Tracy Isaacs

Moral responsibility in collective contexts

Contents Introduction Part One: Collective Moral Responsibility 1 Intentional Collective Action 2 Collective Moral Responsibility 3 Collective Guilt Part Two: Individual Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts 4 Individual Responsibility for (and in) Collective Wrongs 5 Collective Obligation, Individual Obligation, and Individual Moral Responsibility 6 Individual Moral Responsibility in Wrongful Social Practice Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

Feminism and Agency

Given conditions of oppression presupposed by a feminist understanding of social structures, feminist agency is paradoxical. I am going to understand feminist agency as womens ability to be effective agents against their own oppression. The paradox of feminist agency arises because feminist assumptions about womens socialization seem to entail that womens agency is compromised by sexist oppression. In particular, womens agency appears to be diminished in ways that interfere with their capacity for feminist action, that is, action against sexist oppression. Feminist philosophers have taken issue with traditional conceptions of agency, claiming that these conceptions are overly individualistic and valorize an illusory and unattractive ideal of agents and agency. If the paradox arises because women do not attain traditional ideals

The most good we can do: comments on Peter Singer’s The Most Good You Can Do

Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ (1972) had a profound influence on the way I and so many other people in positions of privilege thought about giving and our relationship to people in the world who do not enjoy the same advantages. I have a clear memory of the day my first philosophy professor told me that one of his students changed the entire course of his life upon reading the paper, dedicating it from then forward to living to meet his necessities and giving the rest to those in need. And like so many of us, I have taught the paper countless times to my students. But as many philosophers know, when we read and teach the paper, Singer’s simple and compelling argument makes everyone uncomfortable. Who can take issue with the claim that ‘suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad’? (Singer 1972, 231) And how do you argue against the follow-up principle that ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it’? (Singer 1972, 231). People will always ask (as they should), but what do you mean by a sacrifice of ‘something of comparable moral importance’? And so begin the arguments about what sorts of sacrifices fit the bill. People undertake a closer inspection of the premises because, as it turns out, so much of what we would have to sacrifice is not of comparable moral importance alongside unnecessary suffering and death. If we accept the premises and endorse the argument, we may have to make some drastic changes in the way we live. A common rejoinder, heard in philosophy classrooms around the world, is ‘that’s too demanding.’ The Most Good You Can Do (2015) is an interesting contribution to the project started back in the seventies with that first very influential paper. One of the most admirable features of the recent book is that it shows philosophy, most specifically, effective altruism, in action. The journal Philosophy and Public Affairs, in which ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ first appeared, was launched in the early seventies with a specific mission in mind: to show how philosophy could apply to public affairs. The journal continues to publish exceptional philosophy papers, but most of its content is still so very theoretical. We do not see a lot of real world examples of moral philosophy in action in academic journals and books. The Most Good You Can Do takes a more direct approach. In its pages, Singer introduces readers to examples of people who are living their lives as effective altruists. According to Singer, Effective Altruism is ‘a philosophy and social movement which applies evidence and reason to working out the most effective ways to improve the world’ (Singer 2015,

Responsibility, Obligation, and Climate Change

The issue of how to think about responsibility with respect to enormous global problems that clearly require collective solutions has taken on a pressing significance in recent decades because of the increasingly dire scenarios climate change threatens to bring. My objective in this chapter is to use Peter French’s discussion of “inactive fictive groups” as a starting point for thinking about collective responsibility and obligation in the context of climate change. Of particular interest is French’s conclusion that for practical reasons we should focus on already existing entities. I argue that though we ought not ignore existing entities, it is not enough to rely on existing groups. A coordinated effort that harnesses the potential of “fictive groups” or “putative groups” and transforms them into real collective agents will have an impact collectively and individually because it will enable individual agents to insert themselves meaningfully into effective collective actions. This approach will allow individuals not just to feel good about themselves, but actually to make positive contributions that indeed will make a difference.