Tony Prosser

Regulation and Social Solidarity

Justifications for regulation are commonly based on the identification of market failures. This is however inadequate to account for much regulation, and sees regulation as inherently second best to market allocations. This article argues that, although some regulation will be based on market failure, other justifications can be found in the protection of rights and in the maintenance of social solidarity. Theoretical support for this last rationale can be found in the work of Durkheim and Duguit and the concept of public service. To accept this rationale for regulation has important implications both for regulatory policies and regulatory instruments.

Towards a Critical Public Law

It is perhaps surprising that the growth of sociology of law as a major discipline in Britain over the last fifteen years or so has not produced any developed new approaches to the study of public law which can take the place of traditional legal approaches to the subject.[1] Public law is concerned with the heart of the problems of modern social structure; the relationship between the state and society, and it might appear that, given the difficulty of even conceiving of public law as a system autonomous from politics and power, the work of sociologists and political scientists would be ripe for incorporation and development within it. Yet despite several excellent studies of individual institutions there has been no explicit development beyond such studies into the realm of theory, and certainly no emergence of any new governing theory or set of theories to provide structure and coherence to the development of the subject. To a large extent this can of course be attributed to the absence of a tradition of the

Rail Franchises, Competition and Public Service

The use of franchises to deliver rail services has raised major problems. Franchises restrict competition in the market, whilst competitive bidding for franchises has met with difficulties, notably in relation to risk transfer and the recent use of short‐term contracts that have not been awarded competitively. Further, franchise agreements are detailed and highly stipulative and do not achieve the flexibility and opportunities for innovation originally intended. This reflects an underlying lack of trust resulting from the arrangements adopted on privatisation. By contrast, in Sweden regional services have been procured through contracts with limited risk transfer, and in Italy provision of services has been entrusted to a dominant operator with comparatively limited detailed service specifications; both seem to have been more successful. For the future in the UK, possibilities include greater use of competition, a return to public ownership, regionalisation, and the use of concessions with limited risk transfer to secure stability.

Limitations on Government Debt and Deficits in the United Kingdom

Control of taxation and of public expenditure is in principle a central function of the UK Parliament. However, the practical powers of Parliament are limited, especially in relation to borrowing and the planning of public expenditure. In the case of borrowing, there is some degree of scrutiny through the EU processes, and the creation of the Office for Budget Responsibility has greatly increased transparency. As regards expenditure, internal controls administered by the UK Treasury, in particular now through the process of the Spending Review, are in practice much more important than advance Parliamentary scrutiny.

Markets, Planning, and Socialism

It now seems accepted almost throughout the Left that socialist principles and the means to achieve them are in urgent need of fundamental rethinking; I hope that this contribution will be part of a much larger continuing debate. The breadth of debate needed is so vast (especially in view of recent political set-backs) that it is difficult to decide the most productive level at which to begin. Is the priority an abstract account of the possible economic organisation of some imagined future socialist society, or a detailed blueprint of the particular institutions to be introduced by a socialist government in Britain? In fact, there has already been much discussion of socialism at a very high level of abstraction, as well as detailed concrete proposals - for example, of the arrangements which would have been adopted by the British Labour Party had it been successful in the 1987 general election.1 What would seem more valuable, especially in view of the inability to secure for those plans adequate popular support, is to attack the middle ground between theory and detailed institutional implementation. Thus, the discussion in this article will concern that level where a broader socialist vision and its realisation in particular institutional forms intersect: what should be the principles of institutional design inspiring their practical construction? It is clear that it will be some time, at least in Britain, before concrete steps can be taken for the building of any kind of socialist economic arrangements; this at least provides an opportunity for an in-depth assessment of possible approaches to this task. A couple of matters must be quickly disposed of. The first is the meaning of socialism as used here. The argument to be made will explicitly reject any simple identification of socialism with nationalisation; nor will I accept as adequate vague incantations of social control of economic life or the replacement of markets with production for need. All these are elements in socialist thought, but have usually been employed as slogans which act as