Todd Walter

Wide area augmentation of the Global Positioning System

The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) is being deployed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to augment the Global Positioning System (GPS). The WAAS will aid GPS with the following three services. First, it will broadcast spread-spectrum ranging signals from communication satellites. The airborne WAAS receiver will add these new ranging signals to the GPS constellation of measurements. By so doing, the augmented position fix will be less sensitive to the failure of individual system components, thus improving time availability and continuity of service. Second, the WAAS will use a nationwide ground network to monitor the health of all satellites over our airspace and flag situations which threaten flight safety. This data will be modulated on to the WAAS ranging signals and broadcast to the users, thereby guaranteeing the integrity of the airborne position fix. Third, the WAAS will use the ground network to develop corrections for the errors which currently limit the accuracy of unaugmented GPS. This data will also be included on the WAAS broadcast and will improve position accuracy from approximately 100 m to 8 m. When complete, the augmented system will provide an accurate position fix from satellites to an unlimited number of aircraft across the nation. It will be the primary navigation system for aircraft in oceanic routes, enroute over our domestic airspace, in crowded metropolitan airspaces, and on airport approach.

Worldwide Vertical Guidance of Aircraft Based on Modernized GPS and New Integrity Augmentations

In the 2020 time frame, the Global Positioning System (GPS) will be fully modernized, and other satellite navigation systems will be operational. With an additional layer of fault detection, these systems will provide vertical guidance worldwide. This capability will be born of three important technologies. First and foremost, avionics will receive signals on two frequencies: L1/E1 and L5/E5a. This frequency diversity will do much to obviate the impact of ionospheric storms that troubles aviation use of GPS today. Secondly, a multiplicity of data broadcasts will be available to convey integrity information from the ground to the airborne users. These will include the navigation satellites themselves, geostationary satellites, and possibly terrestrial transmitters. However, the most important change will be the most subtle. The fault monitoring burden will be split between the aircraft and the supporting ground systems in a new way relative to the fault-detection techniques used in 2008. This new integrity allocation and the associated architectures are the subject of this paper.

RAIM with Optimal Integrity and Continuity Allocations Under Multiple Failures

Among the receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) algorithms treating multiple failures, multiple hypothesis solution separation algorithms (MHSS) - a type of solution separation algorithm - offer several advantages: First, the link between threat model, upper bound on the position error - the protection level and probability of hazardously misleading information is an easy and straightforward one; second, the calculation of the protection level does not involve complex steps. One of the critical steps in this algorithm is the allocation of the integrity and continuity budgets among the failure modes, as it determines the overall performance of the algorithm. After describing the baseline MHSS approach, we present an algorithm that simultaneously allocates the integrity and continuity budget among the failure modes to obtain the minimum protection level per satellite geometry. Then, we show how slope-based RAIM and solution separation RAIM are related through a little-known formula, which both unifies and highlights the differences between the two approaches. Finally, we apply the algorithm to evaluate the performance of RAIM for vertical guidance for a dual constellation, and find that even with a very large prior probability of satellite failure, vertical guidance can be achieved worldwide with high availability.

Availability Impact on GPS Aviation due to Strong Ionospheric Scintillation

Strong ionospheric scintillation due to electron density irregularities inside the ionosphere is commonly observed in the equatorial region during solar maxima. Strong amplitude scintillation causes deep and frequent Global Positioning System (GPS) signal fading. Since GPS receivers lose carrier tracking lock at deep signal fading and the lost channel cannot be used for the position solution until reacquired, ionospheric scintillation is a major concern for GPS aviation in the equatorial area. Frequent signal fading also causes frequent reset of the carrier smoothing filter in aviation receivers. This leads to higher noise levels on the pseudo-range measurements. Aviation availability during a severe scintillation period observed using data from the previous solar maximum is analyzed. The effects from satellite loss due to deep fading and shortened carrier smoothing time are considered. Availability results for both vertical and horizontal navigation during the severe scintillation are illustrated. Finally, a modification to the upper bound of the allowed reacquisition time for the current Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) is recommended based on the availability analysis results and observed performance of a certified WAAS receiver.

Compass-M1 Broadcast Codes in E2, E5b, and E6 Frequency Bands

With the launch of the compass-M1 satellite on 14 April 2007, China is set to become the latest entrant into global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Understanding the interoperability and integration of the Chinese Compass with the current GNSS, namely the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), the European Galileo, and the Russian GLONASS, requires knowing and understanding its signal structures-specifically its pseudorandom noise (PRN) codes and code structures. Moreover, the knowledge of the code is a prerequisite for designing receivers capable of acquiring and tracking the satellite. More important is determining if the signal may degrade performance of the current GNSS in the form of interference. Finally, we are eager to learn from the code and signal design of our Chinese colleagues. For this research, we set up a 1.8-m dish antenna to collect the broadcast Compass-M1 signals. Even with the dish antenna, the received signal is still weak and buried in thermal noise. We then apply signal processing and are able to extract the PRN code chips out of the noise in all three frequency bands. The PRN codes are thousands of bits long. In addition, we find that the Compass-M1 PRN codes in all frequency bands are Gold codes. We also derive the Gold code generators to represents thousands of code chips with fewer than a hundred bits. Finally, we implement these codes in our software receiver to verify and validate our analysis.

Characterizing frequency stability: a continuous power-law model with discrete sampling

This paper examines several aspects of the Allan variance and the modified Allan variance. New expressions for these variances are derived for noise processes that produce power spectral densities with both integer and noninteger powers (/spl alpha/) in their functional dependence on f. A single expression, continuous over /spl alpha/, is presented for each of these variances. Also investigated are the effects of discrete sampling and finite data length. Discrete equations are developed and compared with more familiar continuous expressions. In addition, the uncertainty of the estimates for the Allan variance and the modified Allan variance for fully overlapping data usage is presented. The uncertainties can be calculated for arbitrary /spl alpha/. The results presented are compared with computer simulations and found to be in excellent agreement. >

Improving GPS-based landing system performance using an empirical barometric altimeter confidence bound

This paper develops an empirical confidence bound for barometric altimeter altitude errors and shows how this bound may improve the performance of GPS-based approach and landing systems. This empirical bound is developed using historical meteorological data collected at a set of geographically diverse locations over a thirty year period. The confidence bound developed is shown to provide a Gaussian overbound on altimeter altitude errors in standard atmospheric conditions between a 10-5 and 10-6 confidence level. This confidence bound is integrated into the standard methodology for analyzing the performance of GPS-based landing systems and the results of a performance trade study using the confidence bound are presented. The results show that incorporating the empirical barometric altimeter confidence bound provides an increase in the coterminous United States (CONUS) service volume for lateral precision with vertical guidance (LPV) type approaches. While this increase is approximately 2% for an L1 single-frequency GPS user, it jumps to roughly 40% for an L5 single-frequency user.

Future Dual-Frequency GPS Navigation System for Intelligent Air Transportation Under Strong Ionospheric Scintillation

GPS technology is essential for future intelligent air transportation systems such as the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) of the United States. However, observed deep and frequent amplitude fading of GPS signals due to ionospheric scintillation can be a major concern in expanding GPS-guided aviation to the equatorial area where strong scintillation is expected. Current civil GPS airborne avionics track signals at a single frequency (L1 frequency) alone because it was the only civil signal available in the frequency band for aviation applications. The first GPS Block IIF satellite was launched in May 2010. This next-generation satellite transmits a new civil signal at the L5 frequency, which can be used for air transportation. This paper investigates a possible improvement in the availability of GPS-based aircraft landing guidance down to 200 ft above the runway, which is also known as Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV) 200, under strong ionospheric scintillation when dual-frequency signals are available. Based on the availability study, this paper proposes and justifies a GPS aviation receiver performance standard mandating fast reacquisition after a very brief signal outage due to scintillation. In order to support a temporary single-frequency operation under a single-frequency loss due to scintillation, a new vertical protection level (VPL) equation is proposed and justified. With this new performance requirement and new VPL equation in place, 99% availability of LPV-200 would be attainable, rather than 50% at the current standards, even under the severe scintillation scenarios considered in this paper.

Satellite Navigation for Aviation in 2025

Satellite navigation has been used for aircraft navigation for more than 50 years. In the last ten years, the capabilities of satellite navigation have been expanded to more demanding phases of flight, in particular vertical guidance down to 200 ft, thanks to the implementation of augmentation systems. In this paper, we attempt to predict the state of satellite navigation in the next 15 years. We will start by reviewing the challenges that must be addressed by satellite navigation for aircraft guidance. Then, we will describe the current techniques that enable satellite navigation for aviation and the level of performance they achieve today. This will be followed by a description of the upcoming changes to satellite navigation, which include the launch of new constellations and the introduction of new civil signals. Despite these developments, satellite navigation is inherently vulnerable to radio-frequency interference so that backup navigation systems are still necessary. Nonetheless, these improvements will have a great impact on the availability and level of service achieved by satellite navigation, in particular enabling worldwide coverage of vertical guidance.

GPS Signal-in-Space Integrity Performance Evolution in the Last Decade

Knowledge of the Global Positioning System (GPS) signal-in-space (SIS) anomalies in history has a great importance for not only assessing the general performance of GPS SIS integrity but also validating the fundamental assumption of receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM): at most one satellite fault at a time. The main purpose of this paper is to screen out all potential SIS anomalies in the last decade by comparing broadcast ephemerides and clocks with precise ones. Validated broadcast navigation messages are generated from 397,044,414 navigation messages logged by on average 410 International GNSS Service (IGS) stations during the period 6/1/2000-8/31/2010. Both IGS and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) precise ephemerides/clocks are used as truth references. Finally, 1256 potential SIS anomalies are screened out. These anomalies show an improving SIS integrity performance in the last decade, from tens or hundreds of anomalies per year before 2003 to on average two anomalies per year after 2008. Moreover, the fundamental assumption of RAIM is valid because never have two SIS anomalies or more occurred simultaneously since 2004.