Timothy Shanahan

Betraying a certain corruption of mind: how (and how not) to define ‘terrorism’

A common assumption underwriting much counterterrorism activity is that terrorism, by definition, is necessarily morally wrong. One aim of this paper is to challenge this assumption by defending a novel definition of ‘terrorism’ that makes the morality of terrorism a question to be answered by the application of moral theories to specific terrorist acts, rather than by definitional fiat. After surveying definitions of ‘terrorism’ current in the literature and identifying criteria for a more adequate definition, the paper explicates and defends a novel definition of ‘terrorism’ that can ground serious inquiry into the moral status of specific acts of terrorism.

Selection, Drift, and the Aims of Evolutionary Theory

According to textbook presentations of evolutionary theory, evolutionary change is a result of the interaction of a number of biological processes that together shift a population away from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. Among the factors typically mentioned are genetic mutation, gene flow (emigration and immigration), nonrandom mating, selection, and drift (“chance”).1 By constructing equations which factor in specific values for each of these processes, evolutionary biologists try to explain why a population follows a particular evolutionary trajectory. Hence, much of evolutionary biology is concerned with the empirical determination of values for each process, and the ways in which the various processes can and do interact with one another to produce evolutionary change.

Selfish Genes and Lucky Breaks: Richard Dawkins’ and Stephen Jay Gould’s Divergent Darwinian Agendas

Darwin expressed alternative theoretical perspectives on a range of issues fundamental to our understanding of evolution, thereby making it possible for his intellectual descendants to develop his ideas in markedly different and even incompatible directions while still promoting their views as authentically “Darwinian.” The long-running and well-publicized scientific rivalry between Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould is a striking case in point. In elegantly written books and essays spanning the last quarter of the twentieth century, they developed and defended diametrically opposed views on the units of selection, the scope and depth of adaptation, the significance of chance events, and the reality and meaning of evolutionary progress—each explicitly juxtaposing his own views against those of the other while insisting that his own conclusions represent the genuinely “Darwinian” view. These skirmishes raise many questions. If there is just one world, why do they reach such different conclusions about it? Does each have an equally good claim to represent authentic “Darwinism”? Are they best viewed as defending different interpretations of a single Darwinian tradition, or as representing alternative (e.g., competing) Darwinian traditions? More generally, is a scientific tradition best characterized by a set of propositions that define its essence, or by causal interactions providing cohesiveness in terms of self-identification, social relations, and historical continuity? An analysis of the Dawkins–Gould rivalry provides a fertile opportunity to address these and other questions concerning “the Darwinian tradition” in the twentieth century.

The Evolutionary Indeterminism Thesis

Abstract Evolutionary indeterminists argue that, in addition to any indeterminism introduced by quantum events, at least some evolutionary processes are themselves fundamentally indeterministic. That is, they maintain that the chance element in evolutionary processes results from indeterminism in the processes themselves, rather than simply from our cognitive limitations. Not everyone has been persuaded. A number of philosophers have argued that claims for evolutionary indeterminism are premature at best and deeply confused at worst. They maintain that evolutionary processes can and should be understood as deterministic processes. According to them, “chance” is merely a word denoting our ignorance of causes. This controversy is now one of the liveliest topics in the philosophy of biology. This article reviews the main arguments on each side, showing how the issues at stake in this debate raise fundamental questions about the nature of science as an explanatory enterprise and of the world it seeks to explain.

Realism and Antirealism in Evolutionary Biology

Do scientific theories provide us with genuine insight into the causal structure of the world, or do they merely provide useful models for organizing observable phenomena into coherent patterns? Scientific realists maintain that scientific theories do, at least approximately and on some occasions, give us insight into the causal structure of the world, including its unobserved and unobservable parts. Antirealists claim that scientific theories serve a number of useful functions, such as organizing empirical data and facilitating predictions, but revealing the hidden structure of the world is not one of them. At issue here is nothing less than the nature of our scientific understanding of the world.

Kitcher's Compromise: A critical examination of the Compromise Model of scientific closure, and its implications for the relationship between history and philosophy of science

Abstract In The Advancement of Science (1993) Philip Kitcher develops what he calls the ‘Compromise Model’ of the closure of scientific debates. The model is designed to acknowledge significant elements from ‘Rationalist’ and ‘Antirationalist’ accounts of science, without succumbing to the one-sidedness of either. As part of an ambitious naturalistic account of scientific progress, Kitchers model succeeds to the extent that transitions in the history of science satisfy its several conditions. 1 critically evaluate the Compromise Model by identifying its crucial assumptions and by attempting to apply the model to a major transition in the history of biology: the rejection of ‘naive group selectionism’ in the 1960s. I argue that the weaknesses and limitations of Kitchers model exemplify general problems facing philosophical models of scientific change, and that recognition of these problems supports a more modest vision of the relationship between historical and philosophical accounts of science.

Time and Meaning

There are many clues that the replicants are obsessed with time. ‘Time’ is the first word we hear from Roy Batty as he emerges from a phone booth to assure Leon: ‘Time enough.’ At that point his declaration is still utterly mysterious. Time enough for what? As later becomes clear, the replicants are obsessed with time as it relates to their ‘morphology, longevity, incept dates’ — that is, to the amount of life they have left, and how they might acquire more of it. When Leon drags Deckard into an alley after witnessing Zhora’s retirement, time is clearly on his mind as well: Leon: How old am I? Deckard: I don’t know. Leon: My birthday is April 10, 2017. How long do I live? Deckard: Four years. Leon: More than you! … Wake up! Time to die.

Philosophy and Blade Runner

Acknowledgments Preface 1. Introduction 2. Being Human 3. Persons 4. Identity 5. Consciousness 6. Freedom 7. Being Good 8. God 9. Death 10. Time and Meaning Epilogue Literature Cited Endnotes Index