Tomasz Zaleskiewicz

Money Cues Increase Agency and Decrease Prosociality Among Children: Early Signs of Market-Mode Behaviors

People can get most of their needs broadly satisfied in two ways: by close communal ties and by dealings with people in the marketplace. These modes of relating—termed communal and market—often necessitate qualitatively different motives, behaviors, and mind-sets. We reasoned that activating market mode would produce behaviors consistent with it and impair behaviors consistent with communal mode. In a series of experiments, money—the market-mode cue—was presented to Polish children ages 3 to 6. We measured communal behavior by prosocial helpfulness and generosity and measured market behavior by performance and effort. Results showed that handling money (compared with other objects) increased laborious effort and reduced helpfulness and generosity. The effects of money primes were not due to the children’s mood, liking for money, or task engagement. This work is the first to demonstrate that young children tacitly understand market mode and also understand that money is a cue to shift into it.

Saving can save from death anxiety: mortality salience and financial decision-making.

Four studies tested the idea that saving money can buffer death anxiety and constitute a more effective buffer than spending money. Saving can relieve future-related anxiety and provide people with a sense of control over their fate, thereby rendering death thoughts less threatening. Study 1 found that participants primed with both saving and spending reported lower death fear than controls. Saving primes, however, were associated with significantly lower death fear than spending primes. Study 2 demonstrated that mortality primes increase the attractiveness of more frugal behaviors in save-or-spend dilemmas. Studies 3 and 4 found, in two different cultures (Polish and American), that the activation of death thoughts prompts people to allocate money to saving as opposed to spending. Overall, these studies provided evidence that saving protects from existential anxiety, and probably more so than spending.

Implicit attitudes toward risk: the construction and validation of the measurement method

Methods that are typically used to examine individual differences in risk attitudes (e.g. lotteries, dilemmas, questionnaires) require participants to explicitly declare their willingness to take risk. Therefore, they may be biased by the need for self-presentation or situational characteristics such as time pressure and cognitive constraints that lead to more spontaneous and automatic processing of risk-related information. The aim of this study was to construct an indirect measure of risk attitudes that is free of these methodological limitations. The method based on the Implicit Association Test shows high internal reliability and satisfactory stability over time. It correlates moderately with different explicit measures of risk attitudes that are related to sensation seeking. Finally, it is characterized by a high predictive power. Adding the implicit measure to the set of independent variables representing declarative evaluations of risk attitudes significantly improved the model predicting risky real-life behavior. We argue that the indirect assessment of risk attitudes presented in this paper may be used as an universal measure of people’s risk propensity that is free of biases related to self-presentation and situational factors.

Affect-Laden Imagery and Risk Taking: The Mediating Role of Stress and Risk Perception

This paper investigates how affect-laden imagery that evokes emotional stress influences risk perception and risk taking in real-life scenarios. In a series of three studies, we instructed participants to imagine the consequences of risky scenarios and then rate the intensity of the experienced stress, perceived risk and their willingness to engage in risky behavior. Study 1 showed that people spontaneously imagine negative rather than positive risk consequences, which are directly related to their lower willingness to take risk. Moreover, this relationship was mediated by feelings of stress and risk perception. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings by showing that imagining negative risk consequences evokes psychophysiological stress responses observed in elevated blood pressure. Finally, in Study 3, we once again demonstrated that a higher intensity of mental images of negative risk consequences, as measured by enhanced brain activity in the parieto-occipital lobes, leads to a lower propensity to take risk. Furthermore, individual differences in creating vivid and intense negative images of risk consequences moderated the strength of the relationship between risk perception and risk taking. Participants who created more vivid and intense images of negative risk consequences paid less attention to the assessments of riskiness in rating their likelihood to take risk. To summarize, we showed that feelings of emotional stress and perceived riskiness mediate the relationship between mental imagery and risk taking, whereas individual differences in abilities to create vivid mental images may influence the degree to which more cognitive risk assessments are used in the risk-taking process.

The Affective Bases of Risk Perception: Negative Feelings and Stress Mediate the Relationship between Mental Imagery and Risk Perception

Recent research has documented that affect plays a crucial role in risk perception. When no information about numerical risk estimates is available (e.g., probability of loss or magnitude of consequences), people may rely on positive and negative affect toward perceived risk. However, determinants of affective reactions to risks are poorly understood. In a series of three experiments, we addressed the question of whether and to what degree mental imagery eliciting negative affect and stress influences risk perception. In each experiment, participants were instructed to visualize consequences of risk taking and to rate riskiness. In Experiment 1, participants who imagined negative risk consequences reported more negative affect and perceived risk as higher compared to the control condition. In Experiment 2, we found that this effect was driven by affect elicited by mental imagery rather than its vividness and intensity. In this study, imagining positive risk consequences led to lower perceived risk than visualizing negative risk consequences. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that negative affect related to higher perceived risk was caused by negative feelings of stress. In Experiment 3, we introduced risk-irrelevant stress to show that participants in the stress condition rated perceived risk as higher in comparison to the control condition. This experiment showed that higher ratings of perceived risk were influenced by psychological stress. Taken together, our results demonstrate that affect-laden mental imagery dramatically changes risk perception through negative affect (i.e., psychological stress).

Lay Evaluation of Financial Experts: The Action Advice Effect and Confirmation Bias

The goal of this experimental project was to investigate lay peoples’ perceptions of epistemic authority (EA) in the field of finance. EA is defined as the extent to which a source of information is treated as evidence for judgments independently of its objective expertise and based on subjective beliefs. Previous research suggested that EA evaluations are biased and that lay people tend to ascribe higher EA to experts who advise action (in the case of medical experts) or confirm clients’ expectations (in the case of politicians). However, there has been no research into biases in lay evaluations of financial experts and this project is aimed to fill this gap. Experiment 1 showed that lay people tended to ascribe greater authority to financial consultants who gave more active advice to clients considering taking out a mortgage. Experiment 2 confirmed the action advice effect found in Experiment 1. However, the outcomes of Experiments 2 and – particularly – 3 suggested that this bias might also be due to clients’ desire to confirm their own opinions. Experiment 2 showed that the action advice effect was moderated by clients’ own opinions on taking loans. Lay people ascribed the greatest EA to the advisor in the scenario in which he advised taking action and where this coincided with the client’s positive opinion on the advisability of taking out a loan. In Experiment 3 only participants with a positive opinion on the financial product ascribed greater authority to experts who recommended it; participants whose opinion was negative tended to rate consultants who advised rejecting the product more highly. To conclude, these three experiments revealed that lay people ascribe higher EA to financial consultants who advise action rather than maintenance of the status quo, but this effect is limited by confirmation bias: when the client’s a priori opinion is salient, greater authority is ascribed to experts whose advice confirms it. In this sense, results presented in the present paper suggest that the action advice effect might be also interpreted as a specific manifestation of confirmation bias.

Tell Me What I Wanted to Hear: Confirmation Effect in Lay Evaluations of Financial Expert Authority: LAY EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL EXPERTS

In real life, people engage in interactive decision processes by consulting with experts. However, before taking advice, they must recognise the authority of an expert to assess the quality of the advice. The main goal of this research was to investigate how the confirmation effect affects lay evaluations of the epistemic authority of financial experts. Experiment 1 showed that lay people tend to ascribe greater epistemic authority to those experts whose advice confirms people s opinions, both measured and manipulated. Experiment 2 revealed that when participants own opinions are not salient, people tend to evaluate experts authority as higher when their advice confirms social norms. In Experiment 3 we jointly investigated the effects of participants own opinions and social norms on the evaluations of authority. When both sources of expertise were made salient, decision-makers favoured advice confirming their own beliefs and used it to evaluate experts authority. Three interpretations of the role confirmation plays in the experts authority evaluations are proposed: (1) self-defensive strategies; (2) processing fluency; and (3) psychological consequences of na€ıve realism. The paper discusses practical implications of the results. We propose that increasing consumers knowledge about biases might protect their evaluations of financial advice from being susceptible to the confirmation effect.