Tom Grimwood

Mountains, Cones, and Dilemmas of Context The Case of “Ordinary Language” in Philosophy and Social Scientific Method

The order of influence from thesis to hypothesis, and from philosophy to the social sciences, has historically governed the way in which the abstraction and significance of language as an empirical object is determined. In this article, an argument is made for the development of a more reflexive intellectual relationship between ordinary language philosophy (OLP) and the social sciences that it helped inspire. It is demonstrated that, and how, the social scientific traditions of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (CA) press OLP to re-consider the variety of problematic abstractions it has previously made for the sake of philosophical clarity, thereby self-reinvigorating.

How to do things without words

The impact of J.L. Austin’s Speech-Act Theory has resonated throughout the social sciences over the last three decades, not least in its catalysis of the so-called linguistic turn and the rise of cultural studies. Since this original shockwave, a great deal of innovation and progress in the study of ordinary language itself has emanated from these social sciences, not least among which is Harvey Sacks’ Conversation Analytic approach (see Sacks, 1972; 1984; 1992a; 1992b). Pioneered by Sacks, and strongly influenced by the methods of ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel (1967; 1996; 2007), Conversation Analysis (henceforth CA) has, over the last four decades, built on many of the foundational principles of Austin’s work in developing a working corpus of research addressing how ordinary conversation works in concrete, empirical situations. The flow of intellectual influence with respect to the understanding of how “ordinary language” works has, however, been largely monodirectional; ideas have moved steadily from philosophy into the realms of the social sciences, with very little converse drift. In this chapter it is argued that, despite this historically-ingrained disciplinary tide, there is much that CA can “give back” to Austin scholars – particularly in terms of the how dialogue might be pragmatically conceptualised. As a thematic lynchpin, focus falls chiefly upon Sacks’ criticisms of the persistent employment of invented and “ideal” cases of language-use endemic to the Speech-Act tradition. Using such idealisations is, from Sacks’ perspective, inimical to any claim regarding the provision of insight into the “ordinary” language that actually manifests in real social interactions. Furthermore, the implications of this important charge are elucidated herein with reference to one particular substantive component of conversational practice in which the discrepancies between “real” and “ideal” examples become especially salient: silence.

Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, Volume 7: Journals NB15—NB20

This volume of the new complete translation of Soren Kierkegaard’s Skrifter (for my review of earlier volumes, see The European Legacy 17.2 and 19.4), includes the journals and notebooks archived as NB15 to NB20, written throughout 1850. As with previous volumes, this edition features a translation of the journals in a two-column format, in order to best represent the multiple alterations and drafting Kierkegaard made to his own personal documents. These are followed by a “Critical Account of the Text” (discussing both the physical appearance and chronological information of each notebook), and “Explanatory Notes” by the editors. These notes include maps of the cities and areas that Kierkegaard discusses, the calendar for the year he followed (particularly pertinent in this edition, given the number of reflections on holy feast days Kierkegaard reflects on in NB15), and any illustrations that he refers to in his writing.

The Meaning of Clichés

There is no shortage of 19th, 20th and 21st century literature condemning the generic, the formulaic, and the banal as not simply bad writing, but as a broader symptom of cultural stagnation; a topic which has recently re-ignited in debates over ‘anti-critique’ or ‘post-criticism’. But is it possible to write a history of the cliche, which the cliche itself is not automatically excluded from? Is it possible to critically think through that which expresses the absence of critical thought? This paper pursues this question by exploring what is meant by the ‘time’ of cliches. It builds on Boris Groys’ concept of ‘anti-philosophy’ to suggest that a straightforward ‘history’ risks privileging a particular critical viewpoint that mistakenly insists on the cliche as a mark of difference, rather than a peculiar and perturbing sameness which is both superfluous and tyrannical in equal measure. Instead, the paper suggests that, the time of cliches should be viewed through particular sites where the boundaries between philosophical meaning and non-meaning – and, in turn, technological and human, archival and visible, intellectual and everyday – are contested and underdetermined. The paper explores the concept of the rhetorical ‘commonplace’ as one such site where the marking of cliche exposes a range of specific material and contextual configurations that shape the conditions for the suspicion of cliche as tyrannical, stupid or stagnant.

Key debates in social work and philosophy

In order to practice effectively in today’s complex and changing environment, social workers need to have an understanding of how contemporary cultural and philosophical concepts relate to the people they work with and the fields they practice in. Exploring the ideas of philosophers, including Nietzsche, Gadamer, Taylor, Adorno, MacIntyre, Zizek and Derrida, this text demonstrates their relevance to social work practice and presents new approaches and frameworks to understanding social change. Key Debates in Social Work and Philosophy introduces a range of concerns central to social work and social care, with chapters looking at questions such as: What is the ‘self’?; How are communities formed?; Why is ‘choice’ important?; Are certain rights really applicable to all humans?; What are the political and ethical implications of documenting your practice?; What does it mean to be a professional social worker? Each chapter focuses on a particular area of dispute, presenting the relevant philosophical theories, and considering how relevant social work examples and research can be used to further inform theoretical debate, and includes questions to prompt discussion and reflection. The only book to examine the philosophical ideas that underlie and inform contemporary issues for social work and social care practitioners, this is a useful resource for those studying social work theory, policy and practice.

The Concept of Reading: Kierkegaard, Irony, and Duality—A Response to Mark Cortes Favis

In a recent article in The European Legacy, Mark Cortes Favis argued that the figure of Kierkegaard expressed a tension between two aspects of writing—the Socratic and the Platonic. While Favis is correct to see a duality in Kierkegaards writing, his article does not fully answer the problem of how we can account for our interpretation of this tension. Given that the duality within Kierkegaards writing transgresses the boundaries of author and reader, we cannot easily circumscribe any claims on his writing without considering its effect on our reading. Rather, the characteristic duality of his authority manifests itself in a number of ways in the task of identifying the philosophical meaning of his texts. Kierkegaards relationship to Socrates is thus symptomatic of a number of figural dualities that pervade interpretations of his work. By surveying the ways in which these interpretations draw on the axiom of duality in order to ascribe an authority to Kierkegaards texts, I suggest Faviss argument that Kierkegaards writing expresses both Socratic and Platonic aspects should be placed within the wider duality at work in the interpretation of Kierkegaards work.

Hesitation and Irony in Nietzsche's “Woman and Child”

introduction: why ironymatters The question of whether Nietzsche’s texts can be interpreted as ‘‘misogynistic’’ is often troubled by the possibility of ironic interpretation: how can we be sure that a writer as deceptive and mischievous as Nietzsche is not ‘‘performing’’ or playing with prejudice, in some sense, when he comments on the opposite sex? After all, both misogyny and irony are concerned with the notion of an ‘‘authorial subject position.’’ The status of Nietzsche’s ‘‘voice’’ within the text, and the structure of authority from which it speaks, is intrinsically related to the value of what it has to say. For certain readers, this question raises an issue of the ‘‘seriousness’’ of interpretation. For example, Linda Singer argues that:

Re-Reading The Second Sex's ‘Simone de Beauvoir’

Referencing ‘Simone de Beauvoir’ is to reference a stage in the history of feminist philosophy; when one cites the name ‘Simone de Beauvoir’, as the signature of The Second Sex, one is also citing not just the context of its original inscription, but a further context endowed upon it by the history of critical responses. Every time that the name is re-written, a particular figure of the author is brought forth, shaped as much by every previous rewriting as its original inscription; but while the philosophical signature is traditionally afforded an authoritative value within such references, in the case of The Second Sex’s ‘Simone de Beauvoir’ such a citational context has played a fundamentally detrimental role in both the interpretation and value of the author’s work. In this paper, I will argue that this context of ‘failure’ that accompanies the citation of Beauvoir’s signature should not be ignored, but is rather a key to the understanding of The Second Sex’s philosophical meaning. I will examine the effect of such a context on various readings of The Second Sex; review possible responses to such a signature; and finally, suggest a way in which this negative context yields a constructive meaning. Of course, in general, feminist philosophy has been enthusiastic to reference the name of Simone de Beauvoir as a figure of influence. In her allotted role as the ‘mother’ of post-war feminist philosophy, Simone de Beauvoir’s name is an inevitable point of reference as a polemical icon of ‘early’ feminism. However, if we differentiate the general iconic name of Simone de Beauvoir from the specific references to the ‘Simone de Beauvoir’ who signs The Second Sex, a quite distinct referential history emerges. This latter reference is to the author of the book that, using historical account, psychological analysis and biological ‘fact’, attempts to formulate the philosophical question ‘what is a woman?’, suggesting that while man ‘is’, woman ‘is not’; man is ‘being’, woman is ‘becoming’. Despite such polemical statements having been echoed throughout the British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16(1) 2008: 197 – 213

The Body as a Lived Metaphor: Interpreting Catherine of Siena as an Ethical Agent

This article argues that reading the life of Catherine of Siena can fall into passive models of feminine agency that stifle the potential such a life has to offer. By investigating the way passivity is imposed by both traditional and feminist writers on her life, this article argues that new ways of conceptualizing asceticism are possible through the affirmation of Catherine of Siena’s agency as active. This involves viewing the relation of the ascetic body to its explanatory texts (both historical and contemporary) as something more than literal. Using recent interpretations of Paul, this article argues that Catherine of Siena can be read as a performative exposition of the hidden oppressiveness of the dualistic framework ascetics are often taken to be mere ‘victims’ of.