Timothy P Edmunds

The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-military Relations

This article argues that a decade after the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe, the establishment of democratic civil-military relations has moved on from first generation issues of institutional restructuring to second generation challenges relating to the democratic consolidation of these relationships. In practice, these have more to do with issues of state capacity-building and bureaucratic modernization with the traditional concerns of the civil-military relations literature. In most cases, the problem is not the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces or the separation of the military from politics, but rather that of the effective execution of democratic governance of the defense and security sector-particularly in relation to defense policy-making, legislative oversight and the effective engagement of civil-society in a framework of democratic legitimacy and accountability.

illiberal reSilieNCe iN Serbia

Since 2000, overt resistance to democratization in Serbia has been rare. However, illiberal actors and networks have persisted within the formal framework of democracy itself; coopting formal institutions to their own particularist interests and adapting to the constraints and opportunities of electoral competition. Though rooted in domestic political culture, this process can only be understood as part of a dynamic interaction with international policy. The project of liberal democracy in Serbia has thus become transnational; both underpinned and undermined by the actions and policies of external actors. Serbia has become a country where political contention is vigorous, but illiberal forces have shown an ability to adapt to the new conditions.

Complexity, strategy and the national interest

In 2010, and in anticipation of a controversial and contested Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the UK House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) issued a stinging critique of strategy making in the UK, accusing the government of having ‘all but lost the capacity to think strategically’ (PASC 2010, p. 3). Two years later, in 2012, it was still lamenting ‘the government’s inability to express coherent and relevant strategic aims’ (PASC 2012, p. 38). These criticisms have been echoed in the strategic studies and foreign policy analysis literature, including calls for a revival of grand narratives of national interest to drive strategic practice (Layton 2012, pp. 59–60), for a new relationship between political decision-making and professional expertise in strategy making (Strachan 2006, pp. 77–80) and the reinvigoration of institutional capacities for strategic thinking and action in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and elsewhere (Cornish and Dorman 2010, pp. 408–409). Related themes are apparent too in the burgeoning literature on risk, which identifies distinct challenges of strategic practice associated with contemporary patterns of complexity, uncertainty and interdependence and calls for better strategy making in response (Rasmussen 2006, pp. 203–206).

Introduction: the Challenge of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe

After the collapse of communism in 1989 and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe faced the enormous challenge of making the transition from communism to an unknown future, with little or no experience of democracy, market economics or stable relations with their neighbours to build on.1 One element of this transition was the problem of reforming communist-era armed forces and civil-military relations. The ability of postcommunist elites to secure democratic control of the armed forces, or at least the acquiescence of the military to the democratic transition, would have a significant impact on the prospects for democratization as a whole. The extent of democratic control of the military might also have a significant bearing on Central and Eastern European states’ relations with the West and their prospects for integration with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The extent to and ways in which armed forces maintained influence over foreign and defence policy decisions and were intertwined with conceptions of national identity might also have major implications for relations with neighbouring states and ethnic minorities and hence for peace and security in the region.

Intelligence agencies and democratisation: Continuity and change in Serbia after Milošević

Abstract This article examines the reform of the Serbian intelligence agencies since the fall of Slobodan Milošević and argues that they are important actors in democratisation, with a powerful capacity to influence and frustrate the reform process. However, the Serbian experience demonstrates that the role of intelligence agencies in democratisation is complex. In Serbia, governance of the intelligence sector has been characterised neither by a simple maximisation of civil power over the agencies themselves, nor by outright resistance to change by inherently compromised, authoritarian-era structures. Instead, the role and reform of Serbias intelligence agencies since 2000 has been closely integrated with developments in the political sphere, and has exhibited considerable continuity with past practice.

Reserve forces and the transformation of British military organisation: soldiers, citizens and society

Abstract In recent years, there has been a sharp growth in political and sociological interest in the British military. Set against the backdrop of the armed forces’ increasing presence in everyday life, alongside the organizations’ ongoing restructuring, the current paper focuses on the MoD’s problematic attempts to recruit 30,000 reservists by 2020; what has become known as the Future Reserves 2020 programme (FR2020). We argue that these changes are driven in part by the need to cut costs in defence. However, we also suggest that they are a reflection of the changing nature of modern military organisation, and the manner in which armed forces engage with the societies of which they are a part, and with the citizens that make up that society. We locate FR2020 programme in the context of a wider narrative about the changing nature of military organisation in contemporary western democracies, identifying structural, circumstantial and normative reasons for change. We also examine the specific challenges of implementing FR2020 in practice, including issues of recruitment and retention, integration and support, and relations with families and employers, drawing on the experience of comparator countries to do so. We conclude by considering the implications of these changes, both for the future of UK armed forces, and for the evolving nature of military-society relations in Britain.

Civil–military Relations in Croatia: Politicisation and Politics of Reform

Abstract This article argues that since 2000 successive Croatian governments have shown themselves increasingly dedicated to reforming civil–military relations. However, their efforts have been hampered by four key obstacles. First, the need to implement defence reforms in the context of an unwieldy set of civil–military relationships, political and institutional rivalries, a lack of civil and military defence expertise and a continuing legacy of politicisation. Second, the need to cut defence spending as a proportion of the overall budget whilst taking on new military roles and improving the capability of the armed forces. Third, the need to balance the demands of the NATO accession process while implementing a balanced and fundamental reform of the armed forces as a whole. Finally, the need to implement root and branch personnel reforms and downsizing in the OSRH while simultaneously recruiting and retaining quality personnel and addressing the wider social issue of unemployment.

Civil–military Relations in Serbia–Montenegro: An Army in Search of a State1

Abstract Since 2000, Serbia–Montenegro has faced a threefold challenge in reforming its civil–military relations: First, establishing the principle of civilian control over the armed forces and democratising the nature of this control; Second implementing a comprehensive programme of military modernisation and organisation reform; Finally, managing an evolving and sometimes troubled relationship with the West—particularly over the issue of war crimes. This paper argues that while progress has been made in all three of these areas, reform remains hampered both by the persistent legacies of the Miloevió period and the continuing failure to resolve the question of legitimate statehood in the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia. This wider context has helped to push military reform to the back of the political agenda and left the process in the hands of the armed forces themselves.Abstract Since 2000, Serbia–Montenegro has faced a threefold challenge in reforming its civil–military relations: First, establishing the principle of civilian control over the armed forces and democratising the nature of this control; Second implementing a comprehensive programme of military modernisation and organisation reform; Finally, managing an evolving and sometimes troubled relationship with the West—particularly over the issue of war crimes. This paper argues that while progress has been made in all three of these areas, reform remains hampered both by the persistent legacies of the Miloevio period and the continuing failure to resolve the question of legitimate statehood in the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia. This wider context has helped to push military reform to the back of the political agenda and left the process in the hands of the armed forces themselves.

Civil-military relations in postcommunist Europe : assessing the transition.

Abstract This article argues that the relative homogeneity of communist civil–military relations postcommunist Europe has been replaced by significant diversity. Those states that have joined NATO and the EU have consolidated democratic civilian control of their militaries, re-oriented their defence policies towards peacekeeping and intervention operations beyond their borders and are fashioning new military–society relationships. In contrast, in Russia, Ukraine and most of the other former Soviet republics the military has become part of the nexus of semi- or outright authoritarian presidential rule, while severe economic and social problems are resulting in a dramatic downgrading of the militarys professional and operational competence and severely inhibiting the prospects for meaningful military reform. In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, civil–military reform is gathering pace, but continues to struggle with twin legacies of war and authoritarianism.

Armed Forces and Society: a Framework for Analysis

Armed forces and societies in central and eastern Europe have undergone dramatic changes since the collapse of communism, with important implications for military-society relations. Communism in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe produced a particular model of military-society relations.1 For four decades after the Second World War, all the countries of the region had large armed forces based on conscription. As a result, almost all adult males experienced military service. The military also received a relatively large share of state resources — significantly higher in percentage terms than in the West. As a result communist societies and economies were often highly militarised. The physical presence of uniformed personnel throughout society and the symbolic and economic significance of the armed forces within the socio-political system were striking features of communism throughout central and eastern Europe. The main official justification for the armed forces in the communist states was one focused around external threat. This took a variety of different forms including the capitalist West, fascism during the 1930s and 1940s, and the Soviet Union itself for Yugoslavia after 1948 and Romania from the mid-1960s.