Tom-Reiel Heggedal

Environmental Policy and the Direction of Technical Change

Should governments direct research and development (R&D) away from “dirty” technologies towards “clean” ones? How important is this compared to carbon pricing? We address these questions with the introduction of two model features to the literature on directed technological change and the environment. We introduce decreasing returns to R&D, and allow future carbon taxes to influence current R&D decisions. Our results suggest that governments should prioritize clean R&D. Dealing with major environmental problems requires an R&D shift towards clean technology. However, in the case where most researchers are working with clean technology, both productivity spillovers and the risks of future replacement increase. Consequently, the gap between the private and social values of an innovation is greatest for clean technologies.

Knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies to new, emerging technologies

Is knowledge spillover a rationale for supporting R&D on new, emerging technologies more than R&D on other technologies? In this paper, I analyze whether innovation externalities caused only by knowledge spillovers differ between technologies of different maturity. I show that R&D should not be subsidized equally across industries when the knowledge stocks differ. This is because knowledge spillovers depend on the size of the knowledge stock and the elasticity of scale in R&D production. R&D in the emerging technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is smaller than one. However, R&D in the mature technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is larger than one.

Productivity Spillovers Through Labor Mobility in Search Equilibrium

This paper proposes an explicit model of spillovers through labor flows in a framework with search frictions. Firms can choose to innovate or to imitate by hiring a worker from a firm that has already innovated. We show that if innovating firms can commit to long-term wage contracts with their workers, productivity spillovers are fully internalized. If firms cannot commit to long-term wage contracts, there is too little innovation and too much imitation in equilibrium. Our model is tractable and allows us to analyze welfare effects of various policies in the limited commitment case. We find that subsidizing innovation and taxing imitation improves welfare. Moreover, allowing innovating firms to charge different forms of fees or rent out workers to imitating firms may also improve welfare. By contrast, non-pecuniary measures that reduce the efficiency of the search process, always reduce welfare.