Tom Dyson

Neoclassical realism and defence reform in post-cold war Europe

PART I: CONTEXT: THE CASE FOR CONVERGENCE Europes Partial and Selective Emulation of the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs Convergence and Divergence in the Institutional Forums of Defence Policy: Functional Complementarity Spatial and Temporal Differentiation PART II: THEORISING AND TESTING DEFENCE POLICY CONVERGENCE Competing Theoretical Frameworks: Realist and Cultural Approaches PART III: TESTING CULTURAL AND REALIST APPROACHED: DEFENCE POLICIES BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE AND EXECUTIVE AUTONOMY France: Domestic Incentives and Timely Adaptation to Systemic Imperatives Germany: Domestic Constraint and the Temporal Management of Reform The United Kingdom High Executive Autonomy and Timely Adaptation to Systemic Imperatives Conclusions: The Empirical and Theoretical Implications

Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French, and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy

Post-Cold War military reforms in Britain, France, and Germany have been characterized by patterns of convergence in the objectives, instruments, and institutional forums of defense policy but by divergence in temporality. These patterns of convergence and divergence cannot be fully explained by cultural approaches. Neither can they be explained solely by a focus on the role of international structure, as neo-realism posits, although the post-Cold War distribution of capabilities is driving Britain, France, and Germany toward policy convergence. Instead, the analysis builds upon the insights of neoclassical realism. Culture emerges not so much as a cause of action as instrumental and a resource for policy leaders in the domestic political and temporal management of reform.

Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century’

In the mid-2000s Germany began a far-reaching defence reform process centred on a selective emulation of the concepts and capabilities associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). These reforms were designed to enable the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) to contribute to global, full-spectrum operations. Germany has, however, faced sharp criticism from North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Alliance partners for its reluctance to contribute to higher-intensity operations in Afghanistan under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The majority of the academic literature focuses upon the impact of German security culture on the willingness of policy leaders to sanction a more offensive role for the Bundeswehr. In contrast, this study argues that low ‘executive autonomy’ deriving from a set of restrictive domestic material power relations has slowed Germany’s convergence with the dictates of international structure. The article explores, in particular, two related yet neglected dimensions of reform which have an important impact on the Bundeswehr’s ability to undertake full-spectrum operations: military doctrine and capabilities. It finds that low executive autonomy continues to incentivise an inappropriate level of political interference in doctrinal development and constrains the core executive’s ability to overcome the impact of organisational politics between the individual Services on capability

Balancing Threat, not Capabilities: European Defence Cooperation as Reformed Bandwagoning

Cladi and Locatellis conceptualization of CSDP as an instance of bandwagoning on US power has significant analytical leverage; however, their analysis fails to outline an alternative systemic explanation to the balance of power. This contribution argues that European defence cooperation is best understood by using a neoclassical realist analysis that integrates the insights of Stephen Walts ‘balance of threat’ theory. Furthermore, it is argued that the analysis presented by Pohl neglects the role of the Atlantic Alliance in European security. In doing so, Pohl misses the nature of CSDP as the central element of the ‘reform’ of western Europes Cold War bandwagoning on US power. One should not, therefore, expect CSDP operations to necessarily be about frustrating or helping US strategic objectives. CSDP is instead an institution that is designed primarily to meet security challenges within Europes geopolitical neighbourhood that the US is unwilling or unable to tackle.

German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint Over International Opportunity

Abstract The article analyses the processes and outcomes of military reforms during the two Schröder governments (1998–2005). These reforms are the litmus test for Germanys willingness and ability to play an important role in crisis-management tasks as part of NATO, CESDP and the UN. The study argues that, despite its strengths, the concept of strategic culture provides only a partial explanation of military reform in Germany. The article illustrates the strongly self-referential nature of Bundeswehr reform, despite adaptational pressures from the EU and NATO and the role of ‘international structure’. The domestic politics of base closures, ramifications for social policy, economic and financial restrictions consequent upon German unification and commitment to EMUs Stability and Growth Pact were critical in determining the outcomes of the reform processes undertaken by Defence Ministers Rudolf Scharping and Peter Struck. The study also draws out the important role of policy leaders in the political manipulation of reform as entrepreneurs, brokers or veto-players and in controlling the extent of adaptational pressure from NATO and the EU. In doing so, the article shifts the focus of leadership studies in Germany away from the Chancellor to an examination of the role of ministerial and administrative leadership within the core executive.

Defence Policy under the Labour Government: Operational Dynamism and Strategic Inertia

This article examines the process and outcome of defence reform under the Labour government, with a particular focus on the structuring of military input to defence planning. It argues that UK defence reform has been characterised by dynamism at the tactical and operational levels but that organisational politics between the services has impacted upon decisions surrounding defence capability procurement and force posture. The core executive has been able to structure military input to defence planning effectively at the tactical and operational levels. However, the core executives capacity to provide clear guidance on the balance to be struck between capabilities and force postures relevant to contemporary and future conflict scenarios has been impeded by the British electoral cycle. Neo-classical realism provides, therefore, compelling analytical leverage in conceptualising British defence reform.

German Defence Policy under the Second Merkel Chancellorship

The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition (2009–13) has witnessed the emergence of three important changes in the international security environment: the US ‘Asia Pivot’, the global financial crisis and the fallout from Germanys backseat role in the Libya crisis. This article examines how German defence policy has adapted to this changing context. It explores the reforms which have taken place to the Bundeswehrs structure and military capability procurement process under defence ministers Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg and Thomas de Mazière. The article also looks at German policy toward defence cooperation through CSDP and NATO. The article finds that while some important changes have been enacted to German defence policy, Germany is failing to properly adapt to the changing strategic environment. The article concludes by examining key defence policy challenges facing the government over the 2013–17 legislative period and the implications of the analysis for theoretical debates on German defence policy.

The Material Roots of European Strategy: Beyond Culture and Values

This article undertakes a critical examination of the analytical leverage provided by the literature on strategic culture in explaining the development of the European Unions Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It posits that patterns of progress and stasis in CSDP cannot be fully explained by processes of normative convergence and the resilience of national strategic cultures. Instead, the article argues that a focus on material power sheds greater light on the dynamics driving and hindering Europes quest for military autonomy. It highlights how the ‘balance of threat’ is fostering both convergence and differentiation in the defence policies of Britain, France, and Germany. Through case studies of the development of British, French, and German policy towards CSDP and NATO, the article demonstrates the important roles played by energy dependency and geographical position in determining the willingness of European states to embed their defence policies in NATO/CSDP or pursue national strategic autonomy. The article argues that strategic culture can provide valuable insights into European defence cooperation; however, this contribution is best framed within the theoretical insights of neoclassical realism. By highlighting the nature of the variables determining the scope and depth of European defence cooperation, the article raises a number of policy implications for European security.

Civilian power and ‘history‐making’ decisions: German agenda‐setting on Europe

This article examines ‘history‐making’ decisions on Europe by the German government, drawing on the concept of civilian power, which has been refined by international relations theorists, subjecting it to a political science critique. Three case studies ‐ of economic and monetary union (EMU), dual enlargement and European defence and security policy ‐ are discussed and compared with the aim of assessing the value of civilian power for the analysis and explanation of key German decisions. The focus is on agenda‐setting in relation to key ‘history‐making’ decisions. It is argued that German European policy behaviour is better explained by civilian power than realism or neo‐liberal institutionalism. However, civilian power does not adequately capture the complex attitudes and values at work in Germany, the interests brought to bear in a fragmented, sectoralised policy process, the resource limitations on pursuing this approach, and the external conditions for sustaining such a role.

Organizing for Counter-insurgency: Explaining Doctrinal Adaptation in Britain and Germany

Why do allies not adapt evenly even in time of war? This article maps and explains differentiation in the development of the stabilization and counter-insurgency doctrines of the British and Germanmilitaries during deployment in Afghanistan. In doing so the study analyses the neglected issue of the organizational capabilities of the British and German militaries to develop and apply military doctrine that is appropriate to the exigencies of the contemporary operational environment. Drawing upon documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews, this article uncovers new empirical material on the institutional reforms which have been undertaken to strengthen the adaptability of doctrine and its application in operations. It finds that while the British militarys organizational capabilities were characterized by deficits at the tactical level between 2006 and 2009, recent years have seen significant improvement. In contrast, the organizational capabilities of the Germanmilitary remain stunted. While international structure is the main independent variable driving doctrinal adaptability, domestic variables exogenous to the military are the dominant intervening factor determining the development of effective organizational capabilities. Neoclassical realism provides the strongest analytical leverage in understanding the factors determining the capacity of militaries to adapt doctrine to the operational environment.