Timothy R. Levine

Truth-Default Theory (TDT) A Theory of Human Deception and Deception Detection

Truth-Default Theory (TDT) is a new theory of deception and deception detection. This article offers an initial sketch of, and brief introduction to, TDT. The theory seeks to provide an elegant explanation of previous findings as well as point to new directions for future research. Unlike previous theories of deception detection, TDT emphasizes contextualized communication content in deception detection over nonverbal behaviors associated with emotions, arousal, strategic self-presentation, or cognitive effort. The central premises of TDT are that people tend to believe others and that this “truth-default” is adaptive. Key definitions are provided. TDT modules and propositions are briefly explicated. Finally, research consistent with TDT is summarized.

A Few Prolific Liars: Variation in the Prevalence of Lying

It has been commonplace in the deception literature to assert the pervasive nature of deception in communication practices. Previous studies of lie prevalence find that lying is unusual compared to honest communication. Recent research, and reanalysis of previous studies reporting the frequency of lies, shows that most people are honest most of the time and the majority of lies are told by a few prolific liars. The current article reports a statistical method for distinguishing prolific liars from everyday liars and provides a test of the few prolific liars finding by examining lying behavior in the United Kingdom. Participants (N = 2,980) were surveyed and asked to report on how often they told both little white lies and big important lies. Not surprisingly, white lies were more common than big lies. Results support and refine previous findings about the distinction between everyday and prolific liars, and implications for theory are discussed.

Direct and Indirect Measures of Lie Detection Tell the Same Story A Reply to ten Brinke, Stimson, and Carney (2014)

Deception-detection experiments typically find that people are poor lie detectors. Bond and DePaulo (2006) reported that in their meta-analysis, the across-study average level of detection-deception accuracy was 54% (50% reflects baseline chance). Although the nil null hypothesis of chance accuracy could be rejected with confidence (p < .0001), 54% accuracy is unimpressive on its face and is understood as evidence of human fallibility in lie detection. From time to time, scholars assert that although people perform poorly when directly asked to make truth/lie decisions, they perform better when accuracy is assessed with indirect, less-conscious measures. Although the argument goes back at least to DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, and Muhlenbruck (1997) and Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle, and Green (1999), ten Brinke, Stimson, and Carney (2014) are the latest to advance the implicitlie-detection argument in the pages of Psychological Science:

The Intertwined Model of Reactance for Resistance and Persuasive Boomerang

Recently, Kim, Levine, and Allen have successfully demonstrated that the intertwined model of psychological reactance is applicable for message features other than freedom threat (i.e., personal insult, poor argument). The supporting evidence was obtained where resistance prevailed. The current study further extends the utility of the intertwined model by replicating Kim et al.’s experiment in a content domain where persuasive boomerang was observable. Consistent with Kim et al.’s findings, results indicate that both poor argument and personal insult produced negative thoughts and anger in an intertwined manner as freedom threat does. The factor structure of reactance remained similar whether the message produced resistance (i.e., freedom threat, poor argument) or persuasive boomerang (i.e., personal insult). Anger constituted a more powerful sub-construct of reactance than negative cognition across conditions.

Comparing Separate Process and Intertwined Models for Reactance

This investigation compares whether an intertwined or a separate process model better explains message failure incurred by threat to freedom. The current project extends the intertwined model proposed by Dillard and Shen (2005) by considering the additional persuasive message elements of weak argument and insult. Results indicate that the intertwined model provides not only a better fit but also a more general model of message resistance than previously considered.

A Defense of Publishing Nonsignificant (ns) Results

An argument is advanced for the propositions that a lack of statistically significant findings does not automatically justify rejecting a scientific article for publication or mean that the findings are necessarily uninformative. Systematically declining publication for nonsignificant results leads to negative consequences that include distorting scientific literatures, making hypotheses and theories less falsifiable, depriving meta-analyses of an accurate sample of prior findings, and encouraging questionable research practices. Providing effect sizes and confidence intervals can make findings more informative, regardless of whether the finding is p < .05.

Active Deception Detection

Actively detecting deception requires (a) gathering information for fact-checking the communication content, (b) strategically prompting deception cues, and (c) encouraging honest admissions and discouraging continued deceit. Most deception-detection research, active or otherwise, finds that people are only slightly better than chance at correctly distinguishing truth from lies. Poor accuracy stems from a lack of reliable deception cues that hold across people and situations. Consequently, basing lie detection on deception cues is prone to error. However, some approaches to active deception detection yield higher accuracy than passive observation. Not all active approaches are advantageous. Mere interaction and mere question-asking produce outcomes similar to passive observation. Evidence-based and confession-solicitation approaches can be highly effective: for example, strategic use of evidence (SUE) and the content in context approach.

Theorizing About Deception

This essay provides a unifying commentary concluding this special issue on new theories of deception. Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2) and Truth-Default Theory (TDT) offer perspectives of deception that contrast with many past and current approaches. Key points of difference between these new theories and prior works include how deception is defined, the centrality of deception cues, the role of stakes in deception, the importance of communication media or channel, and whether or not deception is intrinsically more cognitively effortful than truthtelling. IMT2 and TDT shift focus away from deception cues and toward situated, contextualized information and communication content. Theory-data consistency is argued to be paramount. The overarching goal of these new theories is to chart the course for future deception research.

Sharing Good and Bad News with Friends and Strangers: Reasons for and Communication Behaviors Associated with the MUM Effect

People are reluctant to share bad news. Reasons include self-presentation and sensitivity to receiver emotionality. An experiment investigated these reasons during interactions between friends and strangers. Females (N = 330, 165 dyads) gave good or bad news to a close friend or stranger. Time to response was recorded. The MUM effect replicated for both friends and strangers. No main effects for friend/stranger or interaction between friend/stranger and news valence were found. Data were more consistent with a self-presentation explanation. Behavioral data were also analyzed to explore communicative behavior that accompanies the sharing of good and bad news. Limitations and implications are discussed.

Teenagers Lie a Lot: A Further Investigation into the Prevalence of Lying

Although it is commonly believed that lying is ubiquitous, recent findings show large, individual differences in lying, and that the proclivity to lie varies by age. This research surveyed 58 high school students, who were asked how often they had lied in the past 24 hr. It was predicted that high school students would report lying with greater frequency than previous surveys with college student and adult samples, but that the distribution of reported lies by high school students would exhibit a strongly and positively skewed distribution similar to that observed with college student and adult samples. The data were consistent with both predictions. High school students in the sample reported telling, on average, 4.1 lies in the past 24 hr—a rate that is 75% higher than that reported by college students and 150% higher than that reported by a nationwide sample of adults. The data were also skewed, replicating the “few prolific liar” effect previously documented in college student and adult samples.