Trevor M. Ellis

Investigation of outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in waterfowl and wild birds in Hong Kong in late 2002

Outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza have occurred in Hong Kong in chickens and other gallinaceous poultry in 1997, 2001, twice in 2002 and 2003. High mortality rates were seen in gallinaceous birds but not in domestic or wild waterfowl or other wild birds until late 2002 when highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza occurred in waterfowl (geese, ducks and swans), captive Greater Flamingo (Phoenicopterus ruber) and other wild birds (Little Egret Egretta garzetta) at two waterfowl parks and from two dead wild Grey Heron (Ardea cinerea) and a Black-headed Gull (Larus ridibundus) in Hong Kong. H5N1 avian influenza virus was also isolated from a dead feral pigeon (Columba livia) and a dead tree sparrow (Passer montanus) during the second outbreak. The first waterfowl outbreak was controlled by immediate strict quarantine and depopulation 1 week before the second outbreak commenced. Control measures implemented for the second outbreak included strict isolation, culling, increased sanitation and vaccination. Outbreaks in gallinaceous birds occurred in some live poultry markets concurrently with the second waterfowl outbreak, and infection on a chicken farm was detected 1 week after the second waterfowl park outbreak was detected, on the same day the second grey heron case was detected. Subsequent virus surveillance showed the outbreaks had been contained.

Emergence of multiple genotypes of H5N1 avian influenza viruses in Hong Kong SAR

Although A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1/97)-like viruses associated with the “bird flu” incident in Hong Kong SAR have not been detected since the slaughter of poultry in 1997, its putative precursors continue to persist in the region. One of these, Goose/Guangdong/1/96 (H5N1 Gs/Gd)-like viruses, reassorted with other avian viruses to generate multiple genotypes of H5N1 viruses that crossed to chickens and other terrestrial poultry from its reservoir in geese. Whereas none of these recent reassortants had acquired the gene constellation of H5N1/97, these events provide insight into how such a virus may have been generated. The recent H5N1 reassortants readily infect and kill chicken and quail after experimental infection, and some were associated with significant mortality of chickens within the poultry retail markets in Hong Kong. Some genotypes are lethal for mice after intra-nasal inoculation and spread to the brain. On this occasion, the early detection of H5N1 viruses in the retail, live poultry markets led to preemptive intervention before the occurrence of human disease, but these newly emerging, highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses provide cause for pandemic concern.

H9N2 Influenza Viruses Possessing H5N1-Like Internal Genomes Continue To Circulate in Poultry in Southeastern China

ABSTRACT The transmission of H9N2 influenza viruses to humans and the realization that the A/Hong Kong/156/97-like (H5N1) (abbreviated HK/156/97) genome complex may be present in H9N2 viruses in southeastern China necessitated a study of the distribution and characterization of H9N2 viruses in poultry in the Hong Kong SAR in 1999. Serological studies indicated that H9N2 influenza viruses had infected a high proportion of chickens and other land-based birds (pigeon, pheasant, quail, guinea fowl, and chukka) from southeastern China. Two lineages of H9N2 influenza viruses present in the live-poultry markets were represented by A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (Qa/HK/G1/97)-like and A/Duck/Hong Kong/Y280/97 (Dk/HK/Y280/97)-like viruses. Up to 16% of cages of quail in the poultry markets contained Qa/HK/G1/97-like viruses, while about 5% of cages of other land-based birds were infected with Dk/HK/Y280/97-like viruses. No reassortant between the two H9N2 virus lineages was detected despite their cocirculation in the poultry markets. Reassortant viruses represented by A/Chicken/Hong Kong/G9/97 (H9N2) were the major H9N2 influenza viruses circulating in the Hong Kong markets in 1997 but have not been detected since the chicken slaughter in 1997. The Qa/HK/G1/97-like viruses were frequently isolated from quail, while Dk/HK/Y280/97-like viruses were predominately associated with chickens. The Qa/HK/G1/97-like viruses were evolving relatively rapidly, especially in their PB2, HA, NP, and NA genes, suggesting that they are in the process of adapting to a new host. Experimental studies showed that both H9N2 lineages were primarily spread by the aerosol route and that neither quail nor chickens showed evidence of disease. The high prevalence of quail infected with Qa/HK/G1/97-like virus that contains six gene segments genetically highly related to HK/156/97 (H5N1) virus emphasizes the need for surveillance of mammals including humans.

Identification of a Novel Coronavirus in Bats

ABSTRACT Exotic wildlife can act as reservoirs of diseases that are endemic in the area or can be the source of new emerging diseases through interspecies transmission. The recent emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) highlights the importance of virus surveillance in wild animals. Here, we report the identification of a novel bat coronavirus through surveillance of coronaviruses in wildlife. Analyses of the RNA sequence from the ORF1b and S-gene regions indicated that the virus is a group 1 coronavirus. The virus was detected in fecal and respiratory samples from three bat species (Miniopterus spp.). In particular, 63% (12 of 19) of fecal samples from Miniopterus pusillus were positive for the virus. These findings suggest that this virus might be commonly circulating in M. pusillus in Hong Kong.

Characterization of H5N1 Influenza Viruses That Continue To Circulate in Geese in Southeastern China

ABSTRACT The H5N1 influenza virus, which killed humans and poultry in 1997, was a reassortant that possibly arose in one type of domestic poultry present in the live-poultry markets of Hong Kong. Given that all the precursors of H5N1/97 are still circulating in poultry in southern China, the reassortment event that generated H5N1 could be repeated. Because A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-like (H5N1; Go/Gd) viruses are the proposed donors of the hemagglutinin gene of the H5N1 virus, we investigated the continued circulation, host range, and transmissibility of Go/Gd-like viruses in poultry. The Go/Gd-like viruses caused weight loss and death in some mice inoculated with high virus doses. Transmission of Go/Gd-like H5N1 viruses to geese by contact with infected geese resulted in infection of all birds but limited signs of overt disease. In contrast, oral inoculation with high doses of Go/Gd-like viruses resulted in the deaths of up to 50% of infected geese. Transmission from infected geese to chickens occurred only by fecal contact, whereas transmission to quail occurred by either aerosol or fecal spread. This difference is probably explained by the higher susceptibility of quail to Go/Gd-like virus. The high degree of susceptibility of quail to Go/Gd (H5N1)-like viruses and the continued circulation of H6N1 and H9N2 viruses in quail support the hypothesis that quail were the host of origin of the H5N1/97 virus. The ease of transmission of Go/Gd (H5N1)-like viruses to land-based birds, especially quail, supports the wisdom of separating aquatic and land-based poultry in the markets in Hong Kong and the need for continued surveillance in the field and live-bird markets in which different types of poultry are in contact with one another.

Avian Influenza in Hong Kong 1997–2002

Abstract In 1997, a high-pathogenicity H5N1 avian influenza virus caused serious disease in both man and poultry in Hong Kong, China. Eighteen human cases of disease were recorded, six of which were fatal. This unique virus was eliminated through total depopulation of all poultry markets and chicken farms in December 1997. Other outbreaks of high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) caused by H5N1 viruses occurred in poultry in 2001 and 2002. These H5N1 viruses isolated had different internal gene constellations to those isolated in 1997. No new cases of infection or disease in man due to these or other H5N1 viruses have been reported. This paper provides an overview and chronology of the events in Hong Kong relating to avian influenza, covering the period from March 1997 to March 2002.

Vaccination of chickens against H5N1 avian influenza in the face of an outbreak interrupts virus transmission

Vaccination of chickens with a commercially available killed H5N2 vaccine was being evaluated as an additional tool to enhanced biosecurity measures and intensive surveillance for control of highly pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 disease in Hong Kong in 2002. In December 2002 to January 2003, there were outbreaks of H5N1 disease in waterfowl in two recreational parks, wild water birds, several poultry markets and five chicken farms. In addition to quarantine, depopulation of the affected sheds and increased biosecurity, vaccination of the unaffected sheds and surrounding unvaccinated farms was undertaken on three farms. In at least two farms, infection spread to the recently vaccinated sheds with low rates of H5N1 mortality in sheds when the chickens were between 9 and 18 days post-vaccination. However, after 18 days post-vaccination no more deaths from H5N1 avian influenza occurred and intensive monitoring by virus culture on these farms showed no evidence of asymptomatic shedding of the virus. This provides evidence that H5 vaccine can interrupt virus transmission in a field setting.

Sequence data suggests big liver and spleen disease virus (BLSV) is genetically related to hepatitis E virus

A monoclonal antibody (mAb) that reacted specifically with a 16 kDa big liver and spleen disease virus (BLSV) protein was used to identify the protein in western immunoblots of infected liver extracts and enable partial amino acid sequence analysis of the protein. Based on this sequence, a degenerate primer was designed that was used in conjunction with random hexamers in a reverse transcriptase-POR (RT PCR), to amplify a 523 bp product from RNA extracted from homogenates of BLSV-infected livers. There was 62% nucleotide sequence identity between this sequence and the sequence of the helicase gene of human hepatitis E virus (HEV). POR primers designed from this 523 bp fragment were able to amplify a 490 bp product from livers of virus-infected chickens but not chickens from virus-free flocks.

Preparation of a standardized, efficacious agricultural H5N3 vaccine by reverse genetics.

Options for the control of emerging and reemerging H5N1 influenza viruses include improvements in biosecurity and the use of inactivated vaccines. Commercially available H5N2 influenza vaccine prevents disease signs and reduces virus load but does not completely prevent virus shedding after challenge with H5N1 virus. By using reverse genetics, we prepared an H5N3 vaccine whose hemagglutinin is 99.6% homologous to that of A/CK/HK/86.3/02 (H5N1). We used the internal genes of A/PR/8/34 and the H5 of A/Goose/HK/437.4/99 (H5N1) after deletion of basic amino acids from its connecting peptide region. The resulting virus was not lethal to chicken embryos and grew to high HA titers in eggs, allowing preparation of HA protein-standardized vaccine in unconcentrated allantoic fluid. The N3 neuraminidase, derived from A/Duck/Germany/1215/73 (H2N3), permitted discrimination between vaccinated and naturally infected birds. The virus construct failed to replicate in quail and chickens. Similar to parental A/PR/8/34 (H1N1), it replicated in mice and ferrets and spread to the brains of mice; therefore, it should not be used as a live-attenuated vaccine. The H5N3 vaccine, at doses of 1.2 microg HA, induced HI antibodies in chickens and prevented death, signs of disease, and markedly reduced virus shedding after challenge with A/CK/HK/86.3/02 (H5N1) but did not provide sterilizing immunity. Thus, reverse genetics allows the inexpensive preparation of standardized, efficacious H5N3 poultry vaccines that may also reduce the reemergence of H5N1 genotypes.

Characterization of avian influenza viruses A (H5N1) from wild birds, Hong Kong, 2004-2008

Repeated detection of subclade 2.3.2 viruses in nonpasserine birds from different regions suggests possible establishment of this lineage in wild bird species.