Tom Regan

An Examination and defense of one Argument concerning Animal rights

An argument is examined and defended for extending basic moral rights to animals which assumes that humans, including infants and the severely mentally enfeebled, have such rights. It is claimed that this argument proceeds on two fronts, one critical, where proposed criteria of right‐possession are rejected, the other constructive, where proposed criteria are examined with a view to determining the most reasonable one. This form of argument is defended against the charge that it is self‐defeating, various candidates for the title, ‘most reasonable criterion of right‐possession’, are critically examined, and it is argued that this criterion is to be found in the notion of inherent value: What underlies the ascription of rights to any given x is that x has value logically independently of anyones valuing x; thus, to treat x as if x had value only if or as it served ones interests, etc., is to violate x ‘s rights. It is argued that many animals, owing to their being subjects of a life that is more or less ...

Ill-gotten Gains

Late in 1981 a reporter for a large newspaper (we’ll call her Karen to protect her interest in remaining anonymous) gained access to some previously classified government files. Karen was investigating the government’s funding of research into the short- and long-term effects of exposure to radioactive waste. It was with understandable surprise that, included in these files, she discovered the records of a series of experiments involving the induction and treatment of coronary thrombosis (heart attack). Conducted over a period of 15 years by a renowned heart specialist (we’ll call him Dr Ventricle) and financed with government funds, the experiments in all likelihood would have remained unknown to anyone outside Dr Ventricle’s sphere of power and influence had not Karen chanced upon them.

Obligations to animals are based on rights

Some feminist philosophers criticize the idea of human rights because, they allege, it encapsulates male bias; it is therefore misguided, in their view, to extend moral rights to non-human animals. I argue that the feminist criticism is misguided. Ideas are not biased in favour of men simply because they originate with men, nor are ideas themselves biased in favour of men because men have used them prejudicially. As for the position that women should abandon theories of rights and embrace an ethic that emphasizes care: women who made this choice would not so much liberate themselves from “the patriarchy” as they would conform to its representation of women as emotional, subjective and irrational. There is, then, no good reason to withhold ascribing rights to non-human animals, based on the criticisms of rights made by some feminists.

WHALES ARE NOT CETACEAN RESOURCES

What we know about whales is sufficient for ascribing to them the analogues of human rights, including the fundamental right to be treated with respect. Once we recognize their possession of this right, it follows that whales are not to be used or exploited by us for the promotion of our ends, however “benign” they may appear. In the case of humans, to refrain from killing them is to discharge only a small part of our total duties. We must also refrain from exploiting them, whether “consumptively” or “nonconsumptively.” Having come as far as we have in our understanding of the moral ties that binds humans and whales, we must now go further in our deeds. Just as whales are not here for us to kill for our purposes, so they are not here for us “to study,” or “to watch,” or “to play with.” The moral task before us is the most difficult. It is to let whales alone.

Moore's Accounts of ‘Right’

Moore often is credited with implying the view that the meaning of evaluative or normative concepts is distinct from the criteria invoked to justify evaluative or normative judgments. A second view, to the effect that definitions cannot be evaluative or moral assertions, is attributed to him less frequently. In this paper, I shall argue that, while these views seem to be implied by much of what Moore says in Principia Ethica , Moore was not himself uniformly successful in observing their prohibitions. In particular, I shall argue that his account of ‘Right’ in Principia involved the very confusions which he seems to imply others should avoid. Against this backdrop, however, his subsequent treatment of ‘right’ in his Ethics , as well as his retrospective remarks about the relationships between ‘good’ and ‘right’ in his “A Reply to My Critics”, can be interpreted as both predictable and necessary. If the argument developed in this paper is sound, the explanation of Moores abandonment of his earlier account of ‘right’ is not, as he says, merely because that account is “paradoxical”, but lies, instead, in a latent inconsistency between his Principia account of this predicate and other principles implied in that work.

Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics

The position I favor (the “rights view”) prioritizes the moral rights of individuals when it comes to our moral thinking. Some defining features of these rights are explained; reasons for recognizing them in the case of humans are advanced; and arguments for extending them to other-than-human animals are sketched. Several objections are considered, including those that dispute the rights view’s alleged inability to explain (1) the amorality of predator-prey relations and (2) our obligations to preserve rare and endangered species.

Rights Across Species

Organized efforts to protect other animals are at an historic crossroads. Never before have so many joined in the struggle to bring significant improvements to their lives. The number of people involved and their growing sense of shared values are making a difference in the political process, in the marketplace, in the classroom, even — on some occasions — in places of worship. Truly, animal protection efforts are a force to be reckoned with.