 11. The role of UK statutory Nature Conservation Agencies in the environmental governance of fisheries - N Clare Emo and Mark Gray 12. The role of environmental NGOs in fisheries governance - Euan Dunn 13. The participatory role of the media in fisheries governance - Tim Oliver 14. The role of marine science in participatory fisheries governance - Chris Frid 15. Bringing experiential knowledge into fisheries science advisory processes: Lessons learned from the Canadian experience of participatory governance - Jake Rice 16. Local ecological knowledge, science, participation and fisheries governance in Newfoundland and Labrador: A complex, contested and changing relationship -Grant Murray, Dean Bavington and Barbara Neis 17. A comparative analysis of three modes of collaborative learning in fisheries governance: Hierarchy, networks and community - Kelly Vodden, Rosemary Ommer and David Schneider 18. Getting the scale(s) right in ocean fisheries management: An argument for decentralised, participatory governance - James Wilson 19. Scientific knowledge and participation in the governance of fisheries in the North Sea - Douglas Clyde Wilson and Alyne Elizabeth Delaney 20. Participatory fisheries governance - Three central themes - Tim S Gray index

Re-visiting the 'Social Gap': Public Opinion and Relations of Power in the Local Politics of Wind Energy

Our widely cited 2005 explanatory framework for considering public responses to wind farm developments distinguished two gaps: a ‘social gap’ between the high support for wind energy reported in surveys and the low success rate for wind farm applications; and an ‘individual gap’ whereby an individual supports wind energy in general but opposes a local wind farm (NIMBYism). The popular assumption that NIMBYism was the only explanation for the ‘social gap’ was contested. Instead, three explanations of the social gap were provided – democratic deficit, qualified support, and NIMBYism – and a range of different policy responses was suggested. This analysis is re-visited in order to take account of the theoretical and empirical developments since its publication. The original explanatory framework is expanded and revised and new conclusions are drawn about the likely causes of the ‘social gap’.

The 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy's system of governance--rhetoric or reality?

The 2002 Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was claimed to be a radical overhaul of a failing system. Several EU fish stocks--particularly North Sea cod--had reached dangerously low levels, and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the way in which the CFP was operating. The European Commission took the opportunity of the legal requirement to review some features of the CFP (principally access provisions) in 2002, to undertake a broader reappraisal of the CFP. One of the features of this reappraisal was an attempt to improve the CFPs system of governance by increasing the amount of stakeholder participation, decentralisation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. In this paper, the conclusion is reached that this attempt to improve the quality of governance in the 2002 CFP reform package has been more rhetorical than real.

Offshore wind farms and commercial fisheries in the UK: A study in Stakeholder Consultation

This paper is an exploration of a current environmental issue dividing two industries in the UK. The issue is offshore wind farms, and the industries are commercial fishing and wind energy. The controversy over offshore wind farms highlights three core issues of conflict: the adequacy of stakeholder consultation processes; the right to compensation for loss of livelihood; and the lack of adequate data. We find that the characterisations that developers, regulators, and fishers hold of each other critically inform their positions on these issues. We examine the weak bargaining position of fishers, and the ‘power game’ that is played out between them and developers. We conclude that offshore wind farm development would be better managed if stakeholder consultation was more extensive, compensation claims were standardised, and scientific data were more readily available, but that in the meantime, fishers could improve their bargaining power by mobilising potential allies.

Theorising about Participatory Fisheries Governance

This edited book is about participation in fisheries governance, which is an issue that has become fashionable during the last decade, partly because of dissatisfaction with the performance of fisheries management systems across the world; partly because of the increasing interest in the notion of ‘governance’ as a substitute for ‘government’ in a variety of policy sectors; and partly because of the growing popularity of the concept of stakeholder participation in all areas of decision-making. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to establish a theoretical framework within which the participatory mode of governance may be best understood. First, I explore the conceptual issues raised by the notion of governance. Second, I analyse and discuss the three main ways in which the notion of governance has been applied to fisheries management — the hierarchical mode; the market mode; and the participatory mode — focusing especially on the four sub-types of the participatory mode: industry self-governance; co-management; community partnership; and environmental stewardship. Third, I discuss the wider implications of the three different modes. Finally, I provide a synopsis of the chapters in the book, showing how they all focus in one way or another on the central imperative of contemporary fisheries governance — how to make greater use of participation in order to improve the quality of decision-making.

The so-called 'Moratorium' on the licensing of new genetically modified (GM) products by the European Union 1998-2004: a study in ambiguity

Abstract It is commonly held that a moratorium on the approval of new genetically modified (GM) products was in place in the European Union (EU) between 1998 and 2004. The substantive issues raised by this so-called moratorium have stirred up considerable political interest, both inside and outside the EU, culminating in a challenge issued to the EU through the World Trade Organisation (WTO) by the United States, Canada and Argentina. However, the status and time-frame of the moratorium have not been much discussed, and in this article we seek to fill this gap, by analysing the status and time-frame of the moratorium through the lens of two competing theoretical frameworks – intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. We find that the moratorium is a highly ambiguous phenomenon, with three alternative interpretations. The first interpretation is that while the origin of the moratorium is explained by intergovernmentalism, its end is explained by supranationalism. The second interpretation, which is based wholly on intergovernmentalism, is that the moratorium is effectively still in place today. The third interpretation, which is based wholly on supranationalism, is that the moratorium never really existed at all. The result of the WTO challenge may well hinge on how the panel views these alternative interpretations of the moratorium.

Common Heritage of Mankind

If the principle of national sovereignty arises from the element of unilateral development in the Third World, with developing countries accepting the capitalist world economy and competing against one another within it, the principle of common heritage arises from the element of solidarity and multilateralism that exists in Third World politics. This chapter on common heritage is divided into three sections. In the first section, we outline our conception of common heritage. This conception is taken primarily from that expounded in the 1960s by the Maltese Ambassador to the UN, Arvid Pardo, with regard to the mineral wealth of the seabed. We elaborate and strengthen this conception by co-opting the ‘difference principle’ of John Rawls. In the second section, we show that, contrary to widespread belief, the common heritage ethic still retains an influence in the politics of genetic resource control. In the third section, we demonstrate that the common heritage ethic is compatible with both the community IPR principle and the national sovereignty principle.

The authenticity of ‘type two’ Multistakeholder partnerships for water and sanitation in Africa: When is a Stakeholder a partner?

Abstract This article is a study of the way in which two Type Two multistakeholder partnerships (TTPs) for water and sanitation in Africa – the UK-based Partnership for Water and Sanitation (PAWS) and the EU-based European Union Water Initiative (EUWI) – have interpreted the concepts of ‘stakeholder’ and ‘partnership’. First, after establishing our theoretical framework, we show how stakeholding and partnership are elements of the contemporary shift from government to governance, whereby responsibility for public decision-making is widened beyond politicians to include the private sector and civil society. Second, we analyse the meaning and implications of the concepts of ‘stakeholder’ and ‘partner’. Third, we apply this conceptual analysis to our two case studies – PAWS and the EUWI – and we find that in both TTPs, governments are the primary partners, while the private sector and civil society are the secondary stakeholders. We argue that in the case of PAWS, this two-tier structure is mainly unintentional, but in the case of the EUWI, it is partly strategic.

The World Trade Organization's Report on the EU's Moratorium on Biotech Products: The Wisdom of the US Challenge to the EU in the WTO

The World Trade Organization (WTO) recently ruled on the case brought by the US, Canada and Argentina against the moratorium imposed by the European Union (EU) on imports of genetically-modified (GM) food and crops. Although the WTOs ruling has been greeted by the complainant countries as a victory, it found in their favor on only one narrow technical procedural issue, and it rejected more substantive challenges to the EU moratorium. In this article, we analyze the WTO report and explain the issues at stake, focusing particularly on the question of why the USA chose the WTO as the forum for its challenge to the EU moratorium, and whether it was wise to do so. Has the USA achieved its aims through the trade-specific WTO, or should it have taken its challenge to the more hostile, but environment-specific forum of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety? Alternatively, should the USA have refrained from mounting an official international challenge at all?