Trevor Lloyd

Explaining Euro-paralysis : why Europe is unable to act in international politics

Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction Beyond Euro-optimism and Skepticism Power Politics, Again Divergent Traditions and Conflicting Interests Paradigm Lost and the Conceptual Confusion The Crisis of Modern Democracy Weak Institutions The Choices to be Made Selected Bibliography Index

The European center-right at the end of the twentieth century

Introduction F. Wilson The British Conservatives J. Rasmussen The French Right in Search of Itself F. Wilson The Christian Democratic Center-Right in German Politics W. Chandler The Greek Right S. Kalyas The Reconstruction of the Italian Right D. Woods The VVD and CDA in the Netherlands G. Irwin The Center-Right in Norwegian Politics L. Svasand The Center-Right in Spain and Portugal M. Theresa Frain & H. Wiarda Swedens Nonsocialist Parties M. Hancock Conclusion: The Center-Right at the Turn of the Century F. Wilson Index

The Norwegian-Soviet Boundary

The Norwegian-Soviet boundary is of unusual interest for several reasons. Its long history involves the territories of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia and has been complicated by the migration of nomadic Lapps1 and by changing Norwegian sovereignty (in relation to Denmark and Sweden), Finnish sovereignty (in relation to Sweden and Russia) and by revolutionary changes in the government of Russia. The boundary was also closely concerned in events at the end of the first World War, in the so-called ”Winter War” between Finland and the Soviet Union (1939—10), in the Nazi occupation of Norway and Finland (1940—44), and the subsequent liberation of northeastern Norway and Finland by Soviet armies late in 1944. The region adjacent to the boundary is significant for other reasons: It contains valuable resources — especially iron ore and nickel; the Pasvik River has potential value for hydro-electric development, and for floating lumber northward toward a region where wood is scarce; there are relatively fertil...

Aviation in Arctic North America and Greenland

Writing as long ago as 1922, Dr Vilhjalmur Stefansson commented: “There are few nowadays who do not agree that the world is round, but there are almost equally few who apply the principle of the worlds roundness consistently when they think about going from place to place.” Twenty-three years later, he returned to the same question, with a statement that, far from sounding prophetic, was all too obvious. “If you shoot robot bombs (as Heaven preserve us from ever doing), they will cross the Arctic on their way from London to Seattle, from Peiping to New York, from San Francisco to. Moscow. That is the way the bombers will fly, if we ever permit them to.”

Review: European Union: The Promise of Alliance NATOThe Promise of Alliance NATO and the political imagination ThomasIan Q.R.Lanham MD: Maryland and Oxford, 1997xii, 305pp, US

Episodic international coverage Tan Thomas has written a survey of hemispheric events leaves outl of the rhetoric and public statesiders with a recognition of the ments about NATOs objectives of important dimensions of formal leading representatives of the Unitdemocracy. (How many of us can ed States, Britain, France, and forget the vivid images of violent (West) Germany. This certainly has despotism in places like Chile, its uses; while it is hard to tell what Nicaragua, and Guatemala?) Yet is the relationship between rhetoric today, in the wake of military dictaand a speakers real beliefs, rhetoric torships, fully fledged and robust shows what the speaker thinks that democracy depends on the informal other people believe. But the author qualities of civil society, popular perhaps lays too much stress on the participation, citizenship and social uplifting rather than the belligerent responsibility which are complex side of NATO rhetoric. He ends by and difficult to facilitate. Their being unhappy about the expansion enhancement, in turn, relies greatly of NATO going on at present, and on the effectiveness of the economy, sounds more surprised by it than is Unfortunately, Latin Americas hisreally justified. torically inequitable distribution of income has further deteriorated in THE EXPANDING EUROPEAN UNION the last decade, seriously challengPast, present, future ing if not undermining the trend Edited by John Redmond and toward democratization. Despite Glenda G. Rosenthal that, the editors conclude that the Boulder CO and London: Lynne growing regional and international Rienner, 1998, viii, 235, US

67.50 cloth, US

49.95 sensitivity to rights (and the need to create mechanisms to ensure their Almost all eligible states have now realization) give grounds for optiapplied to join the European Union, mism about the future. either because of its record of success, or because they see it as a way to EUROPEAN UNION escape difficulties in their own past Reviews by Trevor Lloyd history. This introduction to the problem gives a little of the history of THE PROMISE OF ALLIANCE the effect of previous enlargements NATO and the political imagination and a little of the analysis that will Ian Q.R.Thomas have to be undertaken before largeLanham MD: Maryland and Oxford, scale enlargement in eastern Europe 1997 xii, 305pp, US

24.95 paper

67.50 cloth, can became a reality; It will give readUS

Union and Division in Europe: At Any Moment Some People Are Losing Their Attachment to the Existing Nation-State They Are Supposed to Belong To

24.95paper ers an idea of what the questions are,

Diarist in Power

Boundaries change in Europe every forty years or so. The 1815 settlement after the Napoleonic Wars lasted until the unification of Italy and Germany between 1860 and 1870. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 transformed Europe but left so much unfinished business that a new settlement was carried out between 1938 and 1945. This more durable settlement lasted for forty years until the surprisingly peaceful changes between 1989 and 1995. Russia has shed all its conquests of recent centuries quickly and fairly amicably, Czechoslovakia has divided in two with very little trouble, and only the break-up of Yugoslavia reminds us of the brutal national changes of the past.By comparison, North and South America have been quiet and peaceful. The end of the Spanish Empire caused convulsions that had worked themselves out by 1850; since then few borders in the Americas have been changed. Panama was created, Canadians might say the shape of the Alaska panhandle was altered at the beginning of the century (the British and the Americans say that the Alaska-British Columbia border follows the line already laid down in the negotiated settlement of 1826), Bolivia has lost its access to the sea, and there have been a few changes in unsettled areas in the interior. But anyone who looks at a map of the Americas of 1850 can see how slight the changes have been. It is not in the least surprising to learn that there have been very few wars on American soil in the last 150 years. Canada and the United States have taken part in wars elsewhere that have affected them and the world profoundly, but this is unusual for states in the Americas.The present generation of Europeans has probably had enough changes for its political lifetime, and yet a new set of changes is likely to come, perhaps in twenty rather than forty years. The first and most easily visible change is simply that a great many European borders are becoming less important for military and economic purposes. The European Union (EU) offers a guarantee that there will be no more wars and that a number of other problems can be handed over to the bureaucrats of Brussels.This does not mean that the nation-state is out-of-date or, put in polysyllables, that globalization and mass communications are replacing nationalism. People who think nation-states were invented simply to fight wars more efficiently or to impose unified economic policies may be right to say they will be less important in these areas of activity, but this misses the point: nation-states were effective for military and economic purposes because their populations were united by national feeling. This did not mean that people developed national feelings in order to fight wars better. Nobody would say that countries in Latin America are non-nationalist, but fighting wars is not the way they express national feelings.While boundaries change or even fade, people are more ready than ever to see nationalism as the only real source of political feeling. Earlier in the century loyalty to imperial rulers and commitment to Marxism stood as political principles that could rival nationalism. In more recent decades nationalism has replaced loyalty to imperial rulers, and the great continental and transoceanic empires have dissolved. Nationalism has also replaced Marxism, and the Soviet Union has broken up. At any moment some people are losing their attachment to the existing nation-state they are supposed to belong to, but then at any moment some people are falling out of love and this does not show that love does not exist as an emotion. Lifelong emotional attachments are perhaps found less often than in the past; lifelong national attachment is more common than lifelong emotional attachment, but it could hardly be expected to be universal.One new expression of nationalism in Europe is simply the development of a national feeling for Europe. A few people feel about Europe in the way that people usually feel about their native country, and refer to the heritage of Charlemagne, Dante, Voltaire, and Goethe in the way that nationalists of the old-established variety might refer to Napoleon, Victor Hugo, and Pasteur or Wellington? …

The Polar Regions in their Relation to Human Affairs, by Laurence M. Gould

Richard Grossman had already been keeping a diary for about a dozen years when he became a member of the cabinet that Harold Wilson formed in 1964. He hoped to use it as the basis of a book about the theory and practice of British politics written from the unique standpoint of one who had taught political science and had then been a practising politician. His death before he did so may have been a personal tragedy rather than a loss to political science there is always Wilsons The Governance of Britain to show that a book by an ex-academic who has become a very adept politician may not contain many profound insights. As the diaries stand they will be of immense value to historians but on the theoretical side they simply accept and give ample evidence for accepting the view put forward by John Mackintosh in The British Cabinet. In the realm of practice, Crossmans concern about setting up an inner cabinet may have pointed the way to a step back from prime ministerial government, but in what he writes he accepts the fact that Wilson ruled in the manner established by previous holders of the first place. Diaries of a Cabinet Minister gives an excellent account of the way a normal though not a very successful cabinet operated and, far more novel, tells us what a minister does when running his