Tine Gade

Limiting violent spillover in civil wars: the paradoxes of Lebanese Sunni jihadism, 2011–17

ABSTRACTResearch on violent spillovers in civil war has often exaggerated the potential for conflict contagion. The case of Lebanon is a counter-example. Despite the massive pressure of the horrific war in next-door Syria, it has, against all odds, remained remarkably stable – despite the influx of more than 1 million Syrian refugees and almost complete institutional blockage. This paper, based on ethnographic research and semi-structured interviews from Lebanon, studies the determination to avoid a violent spillover into Lebanon from the perspective of the country’s Sunni Islamists. Recent trends in the scholarly literature have shown that Islamists are not inherently revolutionary, nor always dogmatists, and often serve many social purposes at home. The main argument is that the Syrian war has not been imported into Lebanon; instead, the Lebanese conflict is externalized to Syria. Lebanon’s conflicting factions, including the Islamists, have found the costs of resorting to violence inside Lebanon to be ...

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): A United Army for a Divided Country?

Multi-confessional armies are often seen as being weak and prone to disintegration. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is a case in point. From its inception it was formed as a multi-confessional force meant to serve as a neutral political arbiter, but it experienced civil war fragmentation and dissolution (1975–1990). Post-war restructuring and reform rebuilt the force, but the threat of disintegration along confessional lines has remained. However, the LAF is consistently ranked as the country’s most trusted public institution, its last resort amidst repeated government collapse and state failure. The LAF strives to embody a national ideal: a united force, raised above sectarianism. Even so, the Syrian civil war has strained the LAF’s cohesion and threatens its neutrality – its most valued assets in a deeply divided society.

Pathways to Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Islamist Groups in Lebanon and Mali

Gade and Boas examine the question: Why do some population groups choose to turn away from the state and opt for violence, while other groups that may be equally frustrated with the state remain engaged with the existing polity? This question is addressed by analyzing case studies from Lebanon and Mali. Focus is put on the political behaviour of Islamist groups and individuals, and in particular on the factors that determine the acceptance, or not, of engaging in peaceful reconciliation. Revisiting the lessons learned from the divided societies of Lebanon and Mali, the authors assess the conditions under which reconciliation efforts and power-sharing agreements in Syria may become sustainable.

The Lebanese Army After the Syrian Crisis: Alienating the Sunni Community?

This chapter analyses Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) attempts to deal with security threats in the wake of the Syrian crisis and the implications for relations with Lebanon’s Sunni community. Examining incidents where the LAF has been accused of targeting and conspiring to kill Sunni clerics, the authors analyse the growing discontent among Lebanese Sunnis who are opposed to the military role of Hizbollah in Syria. Since the 2011 Syrian revolt, the LAF has been accused of being a partisan institution, reflecting the growing influence of militant jihadist movements targeting the army. The lack of a national defence strategy has forced the army to intervene on a case-by-case basis in a context of sectarian unrest. However, in contrast to the situation in Shia-majority areas controlled by one dominant actor, Hizbollah, the Sunni ‘scene’ emerges as more fragmented.

The Mosul campaign : winning the war, losing the peace?

After three years and a costly war, which recently destroyed the great al-Nouri mosque in Mosul, the military defeat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq is imminent. The Mosul offensive is a test case for both Iraq and for the international coalition; if it succeeds, it could be used as a model to be applied elsewhere in the region, such as in Raqqa. If it fails to create stability in Nineveh and Iraq, a new radical group may emerge, with far-reaching consequences.