Tomoji Shogenji

Is coherence truth conducive

In recent papers Klein and Warfield (1994, 1996) argue that coherence per se is not truth conducive on the ground that the more coherent of two sets of beliefs is often more likely to contain a false belief. Merricks (1995) responds on behalf of the coherentist that we should not evaluate truth conduciveness on the level of sets, as Klein and Warfield do, but on the level of individual beliefs. A proper examination of these claims requires a clear understanding of what coherence per se amounts to. This paper proposes a precise definition of coherence, and uses it for untangling the epistemological knots of coherence and truth. My analysis reveals that (pace Klein and Warfield) coherence per se is truth conducive on the level of sets; but (pace Merricks and many coherentists) it is not truth conducive on the level of individual beliefs.

The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy

This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that any measure of epistemic justification is also a measure of incremental confirmation. However, the degree of epistemic justification must meet an additional condition, and all known measures of incremental confirmation fail to meet it. I describe this additional condition as well as a measure that meets it. The paper then applies the measure to the conjunction fallacy and proposes an explanation of the fallacy.

A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support

It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidence with respect to the hypothesis in question. This has the consequence that probabilistic support is transitive when the original evidence is testimonial, memorial or perceptual (i.e., to the effect that such and such was testified to, remembered, or perceived), and the intermediary proposition is its representational content (i.e., to the effect that the such and such occurred).

Self-Dependent Justification Without Circularity

This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of beliefs that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown ([1993]) argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justification are not truly circular but are instances of ordinary Bayesian confirmation, and hence they can raise the probability of the hypothesis as legitimately as any such confirmation does. I shall argue in particular that despite its dependence on perception we can use naturalized epistemology to confirm the reliability of a perceptual process without circularity.

Why does coherence appear truth-conducive?

This paper aims to reconcile (i) the intuitively plausible view that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable, and (ii) the negative results in Bayesian epistemology to the effect that there is no probabilistic measure of coherence such that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable. I consider a simple model in which the negative result appears in a stark form: the prior probability of the hypothesis and the individual vertical relations between each piece of evidence and the hypothesis completely determine the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the total evidence, leaving no room for the lateral relation (such as coherence) among the pieces of evidence to play any role. Despite this negative result, the model also reveals that a higher degree of coherence is indirectly associated with a higher conditional probability of the hypothesis because a higher degree of coherence indicates stronger individual supports. This analysis explains why coherence appears truth-conducive but in such a way that it defeats the idea of coherentism since the lateral relation (such as coherence) plays no independent role in the confirmation of the hypothesis.

Coherence of the contents and the transmission of probabilistic support

This paper examines how coherence of the contents of evidence affects the transmission of probabilistic support from the evidence to the hypothesis. It is argued that coherence of the contents in the sense of the ratio of the positive intersection reduces the transmission of probabilistic support, though this negative impact of coherence may be offset by other aspects of the relations among the contents. It is argued further that there is no broader conception of coherence whose impact on the transmission of probabilistic support is never offset by other aspects of the relations among the contents. The paper also examines reasons for the contrary impression that coherence of the contents increases the transmission of probabilistic support, especially in the special case where the hypothesis to evaluate is the conjunction of the contents of evidence.

Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts

This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.

Information and Inaccuracy

This article proposes a new interpretation of mutual information (MI). We examine three extant interpretations of MI by reduction in doubt, by reduction in uncertainty, and by divergence. We argue that the first two are inconsistent with the epistemic value of information (EVI) assumed in many applications of MI: the greater is the amount of information we acquire, the better is our epistemic position, other things being equal. The third interpretation is consistent with EVI, but it is faced with the problem of measure sensitivity and fails to justify the use of MI in giving definitive answers to questions of information. We propose a fourth interpretation of MI by reduction in expected inaccuracy, where inaccuracy is measured by a strictly proper monotonic scoring rule. It is shown that the answers to questions of information given by MI are definitive whenever this interpretation is appropriate, and that it is appropriate in a wide range of applications with epistemic implications. 1 Introduction 2 Formal Analyses of the Three Interpretations    2.1 Reduction in doubt   2.2 Reduction in uncertainty   2.3 Divergence 3 Inconsistency with Epistemic Value of Information 4 Problem of Measure Sensitivity 5 Reduction in Expected Inaccuracy 6 Resolution of the Problem of Measure Sensitivity    6.1 Alternative measures of inaccuracy   6.2 Resolution by strict propriety   6.3 Range of applications 7 Global Scoring Rules 8 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 Formal Analyses of the Three Interpretations    2.1 Reduction in doubt   2.2 Reduction in uncertainty   2.3 Divergence   2.1 Reduction in doubt   2.2 Reduction in uncertainty   2.3 Divergence 3 Inconsistency with Epistemic Value of Information 4 Problem of Measure Sensitivity 5 Reduction in Expected Inaccuracy 6 Resolution of the Problem of Measure Sensitivity    6.1 Alternative measures of inaccuracy   6.2 Resolution by strict propriety   6.3 Range of applications   6.1 Alternative measures of inaccuracy   6.2 Resolution by strict propriety   6.3 Range of applications 7 Global Scoring Rules 8 Conclusion

Reductio, Coherence, and the Myth of Epistemic Circularity

In the argument by reductio ad absurdum, we prove the conclusion by showing that its negation is inconsistent with the premises. I extend this argument pattern to probabilistic support, viz., if the negation of the hypothesis is incoherent with the body of evidence (in the sense of mutual reduction of the probabilities), then the body of evidence confirms (raises the probability of) the hypothesis. The following comparative form of the principle also holds: If the body of evidence is more coherent with the hypothesis than it is with the negation of the hypothesis, then the body of evidence confirms the hypothesis. The principle reveals that the charge of circularity that is still common in epistemology is misguided—for example, it is perfectly legitimate to confirm the reliability of memory by memorial evidence and the reliability of sense perception by sense perceptual evidence.

The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following

This paper addresses the issue of rule-following in the context of the problem of the criterion. It presents a line of reasoning which concludes we do not know what rule we follow, but which develops independently of the problem of extrapolation that plays a major role in many recent discussions of rule-following. The basis of the argument is the normativity of rules, but the problem is also distinct from the issue of the gap between facts and values in axiology. The paper further points out that the epistemic problem of not knowing what rule we follow leads to the outright denial of rule-following. Rule-following has been a subject of vigorous contention in recent philosophy, where the primary concern is the apparent implication that no facts determine what rule we follow. This paper places the issue of rulefollowing in the context of the problem of the criterion and describes how a simple but persistent difficulty emerges in it. The problem arises from the fallibility of the agent following a normative rule, but it differs from the traditional issues in axiology concerning the gap between facts and values. Our problem also differs from the problem of extrapolation. Difficulties associated with the extrapolation of limited past observation into the future play no part in the problem of the criterion in rule-following. Thus, we identify a problem that has not been addressed in the literature with sufficient clarity and distinction. The paper has six sections. The first section clarifies some key concepts. The next three sections present and elaborate an argument against the existence of rule-following-Section two describes an epistemological difficulty in establishing the criterion of conformity to the rule; Section three compares this problem with two familiar challenges in philosophy; and Section four explains how this epistemological difficulty leads to the denial of rule-following. The fifth section disputes some appealing proposals for solving the problem; and the final section examines a way of circumventing the issue by shifting focus from rule-following to rule-ascription.