Timothy Heppell

Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers

Research Highlights and Abstract This article: Contributes to the development of academic research on the internal dynamics of the Conservative Party under the leadership of David Cameron. Contributes to the development of academic research on the processes of ministerial selection within British Government. Contributes to the development of academic research on cohort effects within parties, and the analysis of comparisons and differences between different parliamentary cohorts. Contributes to the development of academic research on the constraints upon Prime Ministerial power when in coalition. This article identifies the ideological composition of the parliamentary Conservative party (PCP) in order to determine the location and numeric strength of the critics of Cameron. By constructing a data set of attitudes across two ideological divides—the social, sexual and morality divide and the European divide—the article identifies the following. First, despite Camerons social liberal emphasis both the PCP and his ministerial team is predominantly Thatcherite—i.e. socially conservative. Second, despite numerically having a Eurosceptic PCP and ministerial team, with Europhilia now an inconsequential rump, Cameron faces a minority ‘hard’ Eurosceptic faction of rebels who oppose his ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. Third, the influx of new parliamentarians elected in 2010 may increase social liberal strength, but they are overwhelmingly Eurosceptic, with a significant tranche of hard Eurosceptics amongst them. Finally, through a process of ideological mapping of these two ideological divides the research identifies a core of 50 socially conservative and hard Eurosceptics who are the critics of Cameron.

The Ideological Composition of the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1992–97

With the emphasis on loyalty and unity and an aversion to ideological disputation the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) has traditionally been described as a party of tendencies, rather than factions. The Cowley and Norton study of the ideological and factional basis of rebellion argues that the 1992–97 PCP adhered to the party of tendencies definition. However, through the development of a new three-dimensional, eight-fold typology of Conservatism, that involves behavioural and attitudinal mapping, it can be demonstrated that between 1992 and 1997 the PCP did display evidence of factionalism.

Conservatism and feminism: the case of the British Conservative Party

This article explores the potential links and contradictions between conservatism and feminism in the light of the British Conservative Partys recent claim to ‘ideological renewal’ under David Cameron. It identifies a number of long-standing, significant and sometimes unexpected overlaps and resonances between some conservative ideas as these have developed in the party over time, and some elements of feminist thought. However, the article also argues that no strand of conservative thought supports the robust analysis that would be needed to tackle entrenched gender inequalities and injustices, while many of the partys underlying assumptions are deeply anti-feminist. This means that Camerons pro-feminist rhetoric is likely to be both divisive and incapable of realization, so that a focus on feminism highlights the hazardous nature of his attempt at ideological renewal.

The Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians in the Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2001

This article examines the voting motivations of Conservative parliamentarians in the final parliamentary ballot of the Conservative party leadership election of 2001. By constructing a data set of the voting behaviour of Conservative parliamentarians in the final parliamentary party ballot, this article seeks to test a series of hypotheses relating to the ideological disposition and political characteristics of the candidates vis-à-vis their electorate. The article examines how and why the eliminative parliamentary ballot ensured that the party membership was presented with a face-off between the europhile, Kenneth Clarke, and the eurosceptic, Iain Duncan Smith, and why the modernising and socially liberal Michael Portillo was rejected. It will demonstrate that while arguments based on ideological factors are valid, the political characteristics of age and career status were also significant motivational influences that contributed to the rejection of Portillo and the delaying of the modernisation of the Conservative party.

The United Kingdom Referendum on European Union Membership: The Voting of Conservative Parliamentarians

This article considers the attitudes of members of the parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) during the European Union (EU) membership referendum held in the United Kingdom (UK) on 23 June 2016. First, the article identifies the voting positions – remain or leave – of each Conservative parliamentarian in order to assess the strength of opinion within the PCP and place it within its historical context. Second, the article uses multivariate analysis to test a series of hypotheses about the voting of Conservative parliamentarians. Through this we will aim to identify whether any associations existed between advocates and opponents of Brexit and social variables such as age, schooling, university, occupation and gender; political variables such as constituency marginality, and whether they were a minister, an ex-minister or a permanent backbencher; and the ideological variable of morality – such as support for or opposition to same sex marriage.

The Labour Party Leadership Election of 1963: Explaining the Unexpected Election of Harold Wilson

The failed attempts that Harold Wilson made to rest the Labour Party leadership from Hugh Gaitskell in 1960, and the Deputy Leadership from George Brown in 1962, had confirmed his reputation for disloyalty and divisiveness, and secured him the hostility of ‘social democratic right’. As they constituted the majority of the parliamentary Labour Party and ideology was assumed to be the dominant influence in any future party leadership contest, this seemed to undermine the chances of the ‘socialist left’ candidate Wilson succeeding Gaitskell. This paper examines how Wilson defied these assumptions and acquired the party leadership in 1963 following the death of Gaitskell. It attributes his success to the following. First, the fact that the minority left only put one candidate forward, ensured that they coalesced around one candidate. Second, the fact that the majority social democratic bloc fractured between Brown and James Callaghan gave Wilson a first ballot lead and second ballot momentum. Third, the naïve campaigning by Brown meant he was perceived to be a divisive candidate whilst Wilson, the devious, disloyal and defeated challenger to Gaitskell, was amazingly the unity candidate.

A Crisis of Legitimacy: The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major

This article evaluates the insecurity of tenure that John Major suffered as leader of the Conservative party. It offers a chronological narrative that demonstrates that for the duration of his tenure as leader of the Conservative party, Major lacked the necessary authority within the parliamentary Conservative party to ensure his legitimacy as Conservative party leader. A range of explanatory themes are explored such as the circumstances through which he acquired the leadership; the betrayal thesis of the Thatcherites and the absence of a cohesive and enduring group of Majorities; and the lack of credible unifying alternatives. The article concludes that Major was the default leader of the Conservative party.

Conservative ministers in the Coalition government of 2010–15: evidence of bias in the ministerial selections of David Cameron?

ABSTRACT The article uses a data set of the 2010–15 Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) to test a series of hypotheses in order to determine whether those selected for ministerial office during the coalition era were representative of the PCP as a whole. The findings show no significant associations or bias by Cameron in terms of age, schooling, regional base, morality, voting for Cameron in the Conservative Party leadership election and, most significantly, gender. Significant associations or bias were evident in terms of Cameron’s patronage with regard to university education and electoral marginality. The findings demonstrate that any critique of current Conservative ministers based on their supposed elitism stems from the institutional and structural biases within the Conservative Party at candidate selection level, and cannot be attributed to bias on behalf of Cameron.

The Presidentialization of Party Politics in the UK

Although constitutional reforms undertaken since 1997 have created new substate legislative and executive bodies (most notably in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) the UK remains a unitary state, with ultimate political authority and sovereignty continuing to reside in the parliament of the UK at Westminster. This chapter concentrates on the two main relevant parties of UK government in the postwar period, the Conservative Party (CP) and the Labour Party (LP). Given that the Liberal Democrats (LDP) are now a junior partner in the UK coalition government, brief coverage of this party is also offered. Between 1945 and 2010 the Conservatives governed alone for 35 years. Labour governed for the other 30 years, although for a short period (1977–78) they had the support of the small Liberal Party in a parliamentary pact. Until the formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition in 2010, at Westminster this was “the only formal deal done between parties” (Norton, 2011, p. 243). The chapter also concentrates on the period from 1990 onwards, and provides a useful starting point, namely the removal from office of Britain’s longest-serving prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. The declining hold of the two-party system is highlighted. Through a (necessarily brief) historical overview of their origins and development, the second section outlines the genetic features of the Conservative and Labour Parties.

The Oratory of Dan Quayle

This chapter reflects on the oratorical style of Dan Quayle, who served as Vice President to President George H.W. Bush between 1989 and 1993. Prior to his surprise selection on the Republican ticket in 1988, he had been an undistinguished and low profile Representative (1977–81) and Senator (1981–89 ). His lack of experience in dealing with the national media and insufficient advance preparation by the Bush campaign team left Quayle exposed in the summer of 1988. A media ‘feeding frenzy’ surrounding allegations of draft dodging to avoid the Vietnam War and unfounded rumours of extra-marital relations engulfed him. His performances in interviews, press conferences and the vice-presidential debates, as well as his address to the Republican National Convention (between August and October 1988), were lamentable, making him a case study of failure in terms of rhetoric and oratory. The fact that the gaffes kept coming—for example, ‘I made a misstatement and I stand by all my misstatements’ or ‘we don’t want to go back to tomorrow, we want to move forward’—reinforced an impression of him as an intellectual lightweight, and when he incorrectly spelt potato with an added e on the end, he was subjected to a humiliating level of ridicule. Quayle thereby demonstrated the importance of ethos in terms of elite level political rhetoric and oratory. He simply lacked credibility as a political communicator. This meant that any attempt that he made to set the political agenda—such as his comments on family values in his infamous ‘Murphy Brown’ speech in 1992—was invalidated by his reputation. He may have been able to make a connection to and shore up the Republican base via pathos-driven oratory, but he was simply unable to reach out beyond known supporters, and attempts by him to use statistical evidence to back up his positions (i.e. logos) failed to gain traction. So chronic was Quayle’s reputation as a political communicator, the fact that he got through his 1992 Republican National Convention address, and later the vice-presidential debates, without making any gaffes, seemed to be a surprise as expectations were so low.