Timo Noetzel

Germany's Options in Afghanistan

Germanys military mission in Afghanistan has become increasingly politicised in the eight years since it was launched. Political and ideological differences between parties and even between ministries are becoming more pronounced, not less. This trend narrows the room for manoeuvre and limits the strategic debate. Greater instability in Kunduz province, at the heart of Germanys area of regional responsibility in Afghanistan, has two immediate effects: it both increases the need to act decisively and it heightens the risk of political paralysis in Berlin. This article argues that the latter is likely to prevail.

NATO's Vietnam? Afghanistan and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance

After the swift victory in conventional battle against Iraqi forces in March 2003, American forces fairly quickly encountered a growing insurgency movement which turned into an enormous political and military challenge for the US. Almost immediately debate arose asking if the Iraq campaign could potentially resemble some similarities with the Vietnam trauma the country had suffered in the 1970s. Surprisingly, no substantial Western strategic debate has emerged so far on what might be the consequences from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) engagement in Afghanistan. At first sight, any comparison between NATO in Afghanistan and the United States’ engagement in Vietnam seems rather inadequate. After all, the strategic and military dimensions of the two conflicts can hardly be compared. The strategic environment, the scale of military operations, the scale of loss of lives, the quality of resistance, the enemy’s support by allies, and duration of combat – all these indicators are very different. A closer look, however, reveals that it is indeed reasonable to start thinking about the strategic consequences from the Afghan operation for NATO using also the Vietnam analogy. First, like the American military in Southeast Asia the Atlantic alliance confronts a sustained insurgency movement while trying to protect and support a state that is situated in a geographically and culturally very alien environment. Some of the political dimensions of the Vietnam campaign might well be applicable to the Afghan theatre. Second, NATO also displays significant political and military problems in fighting the insurgency. The possibility of failure in Afghanistan is thus no longer an academic question. In August 2009, the new Commander of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) forces (COMISAF), General Stanley McChrystal, warned that the Taliban had gained the upper hand. Barring major changes in strategy and the availability of further capabilities and resources NATO might be heading for defeat. Preceding him, other high-ranking military commanders had also publicly warned that NATO might fail in Afghanistan. Western politicians increasingly call for an ‘exit-strategy’ from the country. Strategic experts have pointed out that NATO is likely to fail if it does not change course and develops a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy. Thus, according to prominent leaders and observers – including the incumbent NATO commanders in Kabul – failure in Afghanistan is a real possibility. Given this context, to search for analogies to ‘Vietnam’ might be useful when thinking about the alliances post-Afghanistan future. Barring, a major

Germany s Small War in Afghanistan : military Learning amid politico-strategic inertia

The article analyzes the operational conduct of German forces in northern Afghanistan and the making of German strategy in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since the expansion of the Afghan insurgency to northern Afghanistan in 2007. It is argued that the German contribution to ISAF is characterized by a severe mismatch between politico-strategic planning and decision-making in Berlin on the one hand and operational conduct and requirements on the ground on the other. Since 2007, however, politico-strategic insistence that the German engagement in Afghanistan constitutes a contribution to a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction effort is steadily eroding. Analysis of German operational conduct in northern Afghanistan makes evident the existing mismatch between strategy and operations, but also reveals that the deterioration of the security situation on the ground has lead to a bottom-up-development of counterinsurgency doctrine, capabilities, institutions, and modus of operandi. Operations have been driving the making of German strategy, not vice-versa, which has severely hampered German efforts to counter insurgents’ progress in the north of Afghanistan.

Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency Thinking

Abstract The need for COIN operations to tackle the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is accepted by most coalition members. The German army has yet to adapt to this development. This article examines why the German political establishment still contests the need for counter-insurgency tactics in northern Afghanistan.

Counter–what? Germany and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan

DOI: 10.1080/03071840802002094 Over recent years, the strategic debate in Anglo-Saxon countries about the implications of a sustained counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan has evolved. There is not much disagreement amongst countries like Great Britain, Canada or the United States that NATO faces an intensifying insurgency and that NATO strategy has to be adjusted accordingly. The recognition is that the Western security community is confronted with a Taliban-led insurgency that is gaining momentum. NATO may be engaged in a so-called ‘small war’ in Afghanistan but this misnomer belittles the operational reality that coalition forces on a frequent basis are engaged in sustained combat with insurgents. The majority view amongst NATO members is that under these circumstances a common NATO strategy for the Afghan operation has to be based on a common understanding of counter-insurgency.

Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO

The article puts the contemporary debate on NATO ‘going global’ into its historical and conceptual perspective. Pressure to expand alliance responsibilities is not new, rather it is a fundamental problem of alliance goal setting and legitimacy. The pedigree of concepts like Global NATO can be traced back to earlier attempts at liberal order-building, efforts that have oscillated between universal and exclusive varieties. Recent proposals for the globalization of NATO or the creation of a global organization of democracies may best be understood as an institutional culmination of the liberal critique of universal multilateralism. While going global, taking on ever greater roles and responsibilities, is inconceivable to many alliance members, the liberal tradition makes expansion of alliance roles increasingly hard to resist. Contrary to prevailing continental European wisdom, the article concludes that the existence of a robust reformist tier within NATO as well as major strategic trends will keep the vision of a Global NATO on the agenda of Western security policy. It argues that exploring NATOs contested global question is crucial for the development and definition of the emerging role of the alliance and collective security.

More flexible, less coherent: NATO after Lisbon

At its 2010 Lisbon summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took significant steps towards becoming a modern alliance. In the face of a changing security environment and divergent strategic interests among 28 members, NATO adapted its strategic concept and reformed its way of formulating strategy. The new strategic concept advances conflict management as a core task for the alliance. In combination with a greater emphasis on developing partnerships, NATO conceptually strengthened its profile as a global security actor. The summit also reflected a new approach to formulating NATO strategy by providing the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen with a strong role in setting the strategic agenda. Indeed, he assumed a more supranational function rather than acting as a representative of all allies. But as the Libya operation demonstrates, NATO will struggle to maintain cohesion in an increasingly ‘polycentric’ alliance. While the focus on conflict management will make the alliance more flexible, it will also become a less coherent global security actor.