Tobias Svanström

Auditor-in-Charge Characteristics and Going-concern Reporting

We examine the effect of auditor-in-charge characteristics on audit quality using the propensity to issue a going-concern opinion as the measure of audit quality. We extend the sparse literature on ...

Audit office size, audit quality and audit pricing: evidence from small- and medium-sized enterprises

Using Swedish data, we investigate how audit quality and audit pricing vary with audit firm and office size. In contrast to prior studies, we use disciplinary sanctions issued against auditors not meeting the quality requirement as the measure of audit quality. We find no significant differences in the likelihood of sanctions between Big 4 audit firms and the fifth and sixth largest audit firms in Sweden (Grant Thornton and BDO). We refer to these collectively as ‘Top 6’. However, we find that the probabilities of warnings or exclusions from the profession are much higher for non-Top 6 auditors in Sweden than for Top 6 auditors. Furthermore, we find a strong negative association between the likelihood of sanctions and audit office size for non-Top 6 auditors. This association is insignificant for Top 6 audit firms. Audit fees follow a similar pattern and indicate that larger audit firms and offices put in more effort or have greater expertise. These results suggest that audit quality is differentiated in the private segment market. However, contrary to prior studies, our results suggest that the important dimensions are Top 6 versus non-Top 6 and the office size of non-Top 6 audit firms.

The impact of the global financial crisis on audit and non-audit fees: Evidence from Sweden

Purpose - – The paper aims to investigate audit and non-audit fees during the global financial crisis (GFC) in an environment that is relatively sparsely regulated with regard to the provision of non-audit services. Design/methodology/approach - – Audit and non-audit fees were studied during pre-GFC (2006-2007), GFC (2008-2009) and post-GFC (2010-2011) periods. Findings - – During the GFC, Swedish companies benefited from an increase in sales and total assets, although return on assets decreased. In this setting, the auditors charged higher audit fees compared with the pre-GFC period, despite the absence of increased audit reporting lags. A significant increase in audit fees continued during the post-crisis periods with auditors paying more attention to companies’ leverage and whether they report losses. At the same time, the companies spent less on non-audit services. Research limitations/implications - – This study is limited to companies from Sweden, which was less affected by the GFC. Practical implications - – GFC auditors are able to charge higher audit fees to public companies including those that are well-performing during financial crises, and they are also able to increase the audit fees in the post-crisis period. This implies that auditors put in extra audit effort to compensate for higher risk, or that they are good at negotiating prices with their clients. However, non-audit fees decreased during the same period, implying that the demand for these services drops under financial instability. Originality/value - – The study highlights auditors’ behavior in the liberal economic environment and it studies both audit fees and non-audit fees before GFC, during GFC and after the GFC. The GFC appears to have provided audit firms the opportunity to extract higher audit fees. Our findings are of interest to managers, auditors and regulators.

Is the Public Oversight of Auditors Effective? The Impact of Sanctions on Loss of Clients, Salary and Audit Reporting

Abstract This study examines the consequences of sanctions against individual Swedish auditors issued by the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants (SBPA). The results provide no support for individual auditor client loss after receiving a sanction. However, we find that Big 4 auditors have a lower salary after the sanction than before. Finally, we do not find that auditors become more conservative in their reporting after being sanctioned. Collectively, our results support that public oversight sanctions have relatively limited consequences for auditors of private companies.

The Effectiveness of the Public Oversight of Auditors -- Evidence of the Effects of Disciplinary Sanctions on Auditors’ Reporting, Client Portfolios and Salaries

This study examines the consequences of sanctions against individual Swedish auditors issued by the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants (SBPA). The results provide no support for individual auditor client loss after receiving a sanction. However, we find that Big 4 auditors have a lower salary after the sanction than before. Finally, we do not find that auditors become more conservative in their reporting after being sanctioned. Collectively, our results support that public oversight sanctions have relatively limited consequences for auditors of private companies.