Tobias Hiller

The distribution of power in governing coalitions of the German Laender

In this article, we analyse the distribution of voting power in governing coalitions of the German Laender (states). In a first step, we use the number of votes of parties in a parliament to determine the voting power of the parties. Based on these results, we apply the -power index (Casajus, 2009) to calculate the power of parties within governing coalitions (Wiese, 2007). For this, we consider the limitations of coalition possibilities. In three scenarios, we analyse how these affect the parties’ voting power.

The importance of players in teams of the German Bundesliga in the season 2012/2013 – a cooperative game theory approach

In this article, we employ team games (Hernández-Lamoneda and Sánchez-Sánchez, 2010) and the Shapley (1953) value to analyse the performance/importance of players in teams of the Bundesliga (German football league) in the season 2012/2013.

Excluded coalitions and the distribution of power in parliaments

ABSTRACT In this article, we introduce a new value for cooperative games. This value is based on the Shapley (1953) value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. One example of such exclusions are the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. A case study demonstrates the application of the new value for these situations.

Excluded coalitions and the 2013 German federal election

ABSTRACT In a recent article, Hiller introduced a value for cooperative games considering that players exclude coalitions with other players – the value (excluded coalitions value). One reason for developing the value was to improve the analysis of parliaments, since prior to elections, parties issue coalition statements and exclude cooperation with parties. In this article, we use the value to analyse the influence of coalition statements on the bargaining strength of the parties after the 2013 German federal election. More specifically, we calculate the distribution of power in German government coalitions that were possible with respect to the opinion polls in the time prior to the election.

On the evaluation of soccer players: a comparison of a new game-theoretical approach to classic performance measures

In this article, we analyse the relation of a new measure for evaluating the importance of soccer players, recently proposed by Hiller (2015), to classic metrics of player performance. Using state-of-the-art bootstrap correlation testing and a data set of teams for the German soccer league (Bundesliga), we find evidence that even though this new game-theoretical approach has no significant correlation to a large number of performance measures, it is significantly related to some of the most important measures typically used in academic research (e.g. the player scores published by sports magazines and the number of played matches). These results indicate that the theoretically appealing new measure can be considered an interesting variable in pay–performance regressions and should be used accordingly in future research.

Who benefits from human capital investments? – An analysis with cooperative game theory

This paper employs the χ-value to analyse who benefits from investments in general and in specific human capital, the employer or the employee. Within this framework, we replicate the standard results of human capital theory.

The Effects of Excluding Coalitions

One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value ( φ E value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.

On the Stability of Couples

In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can model couples. We analyze two cases: a symmetrical one with only one type of men and one type of women; and one with several types of women and men.

Koalitionsaussagen und die Verteilung der Macht in der deutschen Regierungskoalition

ZusammenfassungNach langwierigen Verhandlungen haben sich CDU/CSU und SPD auf einen Koalitionsvertrag geeinigt und eine gemeinsame Regierung gebildet. In diesem Beitrag wird analysiert, wie verschiedene Koalitionsaussagen der Parteien im Vorfeld der Bundestagswahl 2013 die Verteilung der Macht in der Regierungskoalition nach der Bundestagswahl beeinflussen. Dies wird auch für weitere mögliche Regierungskoalitionen, die bei alternativen Wahlausgängen resultieren würden, diskutiert. Die Analyse erfolgt mit Hilfe der kooperativen Spieltheorie.AbstractIn this article, the author analyses the distribution of power in the current and possible German government coalitions following the federal election in September 2013 based on statements made by the parties with regard to various potential coalitions in advance of the election. He accounts for four possible election results and five scenarios for statements regarding potential coalitions. The analysis uses cooperative game theory.

Kostenaufteilung mit Hilfe des Shapley-Lösungskonzepts

Der Beitrag präsentiert das Shapley-Lösungskonzept als ein Verfahren zur Aufteilung von Kosten auf verschiedene Kostenstellen bzw. Projektpartner. Nach einer Einleitung werden die grundlegenden Definitionen und Begriffe der kooperativen Spieltheorie sowie das Shapley-Lösungskonzept erläutert. Darauf aufbauend werden zwei in der Literatur häufig behandelte Kostenaufteilungsprobleme, das Flughafen-Spiel und Spiele mit kostenminimalen Spannbäumen (engl.: minimum cost spanning tree games), betrachtet.