Tommie Shelby

Foundations of Black Solidarity: Collective Identity or Common Oppression?*

* Sincere and warm thanks go to my friends and colleagues who commented on previous drafts of this essay, including Linda Alcoff, Anthony Appiah, Lawrie Balfour, Sylvia Berryman, Martha Biondi, Bernard Boxill, Derrick Darby, Dan Farrell, Dena Gilby, Robert Gooding-Williams, Jennifer Hochschild, Bill Lawson, Sarah Loper, Ron Mallon, Howard McGary, Charles Mills, Lucius Outlaw, Naomi Pabst, John Pittman, Diana Raffman, Kathleen Schmidt, and Laurence Thomas. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for Ethics, as well as the editors of the journal. Earlier versions of the essay were presented at Howard University, Harvard University, the Du Bois Scholars Institute in New Jersey, the Collegium for African American Research Biannual Conference, and a special session of the APA Pacific sponsored by the Committee on Blacks in Philosophy. I am grateful to the audiences at these venues. 1. Frederick Douglass, “To Our Oppressed Countrymen,” in Black Nationalism in America, ed. John H. Bracey, Jr., August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), p. 58, originally published as an editorial in the North Star (December 3, 1847). 2. In everyday life, use of the term ‘black’ when referring to individuals or groups rarely causes much confusion; context is usually enough to make the speaker’s meaning relatively clear. But the concept “black” is quite vague and thus is not easily accommodated to theoretical discourse where one would like to be fairly precise. Moreover, the meaning of ‘black’ as a “racial” designator varies with social context, for there are various systems of racial classification around the world; and even within a given locale, who is “black” may shift with political contingencies. My concern in this essay is primarily with blacks living in the United States today, including recent African, Caribbean, European, and Latin American immigrants, though some of what I say here can also be extended to blacks living in other places as well. For the moment, I will rely on context to set the

Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory

The problem of the future world is the charting, by means of intelligent reason, of a path not simply through the resistances of physical force, but through the vaster and far more intricate jungle of ideas conditioned on unconscious and subconscious reflexes of living things; on blind unreason and often irresistible urges of sensitive matter; of which the concept of race is today one of the most unyielding and threatening. —W. E. B. Du Bois

Two Conceptions of Black Nationalism: Martin Delany on the Meaning of Black Political Solidarity

The essay provides both an interpretation and a theoretical reconstruction of the political philosophy of Martin Delany, a mid-nineteenth-century radical abolitionist and one of the founders of the doctrine of black nationalism. It identifies two competing strands in Delanys social thought, “classical” nationalism and “pragmatic” nationalism, where each underwrites a different conception of the analytical and normative underpinnings of black political solidarity. It is argued that the pragmatic variant is the more cogent of the two and the one to which Delany is most committed. It is also suggested that pragmatic nationalism can still serve usefully as a theoretical schema through which African Americans can understand and carry out their current political projects.

RACISM, MORALISM, AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 1

Through a critical engagement with Lawrence Blum’s theory of racism, I defend a “social criticism” model for the philosophical study of racism. This model relies on empirical analyses of social and psychological phenomena but goes beyond this to include the assessment of the warrant of widely held beliefs and the normative evaluation of attitudes, actions, institutions, and social arrangements. I argue that we should give political philosophy theoretical primacy over moral philosophy in normative analyses of racism. I also show how conceptualizing racism as an ideology gives us a unified account of racism and helps us to see what is truly troubling about racism, both in the past and today.

Justice, Work, and the Ghetto Poor

Abstract In view of the explanatory significance of joblessness, some social scientists, policymakers, and commentators have advocated strong measures to ensure that the ghetto poor work, including mandating work as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. Indeed, across the ideological political spectrum, work is often seen as a moral or civic duty and as a necessary basis for personal dignity. And this normative stance is now instantiated in federal and state law, from the tax scheme to public benefits. This Article reflects critically on this new regime of work. I ask whether the normative principles to which its advocates typically appeal actually justify the regime. I conclude that the case for a pro tanto moral or civic duty to work is not as strong as many believe and that there are reasonable responses to joblessness that do not involve instituting a work regime. However, even if we grant that there is a duty to work, I maintain that the ghetto poor would not be wronging their fellow citizens were they to choose not to work and to rely on public funds for material support. In fact, I argue that many among the black urban poor have good reasons to refuse to work. Throughout, I emphasize what too few advocates of the new work regime do, namely, that whether work is an obligation depends crucially on whether background social conditions within the polity are just.

The Ethics of Uncle Tom's Children

1. Living with Injustice How should one live? This central philosophical question can be separated into at least two parts. The first concerns the conduct and attitudes morality requires of each of us. The second is about the essential elements of a worthwhile life; it’s about what it means to flourish, which includes meeting certain moral demands but is not exhausted by this. Answering this two-pronged question traditionally falls within the subdiscipline of ethics, broadly construed. Philosophers have also sought to explain what makes a society just or good, to specify the values and principles by which we are to evaluate institutional arrangements and political regimes. This is the traditional domain of political philosophy. This essay addresses a question that arises where ethics and political philosophy meet. Philosophers who attempt to answer the question of how should one live typically abstract away from the concrete sociopolitical circumstances within which individuals make their lives, circumstances that, as it turns out, may be shaped by serious injustices. This kind of idealization has its place. It is often productive to start with ideal theory, where we assume individuals are acting under reasonably just background conditions, using what we learn to better understand what choices we ought to make in our less than ideal, real lives. But there are vexing ethical questions that can be answered only if we theorize them against the background of societal injustice. The question within nonideal theory that I want to take up is how one should live under conditions of serious societal injustice. I am particularly concerned to understand how members of oppressed groups ought to live when the prospects for overcoming their oppression are uncertain or dim. As with ideal theory, answering the question of how the oppressed ought to live is not limited to specifying their moral obligations. It also entails explaining what a life well lived in the face of oppression would involve. Obviously, to fully flourish (on almost any account of what this

Justice & Racial Conciliation: Two Visions

As we attempt to measure racial progress in America today and chart a path toward further progress, we should look to the vision of Martin Luther King, Jr. Barack Obama has also offered an influential vision of race in America that is similar to and inspired by Kings. This essay compares Kings and Obamas respective visions for race relations in U.S. society. Both men profess a commitment to racial equality and integration as fundamental ideals; and both provide an astute analysis of the racial realities of his day. However, Shelbys comparison of their visions reveals moral deficiencies in Obamas political philosophy, particularly with regard to the proposed way forward and the worthy principles that would have to be compromised on by following his path. Liberal pragmatism in matters of race may yield some social benefits, but not without moral costs.